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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 Reputation has been studied as it is linked to interpersonal trust (e.g. Lewicki & 
Bunker, 1995), firm status (e.g. Fombrun & Shanley, 1990), and interpersonal behavioral 
expectations (e.g. Tinsley, O’Conner, & Sullivan, 2002).  As it is related to trust, 
reputation has received a great deal of attention among economists (Ostrom, 2002) and 
evolutionary biologists (Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981).  Reputation is often considered a 
tool for the facilitation of calculated trust (Williamson, 1993), meaning that reputation is 
a kind of odds indicator as to the cooperative intentions of some party.  Trust as such is 
not a psychological state, but is rationally calculated as a simple function of risk—the 
risk of trust not being reciprocated.   
Economic models of reputation and trust which assume self-regarding 
preferences, such as that proposed by Williamson (1993), ultimately predict no 
cooperation among players in resource games (Ostrom, 2002).  However, 
experimentalists have shown that players in these resource games consistently show at 
least some degree of cooperation in single-round games or the first rounds of multi-round 
games (e.g. Issac, McCue, & Plott, 1985; Orbell and Dawes, 1991, 1993).  Davis and 
Holt (1993) report, “In a wide variety of treatment conditions, participants…persistently 
contributed 40 to 60 percent of their…endowments to the [public good], far in excess of 
the zero percent contribution rate consistent with a Nash equilibrium” (p. 325).  One 
explanation for the inconsistency of these data with rational economic theory is offered 
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by Gouldner’s (1960) work.  Gouldner described a “norm of reciprocity,” the expectation 
that generous behavior will be reciprocated.  In fact, researchers have shown that people 
often reciprocate trusting acts (Berg, Dikhaut, & McCabe, 1995; Gouldner, 1960) and 
acts of generosity (Cialdini, 2001), even when unwanted.  So while people trust as a way 
of reciprocating trust, they also trust with the expectation that their trusting behavior will 
be reciprocated (Malhotra, 2004), and their level of trust varies based on attributions they 
make of others (Diekmann, Tenbrunsel, & Galinsky, 2003; Malhotra & Murnighan, 
2002; Tinsley et al. 2002).  Research has explored the effects on trust of risk (Bert et al., 
1995; Pillutla, Malhotra, & Murnighan, 2003; Malhotra, 2004), emotion (Dunn & 
Schweitzer, 2005; Jones & George, 1998), and past personal experience with a trusted 
party (e.g. Camerer, 2003).  However, there is a gap in the trust literature in what we 
understand about how individual representations and reputation-triggered assumptions 
about others affect their propensity to trust them.  For instance, Granovetter (1985) gives 
us reason to believe that trusting parities will interpret information from different sources 
differently, and proposes a hierarchy of information source trustworthiness.  It would 
seem, then, that the value of reputational information depends, at least in part, on the 
source and quality of the information by which the mental model of a reputation is 
constructed.  In part, I intend this dissertation to address this gap in the literature, by first 
making a theoretical distinction between reputations formed of third-party information, or 
hearsay reputation, and reputations formed of personal experience, or experiential 
reputation, then testing the varied effects of these two reputation constructs on trusting 
behavior.   
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In this dissertation I also address the psychological process by which reputation is 
processed.  I propose and test hypotheses to the effect that reputation is not processed 
only through cognition, but that reputation invokes an affective response from potential 
trusting parties, and that affective response in turn influences one’s propensity to engage 
in trusting behavior. 
This dissertation also addresses a gap in the negotiation literature.  There is a 
great deal of research describing how various psychological biases and other sorts of 
deviations from rational behavior influence negotiator performance and negotiation 
outcomes (Neale & Bazerman, 1991; Bazerman, Curhan, & Moore, 2000a).  However, 
there is a general lack of attention on the role social information plays in informing 
negotiator behavior (Bazerman, Curhan, & Moore, 2000b).  Bazerman and colleagues 
suggest this may be because of the tendency of negotiation scholars to study negotiation 
as isolated incidents, absent the complicated social web of information that is present in 
most real-world negotiations.  One way of conceptualizing the social information 
available to negotiators is through reputation.  Negotiators may not have had prior 
personal experience with their opponent, but in many cases they will know something 
about them.  
Tinsley et al. (2002) define reputation as “socially constructed labels that extend 
the consequences of a party’s actions across time, situations, and other actions.”  Through 
the three studies presented here, I develop a better understanding of how these “socially 
constructed labels” affect individuals’ cognition, emotional state, and, ultimately, their 
trusting behavior in interpersonal relationships.    
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I begin this dissertation by first reviewing previous research on both reputation 
and trust and borrow a model of knowledge-based trust in which reputation, as a kind of 
knowledge, fits.  These reviews comprise Chapters 2 and 3.  In Chapter 4, I develop a set 
of hypotheses on the effects of hearsay reputation, risk, affect, experiential personal 
experience, and firm marketplace tenure on trust.  Three studies comprising a total of five  
experiments tested these hypotheses in a variety of contexts.  The first study is reported in 
Chapter 5.  This experiment employs a trust game (Berg et al., 1995; Kreps, 1990; 
Snijders & Keren, 1999), in which the trusting behavior and emotional state of 
participants towards a supposed counterpart is observed in given various hearsay and 
experiential reputation conditions of the counterpart.  In Chapter 6, I build on the 
hypotheses outlined in Chapter 4 by presenting a model of reputation for online retailing 
which includes several propositions explaining firm and consumer behavior in online 
marketplaces and hypotheses regarding the effect of firm maturity on buyer trust.  
Chapter 7 reports the results of a study comprising two experiments set in a hypothetical 
online marketplace where participants are given hearsay reputational information 
originating from past consumers, and in the second experiment, experiential reputation, 
and asked to make a trust decision.  Firm age is an additional variable of consideration in 
this chapter.  Chapter 8 reports a final study, comprising two additional experiments, set 
in an eBay-type online auction environment, where again participants are asked to a make 
a trust decision given hearsay and experiential reputational information and data on the 
relative experience of the seller.  A general discussion of results follows in Chapter 9.  
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CHAPTER II 
 
REPUTATION 
 
Until you’ve lost your reputation, you never realized what a burden it was. 
--Margaret Mitchell 
 
As have others (Tinsley et al., 2002), I root my theoretical discussion of 
reputation in the fertile cognitive soil of schema theory (Fiske & Taylor, 1991; Hastie, 
1981; Markus & Zajonc, 1985).  Schema theory postulates that concepts, ideas, and 
images are stored in memory as general types, and linked with related concepts, ideas, 
and images.  These stored types, once primed, allow individuals to organize available 
information (Tinsley et al., 2002) and make reliably accurate assumptions about unknown 
characteristics of the concepts, ideas, and images the schemata represent (Bruder, 1973).  
Individual reputations are evoked, rather like stereotypes (Hamilton & Sherman, 1994), 
by socially transmitted information or reputational cues.  Reputational schemata are 
cognitively useful not only for “filling in the blanks,” as it were, with reliable assumed 
content in order to make meaning of behaviors and images (Vallacher & Wegner, 1989), 
but also for predicting future behavior (Fiske & Taylor, 1991; Markus & Zajonc, 1985).  
Tinsley et al. defined reputation as “socially constructed labels that extend the 
consequences of a party’s actions across time, situations, and other actions” (p. 622).    
In this chapter, I first discuss the development of contemporary schema theory, 
upon which I build a conceptualization of reputations as schemata.  Next, I review three 
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different literatures dealing with reputation—research from evolutionary biology and 
economics on the functionality of reputations, research from strategy and organizational 
theory concerned with industry-level reputation, and research grounded in social 
psychology on types, expectations, and first impressions.  Finally, drawing from the 
literature reviews, I draw a theoretical distinction between two kinds of reputations—
those developed through social information excluding personal experience, which I call 
hearsay reputation, and those developed through the social information that is personal 
experience, which I call experiential reputation—and provide operational definitions for 
both which will be used to understand the term “reputation” throughout the balance of 
this dissertation. 
 
What is a Schema? 
Schemata have been described as hypothetical mental structures that focus 
cognitive attention and organize memory for the subsequent recall of events, things, and 
behavior (Bartlett, 1932).  The term schema originates with Kant (1781, 1998), who used 
it in his elaboration of the Greek philosophy of the ideal type.  Plato explains that an ideal 
type is the perfect representation or form of an object which can be conceived but not 
materialized.  A circle, for example, can be described perfectly through mathematical 
rules, but no perfect circle can be created nor observed.  Kant’s description of the schema 
downplays the dogma of Greek idealism, but borrows the idea to explain how ideas are 
captured in memory and how people can make sense of a text which lacks full descriptive 
power.  Kant offers a dog as an example—we hold in our minds a general conception of a 
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dog as a class of four-legged animal without regard to specifics which might describe a 
particular sub-class, or breed, or a specific, particular dog. 
Schemas, and related ideas which are sometimes used to describe the same thing, 
such as frames, scenes, scenarios, scripts, and models, have been useful in linguistic 
study, anthropology (D’Andrade, 1995), psychology (Fiske & Taylor, 1991), and in 
artificial intelligence (Schank & Abelson, 1977).  Research in artificial intelligence has 
been one of the most important drivers of contemporary schema research.  That is 
because schemas can be used to organize information about things, actions, concepts, 
and—as is the case in this dissertation—people.  Computer scientists designing 
computers to interpret human text quickly learned that so much of the meaning in text is 
implied.  In fact, even most newspaper articles require that the reader understand a great 
deal about a great number of things in order to digest their content (D’Andrade, 1995).  
Consider this example text from D’Andrade: 
John wanted to do well on the exam, but his pen ran out of ink and his pencil 
broke.  He tried to find a pencil sharpener, but there wasn't one in the room.  
Finally he borrowed a pen from another student.  By then he was so far behind he 
had to rush, and the teacher took off points for poor penmanship.  
  
Without the reader having knowledge of the writing schema, he or she would be unable 
to understand because it is not explicitly stated that John would need ink (or usable 
pencil) to complete the test.  However, as most if not all readers would be able to make 
this connection, because they have a version of the writing schema embedded in their 
memory, the text can stand alone. 
 Schemas are inseparable from the texts from which they are derived, texts which 
are laden with contextual and cultural knowledge.  For example, Fillmore (1975) explains 
how the writing schema in English is similar to that of the Japanese schema represented 
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by the word kaku.  In fact, in translations the two words are often treated as synonyms, 
even though an important distinction exists.  The schemas related to each word invoke an 
image of the use of a sharp instrument which is dragged across a markable object.  The 
image contains a writer, a writing implement, a surface on which to leave a mark, and a 
product.  Both schemas are general enough so as to not specify particular or specific 
characteristics of the writer, the implement, or the surface.  One could be writing in the 
sand with one’s finger or in the sky with an airplane.  However, in the schema triggered 
by the English verb to write, it is implied that that which is written would be a readable 
text (letters, numbers, linguistic symbols), whereas the schema triggered by the Japanese 
verb kaku is broad enough to include drawing or doodling, actions which not make sense 
if described as “writing.” 
 A schema can be conceptualized as a set of interrelated placeholders organized 
around a theme (D’Andrade, 1995; see Figure 2.1 for a rather detailed visual 
representation of an egg schema).  How placeholders are related varies by context.  For 
example, if I were to say, “John was writing with a pen,” the reader might easily assume 
that John was writing with a pen on paper.  There is nothing in the text of the statement 
“John was writing with a pen” that explicitly states the relationship of John and his pen to 
paper, but because the relationship is implied because pen and paper are likely linked in 
an individual’s writing schema.  In this example, lacking a specific placeholder for the 
surface on which John was writing, the reader assumes a default placeholder.  A schema 
with only default placeholders is called a prototype (D’Andrade, 1995).   
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Figure 2.1.  A Visual Representation of a Schema for Egg 
 
Source: Davis (1991, p. 21).  
 
Reputations as Schemata 
Information about other people or organizations can be cognitively organized into 
reputational schemas (Tinsley et al., 2002).  The information by which reputational 
schemas are constructed is descriptive, but descriptive in that it is information that is 
relevant to the reputation consumer in making an evaluative judgment—a prediction—
regarding the reputation owner’s future behavior.  Reputational information is acquired 
through social channels which connect individuals.  Information about other parties is 
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rarely comprehensive, but the bits and pieces that are available provide “clues,” which 
trigger schemas (Fisk & Taylor, 1991), allowing individuals to fill in the blanks, as it 
were, and create a mental image describing the type of person or organization with which 
one is interacting (Brunder, 1973).  These schemas provide a frame within behavior is 
interpreted and allow individuals to make predictions, based on a set of expectations, 
regarding an entity’s future behavior (Fiske & Taylor, 1991; Ross & Nisbett, 1991). 
Reputational information is only useful insofar as individuals retain schemas of 
particular types and that the information acquired is consistent with one of those types.  
These types may be very general, such as that used to organize the information implied 
by an athlete schema, specific enough to imply a football player schema, or more specific 
still, perhaps implying a linebacker schema.  The sophistication of these types is 
dependent upon on the experience and intellectual finesse of the schema holder.  A sports 
journalist who writes about football will likely retain much more nuanced schemas to 
characterize player types and be much more proficient in predicting types from limited 
information than will an individual with only passing knowledge of the sport.  
Reputation schemata are related theoretically to self-schemata (Markus, 1977) or 
identity schemata (Kleine, Kleine & Kernan, 1993), the difference being that the prior 
two constructs describe a person’s mental model of themselves, whereas a reputational 
schema resides in the memory of the subject and describes an object, the subject and the 
object—who or what the reputation describes—being different, distinct entities (see 
Figure 2.2).  Because reputational schemas have been little described in the literature, but 
identity schemas have been well researched, it is worth reviewing and defining identity so 
as to better pinpoint what is meant by reputation. 
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Figure 2.2.  Reputation in its Conceptual Context  
 
John Locke conceptualized the self as having distinctive characteristics which 
endured over time.  Definitions of identity are generally grounded in the Lockean view of 
the self as a distinct psychological being (as opposed to a purely biological being, as 
Aristotle contended; Monroe, Hankin & Van Vechten, 2000), whose psychology, or 
personality, is constructed through environmental influences, such as the impact of 
critical others, including parents (Erikson, 1980 [1959]).  In this way, personalities are 
said to “develop.”  Through this development, characteristics of one’s self—the 
personality—are not invisible from one’s consciousness.  A person is capable of having 
an awareness of him or herself, is “a thinking intelligent being, that has reason and 
reflection, and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing, in different times and 
places,” (Perry, 1975, p. 12) and out of this awareness emerges identity.   
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Mead described the self as dual-faceted, differentiating between the “I” (self as 
subject) and the “me” (self as object).  What Mead is describing as the “I” identity is a 
schema which resides in the self and describes the self.  It is how one defines one’s self to 
him or herself.  The “me” identity is mediated by one’s perception of others.  It is the 
self’s perception of how others’ perceive the self; how a person believes he or she is seen 
through the eyes of another.  Mead’s second identity has also been described as a social 
image (Leary, 1995).   
Just as there are self-schemas which help people to organize information about 
themselves, there are other-schemas which help people to organize information about 
others (Fiske & Taylor, 1991).  For example, others may be categorized by race, age, 
gender, or sexual orientation.  This type of other-schema, a cognitive organization of 
others according to group membership—membership which links characteristics of group 
members to certain attitudes or behaviors—is called a stereotype (Fiske & Neuberg, 
1990).  Reputation is also a kind of other-schema (Tinsley et al., 2002).  Reputation is a 
broader conceptualization of other-schemas than stereotype in that reputations are formed 
from more information than merely group membership.  However, like stereotype 
schemas, reputation schemas are triggered by incomplete perceptual information; once 
triggered, a reputation schema completes the perceptual picture with additional 
information linked in memory to what has been observed.     
Reputational information can also be the collective knowledge of a community 
about a particular entity in or outside that community.  Reputations can be held and 
transmitted through formal, intuitional mechanisms or may travel through informal social 
networks.  For example, a college graduate considering employment with a number of 
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firms may have a variety of options for learning more about these firms—for learning 
their reputations.  She might begin with asking friends what they know about particular 
companies.  She might discuss the companies with the career professionals at her 
institution’s career center.  She might read about the companies in the newspaper or a 
trade journal.  This process will lead to her developing a mental representation of what 
the firm is, what values it stands for, what sorts of behaviors it’s known for, what kind of 
students it hires, and so on.  Some of the information will come through informal social 
networks, one way in which reputational information travels.  Other information comes 
from more formalized sources, such as a college’s career center, which might produce 
relevant, objective about the firm, like starting salaries, alumni currently employed by the 
firm, turnover, etc.  Reputational data is retained and transferred via the press.  Consider 
the countless articles in the popular business press listing and ranking employers in a 
variety of “-ests”, such as the best places to work, the fastest growing companies, the 
most “parent friendly,” and countless other labels.  Reputational information can come 
from a variety of sources, and as such represents a reflection of a community’s collective 
opinion.  
 The Tinsley et al. (2002) definition of reputation as “labels that extend the 
consequences of a party’s actions across time, situations, and other actions” (p. 622) 
implies that reputation is also a cognitive device used for predicting a party’s future 
behavior.  In fact, reputations would likely not be of interest to decision-makers were it 
not thought that knowledge about a person’s or organization’s past behavior was a 
reasonable predictor of future behavior.  Thus, reputation consumers craft meaning from 
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what is known of a party’s past behavior and use it to make predictions of that party’s 
future behavior. 
In the next section, I review the literature on reputation, which I have grouped 
into three general categories.  First, I review a body of literature concerned with linkages 
between reputation and cooperation and/or trust from an evolutionary perspective; next, 
reputation as it is constructed by those who study perceptions of the firm; and finally, 
reputation in interpersonal relationships.  In Chapter 3, I review the trust literature.  Trust 
and reputation are often treated as related constructs in some literatures, but they are just 
as often not.  I have chosen to review the reputation and trust literatures separately 
because they are in fact different literatures, but I have reviewed both with an eye 
towards my thesis: that reputation informs trust and trusting behavior. 
 
Evolutionary Theories of Reputation 
Scholars of evolutionary biology have long puzzled over the problem of altruistic 
behavior.  Theories of direct reciprocity (e.g. Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981; Axelrod, 1984; 
Trivers, 1971) advance the rather straightforward argument that generous acts are 
reciprocated and therefore a rational incentive exists to perform them.  Theories of 
indirect reciprocity (e.g. Alexander, 1987; Leimar & Hammerstein, 2001; Lotem, 
Fishman, & Stone, 1999; Nowak & Sigmund, 1998a; Nowak & Sigmund, 1998b) offer 
similar explanations of generosity, but with increased complexity—player A’s generosity 
to player B is reciprocated by player B to player C and on again until, in theory, player A 
is the beneficiary of a generous act.  Researchers have developed “games” that can be 
used to test models of direct and indirect reciprocity in laboratory settings.  Empirical 
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observations of indirect reciprocity are explained with the suggestion that reputations 
develop organically among members of a community and that generosity benefits the 
generous not in direct, immediate rewards, but in reputational status.  Generous players in 
indirect reciprocity games develop a ‘good’ reputation that other players notice and 
reward in later rounds.   
A recent stream of research has experimentally explored how reputations develop 
in communities.  Milinski, Semmann, and Krambeck (2002) showed that individuals in 
public goods games (games intended to model a commons dilemma, a la Hardin, 1968, 
where participants secretly choose the quantity of private resources to contribute to the 
public sphere, the quantity of which is distributed equally amongst participants after 
being multiplied by a factor) cooperated more when participants knew they would be 
playing an indirect reciprocity game afterwards with someone in the same community.  A 
tally of cooperative and uncooperative moves was kept on each player during the course 
of the public goods game.  The tally scorecard was made available to the rest of the 
players in the community before each player was paired with another in the community to 
play a kind of trust game (an extended dictator game, where a dictator divides a sum of 
resources between himself and a partner, the portion given the partner is multiplied and 
the partner then may choose to return a portion of her dole to the dictator).  Results 
showed that players seemed to be more conscious of their behavior when they knew that 
over the course of play a reputation for their cooperativeness was evolving, and that 
decisions that would affect their future utility might be made using that information. 
Barclay (2004), in a similar study, tested whether participants would be more 
generous in a public goods game if the tally of their donations were made available to 
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other participants and that participants knew they would play a dyadic trust game with 
another member of the group afterwards.  A trust game (Berg et al., 1995; Kreps, 1990; 
Snijders & Keren, 1999), sometimes called an investment game, is played by player A 
first receiving a sum from the experimenter.  Player A can choose to keep the money or 
invest a portion in player B, wherein it is multiplied by some factor (usually two or 
three).  Player B may choose to keep the entire increased amount or reciprocate Player 
A’s trust by returning a portion to Player A.  Results indicated that participants 
contributed more when they knew they would play a trust game with someone from the 
group afterwards.  In fact, participants competed to be the most altruistic, knowing that 
their altruism would be rewarded.  This finding contrasts with that of Clark (2002), who 
did not observe a competitive altruism when others had merely the opportunity to give to 
the most altruistic. 
These and a number of other studies (Chen, Hogg, & Wozny, 2004; Fehr & 
Gachter, 2000; Ostrom, Walker, & Gardner, 1992; Yamagishi, 1986), including evidence 
from hunter-gather societies (Hill, 2002; Kaplin, Hill, Lancaster, & Hurtado, 2000), 
provide significant empirical support for the position that cooperation is higher between 
individuals in communities of trade where sanctioning mechanisms are installed versus 
those communities where no mechanism exists to neither punish the free rider nor reward 
the altruist.  For example, Chen et al. (2004) showed that in a simulated market 
environment, people fulfilled their contracts more often when other traders in the 
marketplace were made aware of their actions (high information condition) than when 
those actions could be made in private (low information condition).  Because parties 
benefit from trade, players reward and punish each other by whom they choose as trading 
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partners.  In another study (Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1986a), participants were 
given the opportunity to punish proposers in a dictator game who had divided $20 
unequally.  In a dictator game, the “proposer,” or dictator, divides a sum of money 
between himself and a partner, the “reciever.”  Generally, the partner’s role is passive, 
having no means by which to reward or punish the proposer.  In this study, participants 
were given the option of equally dividing $12 with a proposer who had taken a greater 
share of the pot in a prior dictator game or $10 with a proposer who had divided the pot 
evenly.  In other words, participants might profit $6 by allocating $6 to a selfish proposer, 
or profit $5 by allocating $5 to a fair-minded proposer.  Seventy-four percent choose to 
forgo $1 in profit by rewarding the cooperative behavior of the “fair” prosper rather than 
reward the non-cooperative behavior of the “unfair” proposer. 
In a convincing recent study, Gurerk, Irlenbusch, and Rockenback (2006) 
demonstrated the market efficiency of sanctioning mechanisms.  Participants were given 
the choice of participating in a public goods game where no sanctioning is allowed or one 
where sanctioning is allowed.  By “sanctioning,” the authors mean that after investments 
to the public pool were distributed equally, participants were given the option of either 
positively sanction cooperators, negatively sanction non-cooperators, or do nothing at all.  
Both sanctioning options cost the sanctioner equal sums, but in the first case the 
cooperator was rewarded one money unit, while in the later case the non-cooperator lost 
three money units.  Gurerk and colleagues found that about two thirds of participants in a 
public goods game initially choose to join a non-sanctioning community over a 
community where sanctioning is allowed.  However, after 30 periods, where in each 
period participants chose to either remain in their present community or switch to the 
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other, all 84 participants had migrated to the sanctioning community.  The authors’ 
conclusion is that institutions that enable sanctioning have a competitive advantage (in 
both attracting members and producing utility) over those that do not. 
It is important to highlight the fact that in the Gurerk et al. (2006) study only a 
minority of actors in the sanctioning community actually engaged in sanctioning 
behavior, but that this minority was sufficient to establish equilibrium of high 
cooperation among all participants.  A unique characteristic of public goods games 
designed to model real-world sanctioning institutions is that beyond the immediate and 
obvious social dilemma, a second, nested social dilemma develops: the matter of who 
will sacrifice personal utility to either punish free riders or reward altruists.  While there 
is ample evidence that humans (at least some humans) do sacrifice utility to encourage 
others’ cooperation, and scholars acknowledge sanctioning is sub-optimal to the 
individual who does it (Camerer & Fehr, 2006), research in this stream fails to provide a 
meaningful explanation for why, except to make the rather cavalier assertion that there 
exists a particular type of person who will, if given the opportunity, dole out rewards 
upon cooperators and/or punishment upon free riders.  These persons are referred to in 
the literature as strong reciprocators (Fehr, Fischbacher & Gachter, 2002; Gintis, 2000). 
The conclusion that sanctioning institutions work when (and because) there exists 
among any sample of humans a sufficient number of individuals with a disposition 
towards a kind of super-cooperation is relatively common (see Camerer & Fehr, 2006; 
Levine, 1998), if not particularly compelling.  To explain outcomes not predicted by non-
cooperative game theory by simply noting that people vary to the extent of their 
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selfishness (or “spitefulness”; Levine, 1998), does not make for particularly good theory 
because it fails to explain why some people behave altruistically and others do not. 
An alternative to the dispositional explanation is given in what McCabe, Rigdon, 
and Smith (2003) call the trust and reciprocity hypothesis.  In two player games, such as 
the ultimatum game, prisoner’s dilemma, or trust game, the sub-game (single round) 
perfect strategy for player one is the non-cooperative response—which in a trust game, is 
to hoard all available resources.  However, this extreme non-cooperative gambit is of 
course Pareto-inefficient, by which I mean that significant value is left unclaimed.  In a 
trust game, when the first of a pair of players entrusts all of her resources to the other, the 
result is that there exists now a larger quantity of resources between the two.  A player 
one who realizes this, and who expects that player two also realizes this, may signal her 
cooperative intentions by entrusting some portion of her resources to player two.  Player 
two can in turn signal his cooperative intentions by returning to player one a sum greater 
than was received.   
McCabe and colleagues (2003) tested the trust and reciprocity hypothesis by 
allowing some subjects the opportunity to signal their cooperative intentions while 
constraining the ability of others to signal anything.  To do this, the authors used two 
versions of the trust game.  The first they call a voluntary trust game, where player one 
can choose to entrust a certain proportion of resources to player two or to keep all the 
resources to herself.  The second they call an involuntary trust game, where player one 
has no decision, but must entrust a proportion of her resources to player two.  McCabe et 
al. observed that in the voluntary trust game, where subjects could signal cooperative 
intentions, significantly more reciprocity of trust was observed from player two than in 
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the involuntary trust game condition, where subjects were unable to signal cooperative 
intentions. 
The trust and reciprocity hypothesis is a signaling model which presumes that 
players consider the intentions of their counterparts when making trust decisions.  As 
McCabe et al. (2003) demonstrated, social actors look to signals of cooperative intentions 
when making trust decisions.  While the focus of the McCabe study was on the behavior 
of the trustee rather than the trustor, the results are relevant to the decision-making of 
trustors as well.  In a complex social world, trustors are likely to look for (and find) 
indicators of intentions from a variety of sources.  Without personal prior experience, 
actors will likely first look to a player’s trusting history in similar games with other actors 
and make assumptions regarding a trustee’s intentions from this information.  Other 
sources of reputational information may include observed behavior in unrelated spheres, 
including associative links—for example, does the trustee associate with groups, 
individuals or firms with known cooperative reputations. 
While the intention-based explanation for cooperation is in some ways more 
satisfying than the outcome-based, or dispositional differences, explanation, it may not be 
complete without incorporating an emotional element.  For instance, several scholars 
have suggested that not only cooperative behavior itself, but also the willingness to incur 
the costs of punishing non-cooperators is emotionally motivated (de Quervain et al., 
2004; Fehr & Gachter, 2000, 2002).  In a study utilizing positron emission tomography 
(PET), de Quervain et al. (2004) scanned the brains of participants as they played a trust 
game.  A scan indicated that when participants learned their trust had been betrayed (not 
reciprocated), and while they considered a punishment, the dorsal striatum, or the portion 
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of the brain associated with satisfaction at having achieved a goal, was activated.  In fact, 
participants who experienced the most activation were also willing to incur the most cost 
in order to punish trust abusers.  These results suggest that the behavior attributed by 
some to the dispositional strong reciprocator is actually an emotional reaction to a 
specific event.  The suggestion of Fehr and Gachter (2000, 2002) that cooperative 
punishment is motivated by anger towards free-riders also supports this reasoning.  The 
expectation of strong emotional reactions to non-cooperative behavior may be a result of 
the perception of unfairness by cooperators (Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1986b).  
The idea that trust and/or cooperation are emotionally motivated is explored 
further in Chapter 4.  The crucial point to make here, from this review of the economics 
literature related to reputation, is that there is strong empirical evidence to support the 
thesis that people are more likely to cooperate when their behavior is monitored by their 
community and where members of that community have the power to reward or punish 
cooperative or uncooperative behavior.  The essential characteristic of these communities 
is that individuals have access to the cooperative history of others.  The essential 
implication is that people use cooperative histories as predictors of future cooperative 
intentions, supported by the observation that trustors invest more in those with 
reputations for altruistic or cooperative behavior than in those without. 
 
Firm-Level Theories of Reputation 
 Scholars of corporate strategy and organizational theory have examined how 
organizational reputations form and the relationship between a firm’s reputation and its 
performance.  For researchers in this stream, reputation is a measurable characteristic of a 
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firm.  Fombrun and others (Fombrun, 1996; Fombrun & Shanley, 1990; McGuire, 
Schneeweis, & Branch, 1990) conceptualize reputation as the aggregate of a large 
number of individual perceptions about (usually) a variety of characteristics of a firm.  
Researchers adopting this perspective are generally interested in reputation as a predictor 
of firm performance.  In Fombrun’s studies, reputational measures were borrowed from 
Fortune magazine (Hutton, 1986), which compiled responses from 4000 executives, 
outside directors, and security analysts on eight components of what they called 
reputation: “quality of management; quality of products or services; long-term investment 
value; innovativeness; financial soundness; ability to attract, develop and keep talented 
people; community and environmental responsibility; and use of corporate assets” 
(Fombrun & Shanley, 1990, p. 244).  Given the items used to build the reputation scale 
(i.e. financial soundness, use of corporate assets, long-term investment value) it comes as 
little surprise that reputation was found to be highly correlated with profitability (r = 
0.42; p < .001) and negatively correlated with a beta coefficient measure of market risk (r 
= -0.21; p < .001). 
 What we learn from Fombrun and Shanley’s (1990) study is that profitable, risk-
averse firms are able to communicate their financial status and strategy, whether it be 
through objective markers or otherwise, sufficiently to business people within their 
industry; when asked, like-industry respondents report that these firms are, in their 
opinion, ‘reputable’ firms.  What we do not learn is how some firms are successful at 
creating an image that may or may not be reinforced by objective fact (to the extent that 
accounting data can be called that) or other, less objective signals of status.  On the other 
hand, it may be comforting to note that, to the subject—the party evaluating the 
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reputation of another person or entity—reputational information is to some extent 
reflective of reality.  In other words, if a firm has a reputation for crafty, opportunistic 
behavior, we might conclude, given the results of this study, that the firm is more likely 
than not to indeed be a crafty opportunist. 
 We also learn from Fombrun and Shanley (1990) that organizations pursue 
reputation as a means to legitimacy.  They suggest that to the extent that a reputation 
ranking is widely publicized (as is the case with the Fortune ranking), managers will use 
reputation information to reevaluate threats and opportunities from other firms in the 
marketplace (Dutton & Jackson, 1987).  Fombrun and Zajac (1987) provided evidence to 
support this view by showing how executives’ perceptions of their competitive 
marketplace differed from an objective analysis of structural variables, a difference which 
presumably affected firms’ evolving strategic imperatives.   
It may be, however, that firms pursue reputation merely because other firms are 
pursuing reputation, even if there is no evidence to suggest that acquiring reputation leads 
to economic benefits (Meyer & Rowan, 1977), a proposition consistent with the 
institutional theory of the firm.  Research by Staw and Epstein (2000) in part supports 
this view.  They found that companies associated with using popular management 
techniques, such as the implementation of programs focusing on empowerment, team-
building, and total quality management, were viewed more favorably and were more 
admired than others, but that the use of popular management techniques was not 
associated with higher economic performance.  As we compare this finding—no link 
between reputation and financial performance—with Fombrun and Shanley’s (1990)—
strong link between reputation and financial performance—it’s important to remember 
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that Frombrun and Shanley’s operationalization of firm reputation was much more 
expansive than that of Staw and Epstein, and included more than just perceptual 
variables.  In fact, Frombrun and Shanley’s don’t measure individual perceptions, but 
conceptualize reputation as more objective, seeming to assume reputation consumers 
would use the same descriptive information to construct their reputation as do Frombrun 
and Shanley and in the same way—that high community and environmental 
responsibility is a positive, and so on.  So the two findings don’t so much contradict each 
other as point out the confusion that can surround the use of the word “reputation.”  As 
we attempt to generalize regarding the effects of reputation on any other variable, we 
must remember to ask ourselves, reputation for what? 
 Nonetheless, it can be concluded from all the studies reviewed here that, for 
individuals within an industry domain (business executives and analysts), there appears 
to be a link between profitability and other firm characteristics that are associated with 
the reputable firm.  This means that, from the perception of the professionals within an 
industry, there is a link between a firm’s reputation and its performance.  This link 
between profitability and reputation can be examined from two directions.  The first is 
that positive changes in reputation drive performance upward.  Through Fombrun’s 
(1996) analysis of the fashion industry, where brand image drives sales, he makes a 
convincing case that reputation positively impacts firm performance.  On the other hand, 
luxury consumer items might represent a special case, because in the luxury market 
consumers may be identifying with a firm’s prestige and in fact buying that prestige with 
the purchase of a consumer good.  The second way in which reputation might drive 
performance is when reputation changes in a negative direction.  Fombrun (1996) 
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provides more evidence to support this proposition, citing the negative effect of firm 
performance from cases of public relations lore: NBC News’ rigged exposé of the 
exploding GM truck (Carter, 1993), the Pepsi syringe scare (a 1993 series of hoaxes 
where supposed victims claimed to have found hypodermic needles and other materials in 
their Pepsi cans; Miller & Glick, 1993), and the Exxon Valdez oil spill (Harrison, 1989).   
While it seems reasonable to assume that crisis events will have an effect on a 
firm’s reputation, and that reputation and firm performance are linked, it is more difficult 
to infer causality in that relationship.  It may be that Fombrun’s (1996) mediation model 
is unnecessarily complicated.  An alternative explanation that seems to fit the data 
equally well is that crisis events impact reputation and performance, that performance 
and reputation are linked, but that the casual relationship between the two remains an 
open question.  
Others have argued that a firm’s generosity in matters of social responsibility 
generates goodwill from employees, consumers, regulators, and other stakeholders that 
will be reciprocated in ways beneficial to the firm, and even measurable in terms of 
financial performance.  Orlitzky, Schmidt, and Rynes (2003) conducted a meta-analysis 
of 52 studies exploring the relationship between corporate social responsibility and 
financial performance and concluded that the relationship is positive.  This view seems 
plausible given our earlier discussion of altruism and indirect reciprocity.  If, in fact, the 
public rewards firms for generous behavior, then it makes sense that generous firms 
would reap long-term benefits from altruistic behavior.  If positive reputations provide 
long-run benefits that are not easily measurable or observable based on how other firms 
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in the marketplace do business, then reputation maintenance may be as important as 
Fombrun (1996) contends. 
 Jones (1995), in his version of instrumental stakeholder theory, begins where 
Fombrun leaves off—that cooperative behavior pays off economically while dishonest or 
competitive behavior does not pay off.  In fact, Jones argues that even in the short-run, 
opportunists do not reap the benefits they expect from their opportunism.  According to 
Jones (1995), humans make sense of their world through vocabularies—“firms with 
moral vocabularies will nurture the moral tendencies of employees” (p. 419).  The larger 
point may be that firms “nurture” their reputation through their vocabularies.  In this 
sense, executives who would be their organization’s image engineers try to instill values 
within their firms through words.  A mission statement or well-publicized goals are, at 
least in part, attempts at this kind of image maintenance.  Jones goes further, making the 
claim that reputation, so far as it is salient in the minds of observers, is only salient in the 
negative.  In other words, a firm cannot effectively signal its relative trustworthiness or 
cooperative intentions.  Thus, a reputation for trustworthiness is in all practicality the 
same as not having a reputation for dishonesty. 
 This argument seems to hang on the Platonic assertion that interactions among 
humans are driven by assumed goodness, unless there is reason to suspect otherwise.  
While this is certainly a tenable philosophical position on human nature (or perhaps it is 
not meant to be so fundamental, but rather culturally specific; Jones doesn’t give us hints 
as to which), it does not seem functional nor does it pass the test of anecdotal experience.  
There may be a general standard of trustworthiness that we expect of strangers, but we 
would likely not leave a stranger to watch over an expensive camera outside a bus station 
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while using the restroom.  However, had this stranger somehow demonstrated 
exceptionally trustworthy behavior by, say, returning a $100 bill that had fallen unnoticed 
from your pocket, you might carry an elevated opinion of this person because of their 
demonstrated integrity.  By the same token, if a friend whom you trust informed you that 
a certain stranger was in fact not a stranger to her but a trustworthy person, you might be 
inclined to trust your friend’s judgment and similarly exercise trust in this person were 
the need to arise. 
 In the previous example, the friend that provided the key social linkage between 
you and the stranger acted as a facilitator of trust.  Because the friend possessed a 
reputation for trustworthiness, she was able to lend a measure of reputational credibility 
to the stranger.  In this sense, she served a facilitative role in distributing social 
information relevant to the interaction.  Institutions can also serve this role.  Maggi 
(1999) reports that the World Trade Organization (WTO) serves as a kind of reputational 
broker among WTO member countries.  The WTO fulfills this role by (1) verifying 
violations (anti-cooperative behavior) among WTO members and (2) reporting these 
violations to third parties.  The WTO, while lacking the power to enforce violated 
agreements directly, nonetheless exercises considerable power through its management of 
reputations. 
 
Reputation in Online Markets 
 The internet has facilitated the development and popularity of many formal 
reputation systems.  These reputations systems, environments where buyers (and in some 
cases sellers) are able to record the quality of their experience and newcomers are able to 
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access the collective positive and negative experiences of all previous transactions with a 
particular seller, are de facto sanctioning institutions.  By storing data on past interactions 
and making that information available to users, an environment has been created which 
facilitates the rewarding (with business) of cooperators and the punishing of non-
cooperators (with no business).  With potentially billions of people having access to the 
internet, the scope of possible social connections amongst internet users is so large as to 
be, for all practical purposes, infinite.  The internet marketplace is not Main Street, where 
buyers and sellers trade within a relatively confined community and reputations develop 
and are transmitted through traditional and limited social ties, or where institutions such 
as Better Business Bureaus log complaints and informally police ethical business 
practices, but an environment where the sum total of every transaction that every 
occurred involving a particular merchant or individual can be potentially evaluated, 
recorded, and presented to any interested party.  Because reputational information can be 
easily accessed in online markets, and because traditional reputational markers are not 
present, reputations may be even more important in online contexts.  A particularly 
salient example of an online marketplace which illustrates the importance of reputation is 
the online auction site eBay.   
 eBay is a virtual online auction house.  Any internet user may list goods for sale 
which are auctioned and sold to the highest bidder.  With each completed transaction, 
buyers and sellers are invited to leave feedback—positive, neutral, or negative—for the 
person with whom they just transacted.  eBay tallies the feedback left for each user and 
that those tallies are displayed with each user’s future listings.  For example, an eBay 
user, Ed, may have bought seven items on eBay and sold three, for a total of ten 
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transactions.  Posting feedback is optional, so let’s imagine that only eight people with 
whom Ed has done business left feedback.  In one case, an eBay user purchased 
something from Ed which she felt was misrepresented.  Because this user was unsatisfied 
with her dealing with Ed, she posted negative feedback.  All other users have had positive 
experiences with Ed.  Therefore, Ed has a positive feedback score of seven and a positive 
feedback percentage of 87.5.  This information is available to all other eBay users. 
Prior research shows that the feedback mechanisms maintained by eBay is salient 
and important in market player decision-making.  Friedman, Anderson, Brett, Olekalns, 
Goates, and Lisco (2004) showed that eBay users’ reputation moderated the effect of 
anger on settlement when eBay users disputed over a transaction gone sour.  The bad 
reputation of the user against whom the complaint was filed also affected the amount of 
anger expressed by the user who filed the complaint.  The authors conclude that eBay 
users are conscious of their reputation, and that those with worse reputations, anxious 
about the possibility of their reputations being further tarnished, may be more motivated 
to settle disputes where settlement will prevent a further degrading of their reputations. 
Of particular importance here is to notice that the social information eBay users 
have by which to construct hearsay reputations is very simple.  Users have access to a 
history of cooperative and uncooperative interactions in past transactions, as reported by 
their counterpart in the transaction, and the total number of transactions in which the user 
has been involved.  This data lacks the nuance that is characteristic of reputational 
information in other social contexts.  In fact, the information is so simple that it can be 
represented in only two continuums—relative cooperativeness and relative experience.  
So when Friedman et al. (2004) refer to a particular eBay user’s reputation as either 
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“good” or “bad,” they mean by this that, relative to others, their history of past 
interactions indicates relatively more or less cooperation. 
 Internet auction sites like eBay which have developed reputation systems to aid in 
commercial exchange must, according to Resnick, Zeckhauser, Friedman, and Kuwabara 
(2000), meet three challenges to operate efficiently: (1) they must exist long enough that 
there is an expectation that users will have future interactions; (2) they must capture and 
distribute data on past transactions such that it is available for others transacting in the 
present or future; and (3) traders must use reputational data to inform trust behavior.  For 
the sake of this dissertation, points one and two above are assumed.  However, point 
number three, whether reputations influence trust behavior (and how they are used) falls 
very much within the scope of this dissertation.  In Chapter 4, I develop specific 
hypotheses pertaining to this point.  In Chapter 8, I test these hypotheses specifically in a 
simulated online auction environment like eBay. 
 
Reputation in Interpersonal Relationships 
 There is a small, but emerging body of research that has begun to focus on the 
impact of some form of reputation on individual cognition and decision-making.  
Research reviewed here appears in literatures on justice and on negotiation, and adopts a 
social psychological approach to reputational analysis. 
Tinsley, O’Conner, & Sullivan (2002) found that negotiators faced with an 
opponent known for their competitiveness judged their opponent less favorably and used 
more distributive bargaining tactics, resulting in lower joint gains.  In some cases, an 
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opponent’s reputation for competitiveness has no basis in objective fact, rather 
reputations were manipulated arbitrarily and the effect still held.   
Research by Diekmann et al. (2003) by some measure attempted to replicate the 
findings by Tinsley et al. (2002), except they were also interested in whether negotiators 
could accurately predict their own behavior when faced with a competitive opponent.  
Participants in their study predicted that when faced with a competitive opponent they 
themselves would behave competitively.  However, participants’ behavior contradicted 
their own predictions: while participants predicted they would behave more competitively 
when faced with a competitive opponent, they actually conceded more and were more 
willing to accept a settlement offer slightly worse than their best alternative to a 
negotiated agreement.  These results contradict others’ findings where players in prisoner 
dilemma games who expected more competitive behavior behaved more competitively 
themselves (see Kelly & Stahelski, 1970; Dawes, McTavish, & Shaklee, 1977). 
 Evidence in other contexts also supports the hypothesis that when individuals are 
caught in interactions with people they view as uncooperative or anti-social, they push 
back and find ways to retaliate.  Jones and Skarlicki (2005), studying how individuals 
respond to authority fairness, presented hypotheses based on “the notion that early 
impressions impact subsequent information processing” (p. 365).  When individuals 
expected fairness or unfairness (authority figure had reputation for being fair or unfair) 
and were treated unfairly (an authority figure giving no explanation for being late), they 
retaliated more than when having no reputational cue or when treated fairly.  Reputation 
here equates to a kind of “early impression.” 
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Other work suggests that individuals may be self-conscious about their own 
reputations even when reputational information may not be available to others, in this 
case, a negotiating partner.  O’Connor, Arnold, and Burris (2005) found that when a 
negotiator reaches an impasse in a negotiation, she is more likely to impasse again even 
when negotiating with a new partner who has no knowledge of her past performance.  
While the authors struggle to provide a theoretical explanation for this finding, they do 
point to previous research which found that less self-efficacious negotiators were more 
inclined to extreme disappointment with impasse (O’Connor & Arnold, 2001).  This may 
suggest that a perceived failure to negotiate a favorable deal (indicated by impasse) 
contributes to a general negative feeling towards negotiation, and that this negative 
feeling leads to the more competitive behavioral stance in following negotiations that 
O’Connor et al. (2005) found led to increased likelihood of impasse in following rounds.  
A related explanation (my own) is that performance in prior negotiations provides the 
raw informative power that aids in the construction of personal identities (Markus, 1977; 
Kleine, Kleine & Kernan, 1993)—specifically, personal identities as negotiators.  As an 
identity is created and reinforced, we would expect a sort of behavioral inertia—the more 
a negotiator behaves in a certain manner in the past, the more likely she is to behave 
similarly in the future.  While this proposition is couched around the development of 
schemas (Fiske & Taylor, 1991) that describe one’s self, the principle should easily apply 
to how individuals construct schemas of an other.  Thus we would expect that when 
individuals predict the future behavior of others, they would be more confident in their 
predictions when the other has a long, rather than short, history of consistent behavior (an 
expectation supported by attribution theory; Kelly & Michela, 1980). 
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Hearsay Versus Experiential Reputation 
Reputation has been defined as a characteristic or attribute assigned to one person 
or entity by another (Wilson, 1985).  Though this definition does not specifically address 
from whence the information for the assignment was derived, Wilson suggests that, 
operationally, a statement of reputation is an empirical statement.  The attributes we 
assign to individuals or entities are based on our or someone else’s experience with those 
individuals, and the predictive power of a reputation lies with our confidence in the belief 
that past behavior predicts future behavior.  Tinsley and colleagues (2002) similarly 
conceptualize reputations as derived from information obtained through “either prior 
social information or credible information from the [individual’s] social network” (p. 
622).  These definitions of reputation blur the distinction between reputational 
information derived from personal experience with that which comes from the experience 
of others, despite, at least in the case of the Tinsley group, of distinguishing between 
“prior social information”—which I take to mean prior personal interaction—and 
“credible information from the [reputation consumer’s] social network.”  In failing to 
provide a definition which distinguishes between reputations derived from these two 
qualitatively different sources, they are not alone.  In fact, there are few researchers 
addressing reputation who argue that the impact of reputational information should be 
analyzed differently depending on the source of that information (e.g. Lind, Kray & 
Thompson, 1998; Yamagishi & Yamagishi, 1994).   
As does Tinsley et al. (2002), I argue that reputational cues come from two 
general sources, (1) past personal interaction and (2) information obtained through social 
networks.   However, unlike the Tinsley group, I argue that there are important 
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theoretical distinctions to be made between reputation derived through personal 
experience and reputations derived through indirect social information.   
Granovetter (1985), in his treatise on the problem of socially embedded behavior, 
argues against the economic proposition that parties to trade are discouraged from 
cheating solely because they are worried about a reputation effect—that others will know 
they cheated and in effect punish them for their past behavior: “In practice, we settle for 
[reputational] information when nothing better is available, but ordinarily we seek better 
information.  Better than the statement that someone is known to be reliable 
is…information from one’s own past dealings with that person” (p. 490).  The intuition 
that guides this reasoning has been institutionalized in law, where evidence presented 
based on the reports of others, or hearsay, rather than a witness’ personal knowledge, is 
generally not considered admissible testimony.   
Geertz (1979) similarly observed that even in very competitive markets actors 
privilege information derived from personal experience, preferring to reward past 
displays of trust even when doing so comes at a short-run economic cost.  In the 
Moroccan bazaar, buyers and sellers who had previously positive interactions favored 
each other, even to their short-run economic disadvantage (for example, when an 
alternative buyer is present and willing to pay more, or when an alternative seller is 
offering a better price on goods of equal quality). 
Granovetter’s (1985) analysis reveals both that (1) there is an important difference 
between reputational information garnered indirectly through social networks and 
reputational information that comes directly through personal experience and (2) there is 
a quality hierarchy of information based on the proximity of information’s source to 
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one’s self, where information acquired personally is valued the most.  Granovetter’s first 
assertion is important, because previous research evaluating the effects of reputation on 
trust and/or cooperation have examined either one dimension of reputation and ignored 
the other, or combined the dimensions without giving attention to the theoretical 
differences between them.  For example, King-Casas et al. (2005) examined the question 
of whether reciprocity expressed by one party would predict future trust expressed by the 
other.  Observing dyads that played ten rounds of a trust game, each with the same 
partner, they found support for their hypothesis.  However, the conclusions of the King-
Casas study are only relevant to predictions of the effect of reputation as personal 
experience, leaving the question of the effect of reputation as social information, or 
hearsay, open. 
The contrast between these two dimensions of reputation was better addressed in 
a study by Bohnet and Huck (2004).  Participants first played ten rounds of a trust game 
in one of three conditions, (1) stranger, each round a new partner about which the trustor 
knows nothing, (2) partner, each round with the same partner, or (3) reputation, a new 
partner each round, but one in which the trustor knows his or her history of reciprocity in 
previous rounds.  After ten rounds, all participants play an additional ten rounds in the 
stranger condition.  Results indicate that in the first ten rounds, those in the partner 
condition trust more than those in the reputation condition which in turn trust more than 
those in the stranger condition.  The same pattern holds for the trustees’ propensity for 
reciprocity.  This study goes a long way in examining the differential effects of two 
dimensions of reputation, that based on hearsay and that based on personal experience. 
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One of the key objectives of this dissertation is to examine how (and if) 
individuals process reputational information differently by source.  In other words, if a 
trustor has reputational information from both his or her social network as well as 
personal experience, (1) to which does the trustor give precedence in making trusting 
decisions, and (2) through what cognitive or emotional process is this process motivated?  
The Bohnet and Huck (2004) study, as well as Granovetter’s (1985) information 
hierarchy assertion, hint towards an answer to the first, that trustors will likely experience 
reputational information acquired through personal experience more saliently than 
reputational information acquired through social information.  Hypotheses to this effect 
are developed in Chapter 4, following a more detailed discussion of Granovetter’s 
hierarchy of information privilege and a review of literature suggesting an alternative 
prediction. 
 
Conclusion 
 In this chapter, I have reviewed three literatures on reputation.  Each of these 
literatures is consistent in the conceptualization of reputations as social constructs which 
organize the characteristics of the organizations, groups, and individuals with which a 
person interacts.  I have argued that these reputational constructs are best modeled as 
schemata (Fiske & Taylor, 1991; Markus & Zajonc, 1985).  Schema theory offers an 
explanation of how persons can make predictions about others’ behavior given only 
imperfect and incomplete information about them—that bits of information, called 
reputational cues, invoke schemas of complete reputational types.  Evidence from the 
evolutionary perspective and the social psychological approach support this theory, 
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though this evidence leaves open the question as to how reputational information from 
different sources, hearsay versus personal experience, might be processed or privileged 
differently.  All the same, even incomplete reputational cues are sufficient to direct or 
change behavior, and in the next chapter I discuss a particular kind of behavior, trusting 
behavior, which I argue is critically dependent on how individuals process reputation. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
TRUST 
 
For it is mutual trust, even more than mutual interest, that holds human associations 
together. 
--H. L. Menchen 
 
Scholars have theorized that reputation mechanisms serve as a proxy for trust in 
decision-making (e.g. Alvarez, Barney, Bosse, 2004; Hardin, 2001; Williamson, 1993), 
however, differences exist as to how trust and reputation are conceptualized, and these 
differences have an impact on theory.  The goal of this chapter is to dive into the trust 
literature and resurface with a conceptualization of trust which compliments the 
conceptualization of reputation developed in Chapter 2, thus guiding the empirical work 
proposed in the following chapters.  Trust is a well-studied construct and has been the 
subject of considerable discussion over the years in disciplines such as psychology, social 
psychology, sociology, organization studies, economics, political science, and 
evolutionary biology.  Because of this, there are literally volumes of scholarly text 
dedicated to the subject.  It is my intention to first define trust as I am using it, then to 
review major streams of research on trust so as to familiarize the reader with the various 
disciplinary approaches to the study of trust, and finally to locate this study of trust on 
that disciplinary map.  
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Trust Defined 
 The concept of trust has been present in the academic literature for several 
decades, in a variety of disciplines, and studied across varied levels of analysis (e.g. 
Cummings & Bromiley, 1996; Deutsch, 1960; Lewis & Weigert, 1985, Luhmann, 1988; 
Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995; Worchel, 1979; Williamson, 1993; Yamagishi & 
Yamagishi, 1994).  Definitions, of course, vary by discipline, research focus, and simply 
from treatment to treatment.  Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, and Camerer (1998), in a review of 
the trust literatures, suggest that although definitions of trust vary greatly across scholarly 
efforts, a distinct commonality between all definitions of trust appears to be a 
“willingness to be vulnerable” (for an example of a definition of trust of which 
vulnerability is not a prerequisite, see Gambetta, 1988).  Not only is a willingness to 
allow one’s self to be vulnerable to risk a key element of most definitions of trust, others 
have suggested that it may also be “one of the few characteristics common to all trust 
situations” (Johnson-George and Swap, 1982). 
In a major treatment of trust, Mayer et al. (1995) began with the explicit intention 
of defining trust, and doing so in a way which distinguished trust from cooperation.  
Mayer and colleagues first define trust as “the willingness of a party to be vulnerable to 
the actions of another party based on the expectation that the other will perform a 
particular action important to the trustor, irrespective of the ability to monitor or control 
that other party” (p. 712).  They go on to argue that trust is often confused with 
cooperation because trusting behavior and cooperative behavior may look similar.  
However, there are many reasons why an individual or collective might act cooperatively 
while not trusting.  Meyer et al. list three: (1) external mechanisms exist which assure 
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that the trusted party will not take advantage or act deceitfully; (2) if the issue does not 
leave the trusting party vulnerable—in other words, the matter is not important to the 
trustor; and (3) “if it’s clear that the trustee’s motives will lead him or her to behave in a 
way that coincides with the trustor’s desires” (p. 713).      
In this dissertation, I adopt the definition of Rousseau and her colleagues (1998): 
“Trust is a psychological state comprising the intention to accept vulnerability based 
upon positive expectations of the intentions or behavior of another” (p. 395).  
 
Worchel’s Multi-Disciplinary Typology of Trust 
In a 1979 review, Worchel organized the trust research into three distinct groups 
that still provide useful insight into the variety of perspectives in the trust literature today.  
Worchel grouped research on trust into (1) theories of personality, (2) the economic or 
sociological perspectives, and (3) the social psychological view. 
 Personality theorists (e.g. Erikson, 1963; Kramer & Brewer, 1984) view trust as 
more or less a basic component of human nature, a general belief in the goodwill and 
non-malicious intent of others.  Differences in the degree to which individuals are willing 
to trust are dispositional and may be accounted for by developmental context, including 
culture (Erikson, 1963), group membership (Kramer & Brewer, 1984), and other-self 
similarities in attitudes and/or behaviors (Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993).  Yamagishi and 
Yamagishi (1994) label this kind of trust general trust:  “A trusting person is the one who 
overestimates the benignity of the partner’s intentions beyond the level warranted by the 
prudent assessment of the available information” (p. 136). 
  41
 Worchel’s (1979) second trust grouping, the economic or sociological 
perspectives, conceptualizes trust as a function of interpersonal experience.  The purpose 
of trust is to reduce uncertainty in institutionalized modes of interaction.  Trust forms as 
obligations and expectations are fulfilled over time; thus the maxim, “Trust is not given, 
but earned.”  Trust of this kind can be exercised in individuals or institutions (Neu, 1991).  
Hardin (1993) describes this trust as “calculated” and provides a definition that is 
consistent with the paradigm, “You trust someone if you have adequate reason to believe 
it will be in that person’s interest to be trustworthy in the relevant way at the relevant 
time” (p. 505).  This is a useful definition for modeling trusting behavior in economic 
interactions, but may not adequately explain the behavior of the individual trustor who 
likely does not look past themselves to consider the interests of others in making 
everyday trust decisions.  
A social psychological conceptualization of trust treats the construct as a matter of 
expectations based on past behavior, as might economists, but moves beyond 
probabilities or cost-benefit analysis and pins the vulnerability component of trust 
(Rousseau et al., 1998) on one’s confidence as to how another party will behave (for 
examples of authors that specifically mention confidence in their definitions of trust, see 
Cook & Wall, 1980, Deutsch, 1960, Lewis & Weigert, 1985; however, others, such as 
Luhmann, 1988, take issue with this definition).  Thus, trust here is a calculus of 
expectations, but not necessarily a rational one because this trust may exist even when 
there are reasons to be hesitant.  For example, a person may choose to exercise trust in a 
friend even when that friend has betrayed trust in the past. 
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The Three-Tiered Taxonomy of Trust 
The Worchel (1979) taxonomy of trust is useful in categorizing definitions of trust 
and streams of research that fit within these categories.  However, other models of trust 
go a step further in integrating multiple conceptualization of trust.  One such model is 
offered by Shapiro, Sheppard and Cheraskin (1992) and further developed by Lewicki 
and Bunker (1995).  Shapiro et al. create a three-tiered taxonomy of trust.  The first, 
deterrence-based trust or calculative trust, is based on the prediction that people will do 
what they say they are going to do in order to avoid the negative consequences of not 
doing it.  This type of trust is deterrence-based because potential punishments deter 
trustee defection; it is calculative because the trustor estimates the trustee’s costs and 
benefits associated with defection versus cooperation and calculates the relative 
trustworthiness of the trustee in making trust decisions.  Calculative trust may or may not 
be founded in prior experience.  For instance, calculative trust may be built on repetitive, 
superficial interaction, or it may be built around an institutional confidence, meaning that 
trustors are confident trusting within a specific institutional context even when interacting 
with unknown actors (Neu, 1991).  For example, the institutional norms of pizza delivery 
(which reside within the norms of a larger scope of marketplace norms) afford 
predictability to the relationship between pizza parlor and consumer which allow for 
comfortable transactions between actors who have had no previous interaction with or 
knowledge of each other. 
The second type of trust is knowledge-based trust.  Trust is knowledge-based 
when one knows another well enough to know their interests, values, beliefs, and 
motivations so as to be able to create accurate expectations of their behavior.  With 
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deterrence-based trust, the trustor trusts because he or she can predict the trustee’s fear-
motivated behavior, however knowledge-based trust is grounded in an understanding of a 
trustee’s preferences under a wider umbrella of stimuli.  Yamagishi and Yamagishi 
(1994) also describe a knowledge-based trust which is consistent with that discussed 
here.    
The last category of trust described by Shapiro et al. (1992) is identification-based 
trust.  Identification-based trust is grounded in the trustor’s identification with the 
trustee’s interests.  The trustor has a deep knowledge of the trustee’s preferences as with 
knowledge-based trust, but has fully internalized these preferences so that the trustee 
could act in place of the trustor and make decisions in the same way that the trustor 
would if the trustor were making them.  In this kind of trust relationship, it is not enough 
to merely know another well enough to know how they might react to different stimuli or 
order preferences, but the identification-based trustee “agrees with, empathizes with, and 
endorses” those choices too (Mayer et al., 1995). 
 
The Three-Tiered Taxonomy of Trust: A Critique 
 It here becomes important to highlight the differences between trust and 
cooperation.  Mayer et al. (1995) argue that while trust often accompanies cooperation, 
trust is not a necessary condition for cooperation to occur.  Mayer and colleagues contend 
that where external mechanisms or institutional safeguards exist to punish non-
cooperators that players can expect cooperation without necessarily trusting one another.  
This is because these external mechanisms have effectively hedged against the risk that 
would need to exist for a real trust to exist.  Because no personal vulnerability is present, 
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there is no need for trust (and the existence of formalized risk-hedging or defector-
punishing mechanisms is rather evidence against to suggest an absence of trust, rather 
than its presence).  Mayer et al. gives the example of an employee who may appear to 
cooperate with a company initiative, but only because she works under a powerful boss 
which is able to punish the employee for uncooperative behavior.  Based on this 
conceptualization of trust, one might question whether Shapiro et al.’s (1992) deterrence-
based trust relationships or Lewicki and Bunker’s (1995) calculative trust are really based 
on trust at all.   
Also, it is clear from the discussions by Shapiro et al. (1992) and Lewicki and 
Bunker (1995) that knowledge-based trust and identification-based trust are predicated on 
personal interaction and continued experience between trustor and trustee.  However, 
what is lacking in the Shapiro / Lewicki analysis is a description of a kind of trust that is 
based on information (sometimes quite sophisticated information) about another that is 
acquired through means other than prior personal experience.  Examples abound: imagine 
moving to a new city and being referred to a “trustworthy” realtor by a friend; a 
newspaper editor recommends a restaurant as having the “most authentic” Thai cuisine; 
Consumer Reports recommends a particular brand of toaster for its quality.  In each of the 
above situations, information has been acquired about a person or business through 
means other than personal experience.  This type of information I have previously 
referred to as hearsay reputation.   
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The Relationship of Reputation to Trust 
 In this dissertation, I am exploring how reputation invokes trust (or distrust) 
within social relationships.  My conceptualization of reputation-informed trust fits 
Worchel’s (1979) description of a social psychological perspective of trust because I 
contend that trust varies in relationships by the salient characteristics of individuals 
within relationships which are perceived as relevant in deciding whether another person 
is trustworthy or not.  However, my view of trust may also be a self-regarding economic 
view in the sense that the decision to trust is to some degree a calculative one, however I 
am arguing something quite different than the proposal that trustors make strictly rational 
evaluations of reputational cues when making trust decisions.  My conceptualization of 
reputation-informed trust also fits within the Shapiro et al. (1992) model of trust.  Here, 
reputation-based trust is a form of knowledge-based trust.  Knowledge of a trusted party’s 
past behavior, received second-hand or inferred from labels, drives the decision to trust. 
 In Akerlof’s (1970) famous analysis of the Market for Lemons, he begins with the 
assumption that only sellers can know the value of some goods.  A buyer that cannot 
verify the quality of a good cannot know if it is premium quality a “lemon”—a term here 
used to mean an inferior, unsatisfactory, or defective good—or somewhere in between.  
Because of this uncertainty, buyers are willing to pay no more than the average value of 
the good.  In some markets, sellers, knowing this, keep higher value goods off the market.  
When only goods of a lesser quality are for sale, buyers are willing to pay less, which 
lowers the quality threshold of goods sellers are willing to sell, and so on until, 
theoretically, no goods are traded or, practically, all goods that are traded are traded at 
value of the poorest quality goods.  However, in markets where buyers can verify the 
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quality of goods, or where sellers can assure buyers of the quality of their goods, market 
equilibrium prices will rise.  Often sellers will invest in their reputations by spending 
money in visible ways (“burning money”), hoping that buyers will reason that a firm 
which can afford to burn money is wealthy and efficient, and that such a firm could not 
afford to sell inferior products.  Burning money changes the incentive structure of the 
seller, such that it is no longer economical to lie to consumers about the quality of her 
products.  In this sense, the practice of burning money is a signal of cooperative 
intentions, in that it suggests to buyers that the seller only deals in quality goods.  These 
signals are part of a larger set of information that is consumed by observers.  This body of 
information is modeled here as reputation, and serves as a basis for trust. 
The idea that trust is influenced by attributes of the trustee is a view shared by 
several scholars.  Early research by Hovland, Janis, and Kelley (1953) found that in order 
for a person to be credible, they must be perceived as having expertise and being 
trustworthy.  Lieberman (1981) makes the claim that fiduciaries must be perceived as 
both competent and as having integrity to be trusted.  Ring and Van de Ven (1992) 
propose that as a matter of risk management, managers must consider the trustworthiness 
of the parties with whom they transact business.  In an effort to synthesize decades of 
work on the antecedents of trust, Mayer et al. (1995) identify three characteristics of a 
trusted party that interact in predicting trust in relationships:  ability, the capacity to fulfill 
an obligation; benevolence, that the trusted party wants good for the trusting party; and 
integrity, “that the trustee adheres to a set of principles that the trustor finds acceptable” 
(p. 719).  According to Mayer et al., while these three attributes of trustees may be 
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interrelated, they are theoretically separate, such that trustors may consider all or some 
combination of these characteristics when choosing whether or not to trust.   
There is also significant evidence to suggest that individuals take into account 
varying levels of risk in their decision to trust.  Snijders and Keren (1999) and Malhotra 
(2004) all found that participants in a sequence of experiments trusted more often when 
the risk of trusting was perceived as low versus high.  Kramer (1999) makes a similar 
conclusion in his review of the organizational literature on trust.  Kramer concludes that 
perceptions of risk are tied to the decision to trust and, similar to the view taken in this 
paper, that perceptions of risk are influenced by attributes associated with the trusted 
party. 
 
Conclusion 
 A central component to a trust situation is that the trustor allow him or herself to 
be vulnerable to the risk of the trustee not complying with expectations.  Reputation, as a 
social construction of the characteristics specific to an individual or collective (such as a 
group, organization, firm, etc.) is relevant to the decision to trust in as much as its 
construction speaks to the presumed trustworthiness of the trustee.  Reputation-informed 
trust, therefore, is not a simple matter of calculative odds—such as the analysis one might 
perform in choosing to play the lottery.  Rather, reputation-informed trusting behavior is 
both calculative (in as much as information about an individual drives the construction of 
reputation itself) and distinctly psychological (as there is no guarantee that the trustee 
will reciprocate the trustor’s trust).  
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 CHAPTER IV 
 
THE EFFECTO OF REPUTATION ON TRUSTING BEHAVIOR 
 
We have to distrust each other.  It’s our only defense against betrayal. 
--Tennessee Williams 
 
The focus of this dissertation is the effect of reputation on trust and trusting 
behavior.  In this chapter, I develop nine hypotheses which systematically tell a story of 
how individual reputation is linked to trust in interpersonal relationships.  First, I describe 
the relationship of hearsay reputation and risk on trusting behavior, detailed in 
Hypotheses 1-3.  Second, I discuss the role of affect in the relationship between hearsay 
reputation and trusting behavior, described in Hypotheses 4 and 5.  Third, in Hypotheses 
6 and 7, I make predictions regarding the relationship between experiential reputation and 
trusting behavior.  Finally, I discuss the role of affect in the relationship between 
experiential reputation and trusting behavior, outlined in Hypotheses 8 and 9.  Hypothesis 
1-9 are first tested by way of a trust game (sometimes called an investment game) in 
Study 1 (Chapter 5).  I attempt to replicate the results of Study 1 in two additional studies 
(Chapters 7 & 8), each contextualizing reputation and trusting behavior in different ways, 
but both simulating real-world trust situations.  The latter two studies also test an 
additional hypothesis developed in Chapters 7. 
Based on the discussion in Chapters 2 and 3, I propose that a good hearsay 
reputation signals cooperative intentions.  A reputation is social-constructed label 
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(Tinsely, o’Conner, & Sullivan, 2002) which contains an aggregate—though often 
abstract—accounting of an actor’s past cooperative and non-cooperative acts.  As the 
context modeled in this dissertation is the reputation systems used in online consumer 
markets, reputation can be thought of as the aggregate number of past cooperative and 
non-cooperative acts.  Reputation exists on a continuum from a totality of cooperative 
acts to a totality of non-cooperative acts, or from “good” to “bad.”  Therefore, a “good” 
reputation references a schema (Fiske & Taylor, 1991) indicating a history of relatively 
more cooperative behavior.  Because past behavior is used as a predictor of future 
behavior, individuals are more likely to engage in trusting behavior with a person or firm 
which enjoys a good reputation, which indicates a history of past cooperative behavior.  
Moreover, a good reputation may trigger an indirect reciprocity norm (Axelrod, 1984; 
Cialdini, 2001; Gouldner, 1960).  A trustor may be more inclined to engage in trusting 
behavior with a person or firm with a good reputation in order to reward past cooperative 
behavior (McCabe et al., 2003), cooperative behavior that may not have directly 
benefited the trustor, but from which the trustor indirectly benefits for interacting in the 
same community (Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1986a).  Thus, potential trustors are 
more likely to trust, or to show trust through trusting behavior with trustees that have 
good hearsay reputations.     
HYPOTHESIS 1:  The better an individual or firm’s hearsay reputation the more 
likely an individual will engage in trusting behavior with them. 
 
 
The Relationship of Risk to Trust 
Numerous scholars have proposed that reputation serves as a way of gauging risk 
in economic relationships (Ostrom, 2002).  In this usage of the term, risk is a proxy for 
  50
probability, or perceived probability under conditions of uncertainty.  A trustee’s 
reputation, therefore, is relevant to decision-making under conditions of uncertainty if it 
contains information which can be interpreted to a trustor as a trustee’s probability of 
performing a given action under given circumstances.  Reputation as such indicates a 
community’s perceived probability of reciprocity in the same way that, for example, an 
odds ratio indicates the perceived probability of a particular horse winning at the track.  
Decisions made based on reputational information alone are indifferent to contextual risk 
factors such as the value of the stake one puts on a risky proposition; in other words, a 
safe bet is a safe bet whether the bet be $10 or $100.  From the self-regarding preferences 
economic model of reputation, we should expect that the only information relevant to a 
trust decision is a trustee’s prediction of the other party’s propensity to reciprocate, and 
that all the information necessary to come to a calculated decision based on risk is 
contained within the trusted party’s reputation.  Contextual risk, then, is irrelevant.   
However, in an experimental context where no reputational information was 
provided trustors, Malhotra (2004) has shown that persons focus a great deal on the 
personal risk of trusting, where risk is conceptualized as a function of the value of the 
trusting party’s stake in the trusted party.  In other words, by contextual risk I mean the 
value of the resources trustors put at risk in the act of trusting.  Trustors were also 
concerned with the interests of the other party, such as the effect trusting (or not) has on 
the other party, as well as how much the trusted party stands to benefit from being 
trusted.  Based on this evidence, I propose that contextual factors, such as the amount at 
stake in a trusting situation, are also relevant to predicting trusting behavior, suggesting 
that the predictive cues contained within reputational information are not processed 
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independently of the context in which trusting decisions are made.  Specifically, I predict 
that when the consequences of trusting are framed as more risky—that the trustor has 
more to lose from trustee exploitation—that trustors will exercise less trust.  This 
hypothesis is important because, if verified, it demonstrates that the self-regarding 
preferences economic model of reputation does not adequately account for how social 
information is cognitively processed and subsequently motivates trust, suggesting 
individuals are subjected to systematic psychological biases relevant to the context in 
which trusting situation are framed (Neale & Bazerman, 1991). 
HYPOTHESIS 2:  Individuals are more likely to engage in trusting behavior when 
there is less to lose (less risk) should their trust be exploited, and less likely to 
engage in trusting behavior when there is more to lose (more risk) should their 
trust be exploited. 
 
I do not, however, expect that hearsay reputation and contextual risk will affect 
trust independently.  Rather, I expect the effect of risk on trust to be comparatively weak 
in comparison to the effect of hearsay reputation.  When a hearsay reputation indicates to 
the trustor that he can have confidence in the trustee’s cooperative intentions, the amount 
of resources (money) to be entrusted should be of little import.  In other words, one 
would be just as likely to entrust $100 as $100,000 in person whose trustworthiness is 
unquestioned.  However, when a party’s hearsay reputation brings their trustworthiness 
into doubt, I predict that trustors will give consideration to the amount of resources to be 
entrusted, perhaps viewing the transaction as a type of lottery.  If the payoff is significant, 
and the potential for loss low, why not gamble and take a chance on the trustee?  On the 
other hand, if the potential payoff does not justify the price of the lottery ticket, as it 
were, the trustor is more likely to keep her resources to herself.  Thus, I predict that 
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hearsay reputation and contextual risk will interact such that only when trustees have a 
bad reputation will risk have an effect on trust.  
HYPOTHESIS 3:  Contextual risk will moderate the relationship between reputation 
and trusting behavior such that risk will only have an effect on trusting behavior 
when trustees have “bad” reputations. 
 
 
Reputation and Emotion 
Williamson (1993) suggests that reputation is related to trust inasmuch as 
reputation is a codification of the odds of another’s propensity to behave cooperatively.  
However, other research suggests that the relationship between reputation and trust is not 
so simple.  Fehr and Gachter (2000; 2002) argue that some forms of public goods 
cooperation, such as conserving common property resources or warfare, cannot be 
explained by existing evolutionary theories of human cooperation.  They argue that 
theories of direct reciprocity (Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981; Axelrod, 1984; Trivers, 1971) 
and indirect reciprocity (Alexander, 1987; Leimar & Hammerstein, 2001; Lotem, 
Fishman, & Stone, 1999; Nowak & Sigmund, 1998), which propose that cooperation is 
observed because those with reputations for cooperation are rewarded (Barclay, 2004; 
Milinski et al, 2002), are inadequate because they focus on rewards for cooperative 
behavior rather than fear of punishment for acting uncooperatively.  Fehr and Gachter 
believe that it is fear of punishment, not the anticipation of a reward, which motivates 
cooperation: it makes sense to cooperate if a punishment befalls those who free ride.  
Punishment works as an adequate deterrent only if there are a sufficient number of 
altruists who will bear the cost of punishing free riders.  But what motive does an 
individual have for incurring the costs of punishing a free-rider?  The answer is both the 
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negative feelings (i.e. anger) cooperators hold against non-cooperators (Fehr & Gachter, 
2000, 2002), and the satisfaction derived from having enacted punishment (de Quervain 
et al., 2004).  In other words, displays of anti-social, uncooperative behavior excite anger 
and resentment by those who are cooperative, or are playing by the rules—be they 
explicit or implicit—of cooperation.   
To illustrate this point let me provide two examples.  First, consider the existence 
of traffic laws as an example of how society defines explicit rules to facilitate cooperative 
behavior and the reaction of cooperative individuals in the face of an uncooperative act.  
As a specific example, consider how a traffic signal facilitates cooperative behavior by 
holding traffic traveling one direction so that traffic may safely flow through a cross 
street.  What happens, however, when a single motorist breaks the rules and, for example, 
runs a red light?  What is the emotional reaction of the other motorists who witness or are 
affected by the anti-social act?  Observing motorists will no doubt respond with anger, 
indignation, frustration, or resentment.   
As a second example, consider the unspoken social norms that dictate line-
forming.  A class breaks for ten minutes and a handful of students proceed to the vending 
machine to purchase soft-drinks.  Instinctively, the thirsty, tired, mildly bored students 
line up to make their purchases, without voicing a single word, organizing according to a 
first-come-first-served cultural norm.  Now, what happens if one student ignores the 
queue and pushes his way to the front of the line?  Leaving aside for the moment the 
possibility of a behavioral response, let us consider first their emotional response.  The 
slighted, cooperative students will likely feel anger, and frustration, perhaps jealousy, or 
at the very least a mild irritation or resentment because of a perception of unfairness 
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(Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1986b).  Similarly, when a cooperative actor observes 
that other actors are likewise engaging in cooperative behaviors, this likely elicits 
feelings of contentment, satisfaction, and peace.       
A reputation system facilitates cooperation by making a history of past bad 
behavior available to the larger community.  A bad reputation signals a propensity 
towards anti-social, uncooperative behavior, which incites negative feelings in others 
(Fehr & Gachter, 2000, 2002).  These negative feelings are functional, in terms of the 
cooperative health of a community, because these feelings motivate cooperative actors to 
engage in punishing behavior toward non-cooperative actors, even when the act of 
punishing imposes an economic cost on the punisher.  In some cases, society bears this 
cost through institutionalized mechanisms for enacting punishments.  For instance, 
communities tax their residents to employ a police force empowered to impose financial 
and sometimes physical punishments on traffic law violators.  In other cases, punishing 
behavior is voluntary and organic.  The students slighted by the line-cutter may say 
something, creating a social distance between the non-cooperator and the rest of the 
community, or perhaps in merely withholding friendly interaction to the student in some 
other context.  Regardless of the mechanism, cooperation can be maintained even when 
only a minority of the community’s actors are willing to engage in punishing behavior 
(Gurerk et al., 2006).  However, not all punishing behavior imposes a cost on the 
punisher.  In some cases, like those modeled in this dissertation, punishing behavior also 
protects the punisher from exploitation.  The larger point, however, is that cooperation in 
trust situations can be maintained by reputation systems, because reputations provide a 
mechanism by which actors are aware of each other’s past cooperative and non-
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cooperative acts, and because defection elicits an emotionally predictive response from 
cooperators which may drive them to vigilantism.  
Dunn and Schweitzer (2005) demonstrated that individuals experiencing a state of 
negative affect were less likely to act in a trusting way.  Additional support for the link 
between emotion and cooperation comes from an analysis of the post-Cold War Russian 
marketplace (Radaev, 2004).  Radaev suggests that trust in Russian business networks, 
when not grounded in the personal experience actors have one with another, is based on 
affective impressions; or, to use Radaev’s word, feeling.  When actors know each other 
well, and have developed a trust based on repeated interaction, making trust decisions is 
simple, programmed, and automatic.  However, in new or less established relationships, 
actors rely on information from other sources in decision-making and follow a pattern of 
more complex decision-making.  It is in these kinds of limited-knowledge situations that 
Radaev argues affect is important.   
The conclusions of Radaev (2004) can be explained theoretically through the 
Affect Infusion Model (AIM), described by Forgas (1995; also see Forgas & George, 
2001)1.  AIM begins with the assumption that information processing and decision 
making processes vary by the complexity of the decision.  Some problems require 
sophisticated, elaborate information processing strategies, whereas others are resolved 
through simpler, quasi-automatic tactics.  According to AIM, the affective state of a 
decision-maker influences decision-making when actors are engaged in higher-order 
decision-making, but does not influence decision-making in very basic kinds of decision-
                                                 
1 It should be noted that while I have chosen to examine Radaev’s observations through the AIM, Radeav 
did not reference Forgas or mention the AIM in his analysis. 
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making.  The more thought that is required to arrive at a decision, the greater chance the 
decision has of being impacted by the present emotional state of the actor.   
It is important to mentioned that the AIM models affect specifically as mood, not 
necessarily emotion (Forgas & George, 2001), which I am discussing here.  However, the 
constructs are similar enough to warrant this adaptation of the model.  Forgas (1992) 
defines moods as “low-intensity, diffuse and relatively enduring affective states without a 
salient antecedent cause and therefore little cognitive content (e.g., feeling good or 
feeling bad).”  Emotions are “more intense, short-lived and usually [have] a definite 
cause and clear cognitive content” (p. 230).  While moods and emotions have been 
defined as distinct constructs, they are similar in that they describe transitory affective 
states rather than dispositional personality traits (Barry, Fulmer, & Goates, 2006).  The 
key distinction between moods and emotions are their intensity and that emotions are 
generally thought to be event-driven.  Given that AIM was developed with low-intensity 
affective experience in mind, it is reasonable to assume that in the case of high-intensity 
affective experience that emotion would more strongly affect high-order cognitive work 
such as reasoning and complex decision-making.  In this dissertation, all predictions 
made regarding affect are referring to as emotional states rather than mood or 
dispositional affect. 
AIM sheds light on both how behavior is influenced by affective state and how 
behavior varies by the valence of affective state.  To predict affect’s primary effect on 
behavior, Forgas (1995) adopts the affect-as-information approach (Schwarz & Clore, 
1988).  As individuals exert effort to makes sense of emotional events, such as the 
valence of their emotional state (Schwarz, 1990; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985), they may 
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misattribute and misapply their feelings to judgments at hand.  Schwarz and Clore (1988) 
argue that individuals, in making judgments, ask themselves how they are feeling (about 
the object of the judgment) and allow the valence of their emotional state to flavor their 
appraisal.  Thus, if an individual is feeling happy (it does not matter why), they are more 
likely to make positive judgments about others.  Likewise, an individual in a negative 
affective state is more likely to make negative judgments about others.   
The decision to trust is one that requires judgment or information processing.  The 
strategies used in making trust decisions run the gamut of the information processing 
strategies described by Forgas (1995).  Some trust decisions might be simple and require 
little or no thought, like the trust exercised in other drivers when proceeding through an 
intersection on a green traffic light.  However, the kinds of trust decisions which I’m 
modeling here involve more complicated judgment or information processing strategies. 
I have previously argued that the decision to trust in an economic relationship is 
complicated by the trustor having to make sense of reputation information as a kind of 
social information.  Others (Williamson, 1993) have argued that this sensemaking 
process is purely cognitive, a rational calculation of odds based on past performance.  I 
do not take issue with this proposition entirely, but suggest that the cognitive explanation 
does not tell the whole story.  Therefore, in proposing affect as a mediator between 
reputation processing and the decision to trust, I do so with the expectation that the 
decision to trust is also influenced directly by non-emotional cognitive reasoning.  
However, I predict that reputational information is processed in the way Forgas and 
colleagues (Forgas, 1995; Forgas & George) theorize other types of information is 
processed, that a decision-maker’s affective state influences his or her decision to trust in 
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a manner consistent with the affect-as-information model (Schwarz & Clore, 1988).  The 
decision to trust is not influenced entirely by rational cognitive calculation nor emotional 
response, but some combination of the two.  Formally put, I expect the relationship 
between hearsay reputation and the decision to trust to be partially mediated by the 
affective state of the trustor, specifically, 
HYPOTHESIS 4:  Trustee hearsay reputation predicts trustor emotional state such 
that  
 
(a) “good” hearsay reputations (reputations for reciprocity) elicit a positive 
emotional response from trustors, and 
 
(b) “bad” hearsay reputations (reputations for exploitation) elicit a negative 
emotional response from trustors.   
 
HYPOTHESIS 5:  Emotional state partially mediates the relationship between 
trustee hearsay reputation and trustor trust such that 
 
(a) trustors experience a positive emotional response to trustees with “good” 
hearsay reputations and are in turn more likely to trust them, and 
 
(b) trustors experience a negative emotional response to trustees with “bad” 
hearsay reputations and are in turn less likely to trust them.  
 
 
Hearsay versus Experiential Reputation 
Reputation is a community’s collective knowledge about the behavioral 
tendencies of a particular person or entity.  As such, a reputation theoretically contains 
more information than any one single individual’s personal experience might contain.  In 
an organizational context, information collected by the community may be important to 
individual sensemaking in that information from peers helps construct and clarify the 
meaning of organizational events (DeGoey, 2000).  Lind, Kray, and Thompson (1998) 
contend that reputation, or information obtained through social networks, is a more 
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powerful representation of reality than is a person’s personal experience because 
reputations are the compilation of numerous individuals’ numerous experiences.  Hearsay 
reputation might also be a more representative sample of a person or firm’s behavior, 
whereas a personal experience, a single data point, may reflect any number of potential 
biases.  Based on this line of reasoning, to the extent that it is beneficial to form an 
accurate opinion of another’s integrity or cooperative tendencies, trustors should weigh 
hearsay-type reputational information more heavily than that which comes of individual 
experience. 
I have previously argued that the trust that reputation elicits lies somewhere 
between calculative and psychological trust.  Shapiro et al. (1992) conceptualize another 
kind of trust, knowledge-based trust, as the ability to predict another’s behavior because 
the other is so well known to the trustor.  Lewicki and Bunker (1995, p. 149-150) use the 
following example, “Brothers who are always competing with each other learn to 
anticipate the other’s tactics so well that they can predict exactly how one will attempt to 
cheat and therefore take measures to ensure that cheating isn’t attempted.”  Shapiro et 
al.’s (1992) knowledge-based trust is a trust based on personal interaction or experience.  
Both hearsay reputation (an individual’s perception of a community’s collective 
knowledge about a specific object) and experiential reputation (the information about a 
specific object that an individual can attest to with certainty) provide information about a 
potential trustee on which trustors can rely in making trust decisions.  However, contrary 
to Lind et al.’s (1998) hypothesis, who argue that because reputation is based on 
collective experience it is a more powerful indicator of behavioral intentions, I predict 
that individuals will privilege information that is born of personal experience over that 
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which comes from others.  This prediction is based in part by the argument and evidence 
presented by Granovetter (1985) and Geertz (1979).  Granovetter (1985) contends that 
people trust knowledge acquired through their own experience more than that acquired 
through other sources, and Geertz’s (1979) empirical work supports this contention.   
According to Granovetter (1985), there are four reasons why information that 
comes through one’s own experience is better than that which comes through social 
networks: (1) it is less expensive; (2) it is more complete, containing more details and 
nuance, and is known (perceived) to be accurate; (3) the expectation for trustworthy 
behavior is greater with those whom future, continued interaction is likely; and (4) past 
experience lays the foundation of social linkage—“continuing economic relations often 
become overlaid with social content that carries strong expectations of trust and 
abstention from opportunism” (p. 490).   
These rationales for favoring information acquired through personal interaction 
(experience) over that which comes from others (reputation) are consistent with standard 
economic analysis save the fourth.  The fourth rationale is laden with the weight of social 
experience.  It suggests that people are less concerned with general reputation probability 
analyses—how might an actor interact with a randomly selected other—but are more 
interested in how that actor will interact with them, specifically.  For example, a certain 
used car dealer might have the worst kind of reputation for cheating his customers, but if 
I personally have developed a trusting relationship with him, based on past interactions, I 
am likely to continue to reward him with my business regardless of whatever bad 
experience others have had.  Geertz (1979) observed this phenomenon even in the 
hypercompetitive Moroccan bazaar markets. 
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  Sometimes individuals may have information from both the community (hearsay 
reputation) and personal experience (experiential reputation) which is contradictory.  A 
co-worker may have a reputation for not delivering on commitments, however in all your 
personal interaction with this person they have been nothing but timely.  Conflicting 
information of this sort may give way to cognitive dissonance when faced with the 
decision to trust.  Based on the above discussion, however, I predict that individuals will 
tend to resolve their dissonance by making decisions based on information acquired 
through personal experience rather than hearsay. 
HYPOTHESIS 6:  Individuals will trust more in persons or entities with relatively 
better experiential reputations than in those with relatively worse experiential 
reputations. 
 
HYPOTHESIS 7: Where both hearsay reputation and experiential reputation are 
available, experiential reputation will more strongly predict trust than will hearsay 
reputation. 
 
 
Hearsay Reputation, Experiential Reputation, and the Salience of Emotion 
As with the relationship between hearsay reputation and trust, I expect affect to 
mediate the relationship between experiential reputation and trust.  In those 
circumstances where a party trusted based on hearsay reputation and found their trust 
exploited—when expectations of trustworthiness were not met—I expect individuals to 
feel angry and perhaps betrayed.  A single betrayal amongst many cooperative acts is 
probably not enough to discourage trusting behavior, unless the many cooperative acts 
were directed towards others and the single betrayal was directed towards the trustor.  
Hearsay reputation, as the collective knowledge of a community, may indicate that a 
particular party behaves cooperatively generally, but if any one person faced with trusting 
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that party has had a negative experience, the negative affect caused by that negative 
experience will keep him or her from again trusting in that party, in a manner consistent 
with Dunn and Schweitzer’s (2005) finding that negative affect makes an individual less 
likely to trust.  I also expect the inverse, that when an individual “takes a chance” on a 
reputedly untrustworthy party and their trust is reciprocated, or a trusting act is made and 
reciprocated prior to the availability of any reputational information, trustors will 
experience a positive emotional reaction and will subsequently be more likely to trust that 
party in the future regardless of the trustee’s hearsay reputation.  Thus, information from 
personal experience is hypothesized to be more emotionally salient than information 
derived through social networks, such that emotional state will mediate the relationship 
between experiential reputation and trust, independent of hearsay reputation.   
HYPOTHESIS 8: The personal experience of trustors with trustees (experiential 
reputation) predicts trustor emotional state (and cancels any similar effect from 
hearsay reputation) such that 
 
(a) positive experiences elicit a positive emotional response from trustors, and 
 
(b) negative experiences elicit a negative emotional response from trustors. 
 
HYPOTHESIS 9:  Emotional state mediates the relationship between personal 
experience (experiential reputation) and trust such that 
 
(a) trustors experience a positive emotional response to having had a positive 
experience with a trustee and are in turn more likely to trust them, and 
 
(b) trustors experience a negative emotional response to having had a negative 
personal interaction with a trustee and are in turn less likely to trust them. 
 
 
  63
CHAPTER V 
 
REPUTATION IN A TRUST GAME 
 
You can’t build a reputation on what you are going to do. 
--Henry Ford 
 
Study 1 was designed to test the sensitivity of trustors to the hearsay reputation of 
trustees and evaluate the relative salience of personal experience versus hearsay 
reputation in decision-making.  Hypotheses 1 through 9b, presented in Chapter 4, are 
tested with a trust game (Berg et al, 1995; Kreps, 1990; Snijders & Keren, 1999), a two-
player sequential decision-making game (see Figure 5.1 for a graphical depiction of a 
trust game).  In this version, player one is given a sum of money which she can choose to 
keep (the decision not to trust) or invest a portion thereof in player two (the decision to 
trust).  If player one chooses to trust, the sum of money (the pot) is multiplied by a factor 
and given to player two.  Player two now chooses how to divide the pot between himself 
and player one.  If player two chooses to return a value greater than what player one gave 
up, player two is said to have reciprocated trust.  However, if player two chooses to 
return a value less than what player one gave up, player two is said to have exploited 
trust.  The payoff structure (see Figure 5.1) and rules of the game are explained to both 
players before the game begins. 
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Figure 5.1.  Flow and Payoff Structure of Trust Game by Risk Condition, Experiment 1 
 
Notes:  The tilde (~) indicates “not,” as in “Player one did not trust.”   
 
The numbers in parentheses indicate the payoffs for player one (first number) and player 
two (second number).  So in trust game A, if player one trusts and player two does not 
reciprocate that trust, the payoffs are 6 lab dollars and 24 lab dollars for player one and 
player two respectively. 
 
Payoffs and risk manipulation modeled after Malhotra (2004).   
 
 
According to the theoretical framework outlined by Coleman (1990) and the 
implementation used by Berg et al. (1995), participants demonstrate trust to facilitate 
exchange if the following conditions are met: (1) risk is assumed by the trusting party; (2) 
the trusted party chooses to reciprocate such that he or she benefits the trusting party at 
his or her own expense; and (3) both parties are better off than they would be had the 
trusting party chose not to trust.  The trust game used in this study accurately measures 
trust because it allows for these criteria to be met when (1) player one chooses to send 
money to player two, (2) player two has the option of returning a sum of money to player 
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one greater than player one gave up, and (3) because the total sum given to player one in 
the beginning is multiplied by a constant factor when passed from player one to player 
two, player one can potentially end up with more money by trusting than not.  In other 
words, joint value increases when player one engages in trusting behavior. 
The trust game is a simplified operationalization of many real-world trust 
situations.  In a commercial context, consumers engage in trusting behavior (e.g. paying 
for a good or service) expecting their behavior will be reciprocated by an honest 
fulfillment of a commitment (e.g. delivering the promised good or service).  Player one 
can gain by trusting only if her trust is reciprocated, which typifies the risk dynamic in 
real-world consumer transactions.  In a single iteration of the game, player two receives 
the highest payoff by exploiting player one and keeping most of the investment to 
himself, the real world equivalent of receiving payment but failing to deliver the 
promised good or service. 
The trust game also allows for the manipulation of contextual risk, hearsay 
reputation, and, in later rounds, exploitation (experiential reputation).  Contextual risk is 
operationalized as high when player one’s default payoff, or the payoff received if player 
one chooses not to invest (trust) in player two (see Figure 5.1), is high rather than low.  In 
other words, contextual risk is high when player one is putting more at risk, relative to 
potential gains, by trusting in player two.  This risk manipulation follows the procedure 
used by Malhotra (2004).   
In this version of the trust game, player two is simulated by a computer, and 
player two’s reputation is experimentally manipulated.  Player two’s reputation is 
represented as the number of times player two has reciprocated trust and exploited trust in 
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six, identical, past trust games.  For instance, player one might be told that player two has 
played an identical trust game several times before, and has reciprocated trust six of six 
times trusted.  The example given above is how a “good” reputation is operationalized in 
this experiment. 
Describing a reputation as “good” or “bad” may at first seem overly simplistic, 
but often the data from which hearsay reputations emerge would be difficult to interpret 
any other way.  Composite scores from consumer rankings is one way reputation is stored 
and communicated (and in Studies 3 & 4, operationalized).  Because it is this type of 
reputational device that I wish to model here, speaking of “good” and “bad” reputations 
is sufficient. 
 
Method 
Research Design 
The experiment was divided into two parts, corresponding to two sequential 
rounds of a trust game (see Figure 5.2).  The data collected from part one of the 
experiment were analyzed with a 2 x 2 (Contextual Risk x Trustee Hearsay Reputation) 
between-subjects design.  The dependent variable in Hypotheses 1, 2, 3, 5a, and 5b is 
player one’s trust in player two in Round 1, operationalized as player one’s (the trustor’s) 
decision to invest (or not to invest) in player two (the trustee) in Round 1.  Because the 
experiment was designed to measure the effects of contextual risk, the trustee hearsay 
reputation, and (in part two) trustee experiential reputation, only the behavior of the 
trustor is of interest.  Participants are told that they will be randomly assigned to the role 
of trustor or trustee, but in fact all participants were assigned the role of trustor and a 
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computer program simulated the trustee.  Computer simulated dyadic games have been 
used in prior research without evidence of participants suspecting they were not 
interacting with a real person (Goates & Friedman, 2006; Van Kleef, De Dreu, & 
Manstead, 2004). 
In many versions of the trust game, the trustor is allowed to give any proportion 
of his or her initial allotment to the trustee (e.g., Berg et al., 1995; Barclay, 2004).  
However, by measuring trustor’s decision to invest in this way, there remains ambiguity 
as to what behavior constitutes trust.  For example, if the trustor is given $10, any portion 
of which he or she can send to the trustee, and the trustor decides to send $5, it is not 
clear whether the trustor has demonstrated trusting behavior or not.  One might respond 
that any sum greater than zero demonstrates a degree of trust, but this argument is 
unsatisfying as we observe that the trustor who sends $1 (or 1/10 the value of their 
allotment) is not putting themselves in a position of any significant vulnerability, and is 
also demonstrating a great deal less trust than the player who sends $9.  An alternative 
design strategy is to give players a binary choice: trustors may either invest the whole of 
their allotment or none of it, trustees may either divide resources in their own or the 
others’ favor (for examples of this usage of the trust game, see Dasgupta, 2000; King-
Casas et al., 2005; or Malhotra, 2004).  By forcing the trustor to choose between only two 
options, we are able to observe without ambiguity his or her intentions.  Because the 
focus of this experiment was on the manifestation of trusting behavior, I adopted this 
alternative design. 
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Figure 5.2.  Trust Game, Experimental Design, Experiment 1 
 
Note:  The figure presented here is merely intended as a visual aid in understanding the 
research design, not as a theoretical model to define phenomena associated with each cell 
in the 2 x 2.   
 
Part two of the experiment involves a second, identical trust game that all 
participants who trusted in the first game were invited to play for the chance to increase 
their odds of winning a $100 prize.  Participants were not told about the second game 
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prior to completion of the first so as to not influence their strategy in the first game.  In 
the second game, participants were told they would again be playing the role of trustor 
and again with the same person as trustee, the trustee of course being simulated by 
computer.  All participants asked to complete part two of the experiment complied.   
Hypothesis 7 states that when hearsay and experiential reputation contradict one 
another, experiential reputation will overshadow hearsay reputation as means for making 
future trust decisions.  Part two of Experiment 1 is designed to test this and subsequent 
hypotheses.  Data from part two were analyzed with a 2 x 2 x 2 (Contextual Risk x 
Trustee Hearsay Reputation x Trustee Experiential Reputation) between-subjects design.  
The dependent variable for Hypotheses 6, 7, 9a, and 9b is the participant’s trust in player 
two in Round 2, or player one’s decision to invest (or not invest) in player two in Round 
2. 
Procedure 
Those who chose to participate were directed to a website where the nature of the 
game was explained (Figure 5.3 is a graphical representation of the experiment’s 
procedural flow).  All games were played and all data collected online.  Participants were 
told that they would be randomly assigned to either the role of player one (trusting party) 
or player two (trusted party), when in reality all participants were assigned to play the 
player one role; player two was simulated by computer program.  To make the simulation 
more believable, participants were told that they can play only at certain times of the day 
and only then if another participant is available.  However, if a potential participant 
logged on during “open” hours, he or she was able to participate.  A similar procedure 
was used by Goates and Friedman (2006). 
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Figure 5.3.  Procedural Flow of Experiment 1 
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 After the nature of the game was explained and a participant was “connected” 
with his or her opponent, the participant was told that their counterpart has played the 
game several times before.  Each participant (player one) is given information regarding 
his or her trading partner’s (computer-simulated player two’s) past behavior: the number 
of times player two chose to reciprocate versus exploit in past (fictional) runs of 
identically structured games.  The game was explained to participants both through 
pictures—by showing them a diagram of the game’s payoffs by condition—and through 
words (see Appendix A for the actual diagrams and accompanying text used to explain 
the experiment to research participants).  Explaining the game through both graphical and 
written text assures to the extent practically possible that participants understand the 
procedures and payoffs of the game.   
The diagrams shown participants indicated payoffs of actual US dollars.  
However, it was explained to participants that they were playing for “lab dollars,” and 
that each lab dollar represented a 1:600 chance at winning a $100 prize, several of which 
would be awarded after the experiment was completed.  The better participants did in the 
game (by absolute value, not comparative value) the better chance they had of winning 
the lottery.  For example, the payoff structure in Figure 5.1 shows that participants (all 
player one) in both risk conditions who choose to trust but whose trust is not reciprocated 
by player two receive the lowest possible payoff (6 lab dollars), whereas participants who 
choose to trust and whose trust was reciprocated by player two received the highest 
possible player one payoff (17 lab dollars).  Participants who get the lowest possible 
score (6 lab dollars) have a 1 in 100 chance at winning a $100 prize.  Participants who get 
the highest possible score (17 lab dollars) increase their chance of winning the $100 prize 
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by more than 2.8 times, to greater than 1 in 35.  Other researchers have used similar 
lottery payoff systems with success (Barclay, 2004).    
Immediately prior to the point where participants are asked for their trusting 
decision, they are presented with a short survey through which survey instruments for 
measuring positive and negative affect and trust are administered.  Because emotion is 
hypothesized to mediate the relationship between reputation and trust, it was important to 
measure emotion after participants were presented with and had time to process the 
reputation of the player two (remember that player two is simulated by computer and that 
reputation is experimentally manipulated), but before participants perform (or not) a 
trusting act. 
 After the rules of the game were explained, payoffs shown, participants given the 
trustee’s hearsay reputation, and after participants complete the emotion and trust 
surveys, participants are asked to decide whether or not to invest in player two.  The 
following is the text shown to all participants in the high risk, good reputation condition 
(to see the exact text used for all conditions, including color formatting, see Appendix A): 
You now have 14 lab dollars.   
 
You must choose to invest this sum in Player Two or to keep it to yourself.  
Remember, if you give the money to Player Two, your 14 lab dollars will become 
30.  Player Two then has two options for dividing it:  
 
Gives $17 to you and keeps $13 
 
OR  
 
Gives $6 to you and keeps $24. 
 
As was mentioned before, [player two] has already completed this exercise 
several times.  Here are [player two’s] statistics: 
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Number of times [player two] divided $30 investment in favor of Player 
One: 6 
 
Number of times [player two] divided $30 investment in favor of Player 
Two: 0 
 
 For those participants who engaged in trusting behavior, player two’s decision to 
reciprocate or exploit is communicated through a message to player one after 
approximately a one minute delay.  Because player two’s behavior is simulated by a 
computer, this delay represents the time it might take for a real person to process player 
one’s decision and choose to reciprocate or exploit.  In fact, the player two’s decision to 
reciprocate or exploit is manipulated as part of the experimental design. 
 Hypothesis 1, that trustees with good hearsay reputations will be trusted more 
often than those with bad hearsay reputations, Hypothesis 2, that individuals will trust 
more often under conditions of low contextual risk, and Hypothesis 3, that the effect of 
risk and trustees’ hearsay reputation is additive, were tested through the collection of data 
in part one of this experiment—the procedure described above.  Hypotheses regarding 
hearsay reputation’s effect on emotional state (H4a & H4b) and the meditating effect of 
emotional state on the relationship between hearsay reputation and trust (H5a & H5b) are 
also tested through these data.  However, I have also hypothesized the effect of 
experiential reputation on trust (H6), the salience of experiential reputation versus 
hearsay reputation (H7) and the emotional response of trusting parties to unreciprocated 
trust (H8 & H9).  To test these hypotheses, the computer-simulated Player Two’s 
decision to reciprocate or exploit player one’s trust was manipulated.  Participants who 
trust receive a message indicating the trustee’s computer-generated response and are 
afterwards invited to play an additional game, again as Player One and with the same 
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trustee (see Figure 5.3).  The trustee’s reputation data is recalculated and the process was 
repeated in this second game as described above. 
Participants 
Participants were drawn from the Vanderbilt University eLab research panel.  At 
the time data was collected, eLab was part of the Vanderbilt University Sloan Center for 
Internet Retailing and funded by a grant from the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation (at the time 
of publishing, eLab was funded entirely by Vanderbilt University).  eLab maintains a 
panel of over 50,000 internet users who have volunteered to participate in behavioral 
research projects.  All panelists are at least 18 years of age.  For this experiment, potential 
participants were randomly selected from the eLab panel and emailed an invitation to 
participate in an experiment about “consumer behavior in online retailing.”  Three 
hundred five participants completed the experiment, 52 percent of which were female.  
Data for part one of this experiment comes from those 305 participants.  Two hundred 
twenty-five exhibited trusting behavior in the first round of the game therefore qualifying 
themselves for a second game, part two of the experiment.  Fifty percent of these 225 
participants were female. 
Measures 
The dependent variable for Hypotheses 1, 2, 3, 5a, 5b, 6, 7, 8a, 8b, 9a, and 9b is 
the participant’s (player one’s) trusting behavior, or trust, in the trustee (player two).  
Trusting behavior, or the decision to trust, is a dichotomous variable; participants that 
choose to invest in player two are said to have engaged in trusting behavior, while 
participants who choose not to invest are said to have not engaged in trusting behavior.  
While this operationalization of trusting behavior has been used before (Berg et al., 1995; 
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Malhotra, 2004) and uncontroversial, the possibility must be entertained that when 
participants play the game that they choose arbitrarily, or that their choice may not 
related to trust.  Mayer et al. (1995) argue that cooperative behavior that looks like trust 
may in fact be motivated something other than trust.  Mayer and colleagues give three 
reasons why someone might act cooperatively without trusting: (1) external mechanisms 
exist which assure that the trusted party will not take advantage or act deceitfully; (2) if 
the issue does not leave the trusting party vulnerable—in other words, the matter is not 
important to the trustor; and (3) “if it’s clear that the trustee’s motives will lead him or 
her to behave in a way that coincides with the trustor’s desires” (p. 713).  In this present 
use of the trust game, none of these three reasons should apply.  However, to safeguard 
against the possibility of participants choosing the game’s cooperative option motivated 
by something other than trust participants are asked to complete a short questionnaire 
measuring trust.  Participants completed the measure immediately prior to submitting 
their investment decision.  Trust was measured through a modified version of the 
Organizational Trust Inventory (OTI).  The OTI-short form was developed by Cummings 
and Bromiley (1996) and a modified version for negotiation was used by Naquin and 
Paulson (2003).  Here I used a further modified version, removing items which did not 
make sense in this experimental context, or by removing merely terms such as 
“negotiation” or “joint gains” from items where necessary (scale items are listed in 
Appendix B).  If player one’s decision to invest in player two was motivated by trust, we 
would expect a significant correlation between player one’s investment decision and trust 
as measured by the OTI.   
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Hypotheses 4a predicts that good hearsay reputations will be processed in such a 
way as to instigate a positive affective state, and Hypothesis 4b predicts that bad hearsay 
reputations will instigate a negative affective state.  Hypothesis 5a and 5b predict that 
positive and negative affective states mediate the relationship between hearsay reputation 
and trusting behavior.  Similarly, Hypotheses 8a and 8b predict that experiential 
reputation will predict emotional state (and override any lingering hearsay reputational 
effect)—trustee reciprocity leading to positive trustor feelings and trustee exploitation 
leading to negative trustor feelings.  Hypotheses 9a and 9b predict that emotional state 
will mediate the relationship between experiential reputation and participant trusting 
behavior.  Because of the mediated relationships proposed in Hypotheses 5a, 5b, 9a, and 
9b, it is important that affect be assessed in such a way as to capture the emotional state 
of the participant between processing the reputational data of player two in the 
experiment and before the decision whether to invest in player two has been made.  
Therefore, a brief questionnaire, utilizing the Positive and Negative Affect Scale 
(PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988), was administered with the OTI immediately 
prior to player one submitting his or her investment decision.  The PANAS requires that 
participants read twenty “emotion words” (i.e. “excited,” “alert,” “distressed,” “hostile”) 
and indicate the extent to which the word describes their “feelings and emotions” while 
deciding to invest or not invest in player two on a five-point scale (where 1 = “very 
slightly” and 5 = “extremely”).  The PANAS measures both positive and negative affect 
as two separate, orthogonal scales.   
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Results 
Preliminary Analysis 
Manipulation checks for hearsay reputation and contextual risk were preformed as 
part of the OTI/PANAS questionnaire after player one made his or her initial decision to 
invest.  The hearsay reputation manipulation was checked through the question, “Given 
what you know about [player two], how would you evaluate his or her reputation for 
reciprocity.”  Participants were asked to respond on a seven-point Likert-type scale 
anchored between “very bad” and “very good.”  Participants in the good hearsay 
reputation condition responded with a mean of 5.60 (σ = 1.364) compared to a mean of 
3.75 (σ = 1.940) for those in the bad hearsay reputation condition.  An independent-
samples t-test confirms the means significantly different (t = -9.634, p < .001).  
Perceptions of risk were checked by asking, “If you choose to invest your lab dollars to 
Player Two, how much are you risking relative to what you stand to gain?”  Participants 
responded on a seven-point Likert-type scale anchored between “risking very little” and 
“risking a great deal.”  The mean response of those in the high-risk condition was 4.77 (σ 
= 1.636) while the mean response of those in the low-risk condition was 4.34 (σ = 1.863).  
An independent samples t-test confirms the means significantly for this manipulation also 
(t = -2.138, p < .05).   
A factor analysis of the twenty-item PANAS scale administered at T1, just prior to 
participants’ investment decision in Round 1, revealed two definite and distinct factors 
(Eigenvalues of 5.84 and 5.018; goodness-of-fit χ2 = 951.31, p < .001).  A scale 
developed from the ten items loading on the first factor (interested, excited, strong, 
enthusiastic, alert, inspired, determined, attentive, active, and proud), which are 
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consistent with definitions of positive affect, returned a Cronbach’s α of 0.905.  
Similarly, a scale developed from ten items loading on the second factor (afraid, guilty, 
hostile, irritable, ashamed, nervous, distressed, upset, scared, jittery), which are consistent 
with definitions of negative affect, returned a Cronbach’s α of 0.892.  The PANAS was 
again administered at T2, just prior to participants’ investment decision in Round 2.  A 
confirmatory factor analysis of the PANAS administered at T2 again revealed two 
definite and distinct factors (Eigenvalues of 7.385 and 6.196; goodness-of-fit χ2 = 
878.126, p < .001).  For the positive affect scale, Cronbach’s α = 0.946; for the negative 
affect scale, Cronbach’s α = 0.942. 
Trust was measured as behavior by the participant’s decision to invest in the 
(computer simulated) Player 2 trustee as well as by a survey instrument administered to 
participants just prior to making that decision.  Because there are two rounds to the trust 
game used in this study, there are two trust decisions made by participants (at T1 and T2) 
and two corresponding administrations of the OTI.  Means for participants’ trust decision 
by conditional cell are reported in Tables 5.1 and 5.2.  A factor analysis (maximum 
likelihood extraction) conducted on the nine-item trust instruments used at T1 and T2 
showed that all items loaded heavily on one factor with both administrations; the lowest 
weighted item at T1 loading at 0.352 and the lowest weighted item at T2 loading at 0.453.  
The chi-square goodness-of-fit statistic for the factor analyses on the OTI at both T1 and 
T2 was significant at p < .001.  Reliability analyses of the nine-item scale produced a 
Cronbach’s α of 0.892 at T1 and 0.927 at T2. 
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Table 5.1.  Means of Participants’ Decision to Trust by Conditional Cell at T1, 
Experiment 1 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5.2.  Means of Participants’ Decision to Trust by Conditional Cell at T2, 
Experiment 1 
 
 
 
The two measures of trust, participants’ investment decision and trust as measured 
by the OTI, are significantly correlated at T1 (r = 0.45, p < .001) and at T2 (r = 0.42, p < 
.001).  These results confirm that the trust decision in an investment-type game (such as 
described here) is a behavior motivated by trust, or that the decision to invest indicates 
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trust.  For means, standard deviations, and correlations between variables used in this 
experiment, see Tables 5.3 and 5.4. 
Primary Analysis 
Part One (H1 – H5b).  Hypotheses 1 and 2 state, respectively, that the hearsay 
reputation of the trustee and the contextual risk of the trusting situation will 
independently influence trustor trusting behavior.  An independent samples t-test 
comparing participants in the good reputation  versus bad reputation conditions revealed 
that trusting behavior was significantly higher in the good reputation condition (µ = 0.92, 
σ = 0.270) than in the bad reputation condition (µ = 0.55, σ = 0.499; t = -8.026, p < .001), 
providing support for Hypothesis 1.  A similar comparison of those in the high risk versus 
low risk conditions showed that trusting behavior was significantly lower in the high risk 
condition (µ = 0.69, σ = .463) than in the low risk condition (µ = 0.78, σ = 0.414; t = 
1.792, p < .05), supporting Hypothesis 2.  An ANCOVA model including variables for 
both hearsay reputation and contextual risk, while controlling for participant gender, 
confirms these results (see Table 5.5, Model 1).  The model proved significant (F[304] = 
23.184, p < .001; adj. R2 = 0.18) as did the coefficients for both hearsay reputation (F = 
64.500, p < .001) and contextual risk (F = 4.061, p < .05).  These results provide strong 
support for both Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2.
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Table 5.3.  Descriptive Statistics and Correlations between Variables Associated with the First Game (Hypotheses 1-5b)1 
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Table 5.4.  Descriptive Statistics and Correlations between Variables Associated with the Second Game (Hypotheses 6-9b)1 
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Hypothesis 3 predicts an interactive effect between hearsay reputation and 
contextual risk on trusting behavior.  Though the model was significant (F[304] = 17.988, 
p < .001; adj. R2 = 0.18) an ANCOVA reveals no statistical significance for the 
coefficient of the interaction term (F = 2.137, p = .07); see Table 5.5, Model 2).  
However, Hypothesis 3 specifically predicts that contextual risk will only matter when 
the trustee has a bad hearsay reputation (risk will have no effect on trusting behavior 
when the trustee has a good hearsay reputation).  A plot of the interaction modeled above 
suggests this to be the case (see Figure 5.4).  A t-test comparing participants in the high 
risk (µ = 0.91, σ = 0.289) and low risk (µ = 0.93, σ = 0.250) conditions, but only among 
those in the good trustee hearsay reputation condition, revealed no significant difference 
in levels of trust (t = .575, ns).  However, the same test comparing participants in the high 
risk (µ = 0.47, σ = 0.503) and low risk (µ = 0.63, σ = 0.486) conditions among those in 
the bad trustee hearsay reputation condition proved significant (t = 1.970, p < .05).  This 
test more succinctly matched the specific prediction of the interaction between hearsay 
reputation and contextual risk and the results support Hypothesis 3. 
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Table 5.5.  Analysis of Variance of Participant Trusting Behavior on Trustee Good 
Hearsay Reputation and Contextual Risk, Controlling for Participant Gender at T1, 
Experiment 1 
 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
Model                                1             2 
                                -----------   ----------- 
F                                 23.184***     17.988*** 
df                               304           304 
adj. R^2                           0.18          0.18 
                                -----------   ----------- 
                                     F             F       
                                -----------   ----------- 
Intercept                         93.950***     93.996*** 
Participant Gender                 0.397         0.418 
Good Hearsay Reputation           64.500***     64.653* 
Low Contextual Risk                4.061*        4.097 
Good Hearsay Reputation X  
   Low Contextual Risk                           2.137 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
*** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05  
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Figure 5.4.  Interaction of Contextual Risk and Trustee Hearsay Reputation Plotted on 
Participant Trusting Behavior at T1, Experiment 1  
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Table 5.6.  Participant Positive and Negative Affect Regressed on Trustee Good Hearsay 
Reputation, with Controls, at T1, Experiment 1 
 
--------------------------------------------------------------- 
Model                                1                 2 
                                -----------       ----------- 
DV                            Positive Affect   Negative Affect     
                                -----------       ----------- 
F                                  3.207*            4.078** 
df                               304               183 
adj. R^2                           0.02              0.06 
                                -----------       ----------- 
                                     β                 β       
                                -----------       ----------- 
Participant Gender                -0.045            -0.182 
Good Hearsay Reputation            0.171**          -0.168** 
Low Contextual Risk                0.025             0.133* 
--------------------------------------------------------------- 
** p < .01; * p < .05 
Note: Positive affect α = 0.905; negative affect α = 0.892. 
 
 
 
 
Table 5.7.  Analysis of Variance of Good Trustee Experiential Reputation on Participant 
Trusting Behavior, Controlling for Participant Gender, Good Trustee Hearsay Reputation, 
and Contextual Risk at T2, Experiment 1 
 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
Model                                1             2 
                                -----------   ----------- 
F                                  3.755*       16.59*** 
df                               224           224 
adj. R^2                           0.04          0.22 
                                -----------   ----------- 
                                     F             F       
                                -----------   ----------- 
Intercept                         94.180***    122.950*** 
Participant Gender                 0.365         1.069 
Good Hearsay Reputation            5.748*        8.339** 
Low Contextual Risk                5.951*        5.293* 
Good Experiential Reputation                    52.474*** 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
*** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05  
 
Hypotheses 4a and 4b state that trustee hearsay reputation will influence trustor 
emotional state, specifically stating that good reputations will invoke positive feelings 
(H4a) while bad reputations will invoke negative feelings (H4b).  Both Hypotheses 4a 
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and 4b were tested with ordinary least squares regression, controlling for both participant 
gender as well as contextual risk.  Both hypotheses were supported (see Table 5.6).  With 
positive affect modeled as DV, the overall model was significant (F[304] = 3.207, p < 
.05; adj. R2 = 0.021) as was the coefficient of trustee hearsay reputation (β = 0.171, p < 
.01; see Table 5.6, Model 1).  With negative affect modeled as DV, the overall model was 
also significant (F[304] = 5.221, p < .01; adj. R2 = 0.063), as was the coefficient of 
trustee hearsay reputation (β = -0.175, p < .01; see Table 5.6, Model 2).   
Hypothesis 5a and 5b state that the relationship between trustee hearsay 
reputation and participant (trustor) trusting behavior is mediated by participant’s 
emotional state, specifically, that good trustee reputations will invoke positive feelings on 
the part of the trustor leading to increased trusting behavior (H5a) and that bad trustee 
reputations will invoke negative feelings on the part of the trustor leading to decreased 
trusting behavior (H5b).  Following the recommendation of James and Brett (1984) and 
James, Mulaik and Brett (2006), the mediated relationships were tested through a 
confirmatory analytic technique, in this case, using SPSS Amos 7.0.  James and Brett 
specifically argued that when mediation models are conceptualized as causal models, 
analytic techniques should be applied that are specifically designed to test causal models, 
such as structural equation modeling (SEM).  Indeed, the experiment was specifically 
designed as a causal model.  Participants are first presented with the trustee’s hearsay 
reputation and explained its significance, then asked to complete the PANAS measure, 
and finally they record their decision to invest in the trustee.  The sequential 
measurement of variables used in the analysis fits well the methodological requirements 
for testing mediation through SEM. 
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The specific hypotheses tested here were that trustor positive affect (H5a) and 
negative affect (H5b) would partially mediate the relationship between hearsay 
reputation and trust.  The distinction between complete mediation and partial mediation is 
important.  In a simple three variable model, where Y represents the dependent variable, 
X is the antecedent, and M is the mediating variable, complete mediation is represented 
as X Æ M Æ Y.  To determine complete mediation, the analytic technique, whether by 
way of the Baron and Kenny (1986) technique or by SEM, must demonstrate that (1) X 
has a significant effect on Y and (2) X separately has an effect on M, that (3) M has a 
significant effect on Y, but that (4) when both X and M are included in a model 
predicting Y, that X does not have a significant effect on Y.  Partial mediation differs 
from complete mediation in that this last condition is not required.  In other words, M is 
said to partially mediate the relationship between X and Y when (1) X has a significant 
effect on Y and (2) X separately has an effect on M, (3) M has a significant effect on Y, 
and (4) when both X and M are included in a model predicting Y, both X and M 
significantly affect Y.  To test partial mediation with SEM, partial mediation must be 
predicted a priori, the model must be shown to fit the model (through various goodness-
of-fit statistics), and the coefficients for the paths X Æ M and M Æ Y must be 
statistically significant (James, Mulaik, & Brett, 2006). 
Figure 5.5 shows the path model used to test the mediation models predicted in 
Hypotheses 5a and 5b.  While only the mediation paths from hearsay reputation to 
trusting behavior through trustor positive and negative affect are hypothesized, additional 
paths are included in the model as controls. 
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Figure 5.5.  A Path Model Representing the Mediation Model Described in Hypotheses 
5a and 5b, at T1, Experiment 1  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.6.  The Path Model Used to Test Hypotheses 5a and 5b, with Standardized 
Coefficients, at T1, Experiment 1  
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In structural equation modeling, the model must be shown to fit the data before 
individual path coefficients can be meaningfully interpreted.  The goodness-of-fit 
statistics used to test the fit of the data to the model are generally accepted in the 
literature as adequate indicators of model fit.  First, a χ2 statistic, where significant, 
indicates that the model statically differs from the data.  Next, three model fit statistics, 
the comparative fit index (CFI), the normed fit index (NFI), and the root-mean-square 
error of approximation (RMSEA) were examined, each with it’s unique strength in 
determining fit.  Models returning CFI and NFI statistics above 0.9 are considered 
acceptable, whereas the RMSEA statistic should be below 0.05. 
The data fit the hypothesized model well (χ2[4, N = 305] = 1.859, ns.).  All 
goodness-of-fit statistics were within accepted standards (CFI = 0.998; NFI = 0.929; 
RMSEA = 0.011).  The data also supports the predicted indirect mediation effects.  While 
the direct path from trustee hearsay reputation to trust remains significant (β = 0.312, p < 
.001), paths from trustee hearsay reputation to trust through both trustor positive affect 
and trustor negative affect were also significant (see Figure 5.6 for standardized beta 
weights for all paths).  First, the path from hearsay reputation to positive affect is 
significant and in the expected direction (β = 0.295, p < .01) as is the subsequent path 
from positive affect to trust (β = 0.059, p < .05).  Second, the path from hearsay 
reputation to negative affect is significant and in the expected direction (β = -.235, p < 
.001) as is the path from negative affect to trust (β = -0.164, p < .001).  These results 
fulfill the requirements described by James, Mulaik, and Brett (2006) and support the 
hypotheses (H5a & H5b) that trustor positive and negative affect indirectly mediate the 
relationship between trustee hearsay reputation and a trustor’s decision to trust. 
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Part Two (H6 – H9b).  Those who chose to trust in Round 1 of the trust game, 
225 of the original 305 participants, played a second round.  Trustee reciprocity 
(remember that all participants played the role of trustor; trustees were simulated by 
computer) was manipulated so that half of the participants had their trust reciprocated, 
while the other half were exploited.  This manipulation served as the basis for 
experiential reputation in this experiment. 
Hypothesis 6 states that participants will trust more in a party with a “good” 
experiential reputation and less in a party with a “bad” experiential reputation.  
Comparing means in the good experiential reputation (µ = 0.96, σ = 0.186) and bad 
experiential reputation (µ = 0.62, σ = 0.489) conditions revealed a significant difference 
in trust (t = -7.086, p < .001).  Modeling trusting behavior in Round 2 as dependent 
variable in an ANCOVA, including good experiential reputation, good hearsay 
reputation, and contextual risk as predictors and participant gender as a control, 
substantiated these results.  The model was significant (F[224] = 16.59, p < .001; adj. R2 
= 0.22) as well as the independent effect of good experiential reputation on trusting 
behavior (F = 52.474, p < .001; see Table 5.7).   
Note also the relative effects of hearsay versus experiential reputation in Table 
5.7.  When experiential reputation is excluded the model is significant (F = 3.755, p < 
.05), but has little explanatory power (adj. R2 = 0.04).  However, when experiential 
reputation is included, the model is meaningfully better at explaining the variance in trust 
(adj. R2 = 0.22).  Repeating the analysis with logistic regression reveals the relative 
strength of the effect of experiential reputation relative to hearsay reputation on trust.  
The overall model was significant (χ2[df = 4] = 59.624, p < .001; Nagelkerke R2 = 0.36), 
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as were the beta weights of both hearsay reputation (β = 1.076, p < .01) and experiential 
reputation (2.975, p < .001; see Table 5.8).  Of special interest, however, is that the 
estimated odds ratio of experiential reputation (eβ = 19.589) is more than six times that of 
hearsay reputation (eβ = 2.933), meaning that in this model a change in trustee 
experiential reputation is more than six times more likely to predict the dependent 
variable, trust, than is trustee hearsay reputation.  While these results confirm the 
(unexpected) result that the effect of hearsay reputation remains significant when 
experiential reputation is included in the model, they nonetheless provide strong support 
for Hypothesis 7.  While the effect of hearsay reputation cannot be denied, the relative 
effect of the two predictors must be considered.  The models including experiential 
reputation have much more explanatory power over the dependent variable. 
Hypotheses 8a and 8b predict that the trustee’s experiential reputation influences 
the buyer’s expression of positive (H8a) and negative affect (H8b).  Using simple 
ordinary least squares, experiential reputation was regressed on participant expression of 
positive affect and negative affect, controlling for participant gender, hearsay reputation, 
and contextual risk.  Model 1 was significant (F[224] = 4.927, p < .01; adj. R2 = 0.07), as 
was the coefficient for trustee experiential reputation on participant positive affect (β = 
0.539, p < .001; see Table 5.9, Model 1).  Likewise, Model 2 demonstrated the significant 
effect of trustee experiential reputation on participant negative affect.  Both the model 
(F[224] = 3.312, p < .05; adj. R2 = 0.04) and the coefficient for experiential reputation (β 
= -0.304, p < .01) were significant (see Table 5.9, Model 2).  These results provide strong 
support for both Hypotheses 8a and 8b.   
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Hypotheses 9a and 9b again predict a mediated relationship between the 
reputation predictor variable and trusting behavior.  In this case, the hypotheses deal with 
the relationship of trustee experiential reputation to trusting behavior.  The prediction is 
that the relationship is partially mediated by the participant’s experience of (H9a) positive 
and (H9b) negative affect.  Again following the recommendation of James and Brett 
(1984) and James, Mulaik, and Brett (2006) for mediated causal models, the hypotheses 
were tested using SEM.  A path model representing the tested structural equation is 
shown in Figure 5.7.  Only the relationships experiential reputation Æ positive affect Æ 
trust and experiential reputation Æ negative affect Æ trusting behavior are of interest 
here, however other endogenous variables—trustee hearsay reputation, contextual risk, 
participant gender—are included as controls. 
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Table 5.8.  Good Hearsay and Good Experiential Reputation Regressed Logistically on 
Trusting Behavior at T2, Contextual Risk and Participant Gender Included as Controls, 
Experiment 1 
 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
Model                                1             2 
                                -----------   ----------- 
Chi-square                        11.012*       59.624*** 
df                                 3             4 
Nagelkerke R^2                     0.07          0.36 
                                -----------   ----------- 
                                   Exp(B)        Exp(B)       
                                -----------   ----------- 
Constant                           5.062**       2.135 
Participant Gender                 0.808         0.700 
Good Hearsay Reputation            2.243*        2.933** 
Low Contextual Risk                0.438*        0.444* 
Good Experiential Reputation                    19.589*** 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
*** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05 
 
 
 
Table 5.9.  Participant Positive and Negative Affect Regressed on Trustee Good 
Experiential Reputation, with Controls, at T2, Experiment 1 
 
--------------------------------------------------------------- 
Model                                1                 2 
                                -----------       ----------- 
DV                            Positive Affect   Negative Affect     
                                -----------       ----------- 
F                                  4.927**           3.312* 
df                               224               224 
adj. R^2                           0.07               0.04 
                                -----------       ----------- 
                                     β                 β       
                                -----------       ----------- 
Participant Gender                -0.119            -0.100 
Good Hearsay Reputation            0.128            -0.065 
Low Contextual Risk               -0.016             0.199† 
Good Experiential Reputation       0.589***         -0.304** 
--------------------------------------------------------------- 
*** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05; † p < .1 
Note: Positive affect α = 0.946; negative affect α = 0.942 
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Figure 5.7.  A Path Model Representing the Mediation Model Described in Hypotheses 
9a and 9b, at T2, Experiment 1  
 
 
 
Figure 5.8.  The Path Model Used to Test Hypotheses 9a and 9b, with Standardized 
Coefficients, at T2, Experiment 1  
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The χ2 statistic for the hypothesized model was not significant (χ2[7, N = 225] = 
6.040, ns.), indicating that the data fit the model.  Additionally, commonly used 
goodness-of-fit statistics were all within accepted standards (CFI = 1.000; NFI = 0.943; 
RMSEA = 0.000).  These results suggest that it is appropriate to interpret specifically 
hypothesized path relationships.  To demonstrate that the relationship between trustee 
experiential reputation and participant trust is partially mediated by participant positive 
affect, the path from experiential reputation to positive affect must be significant as well 
as the path from positive affect to trust.  Because a partial mediation was hypothesized, it 
is expected that the direct path from experiential reputation to trust will also be 
significant.  The data did not support these predictions.  The path from experiential 
reputation to positive affect was significant (β = 0.589, p < .001), however the path from 
positive affect to trust was not (-0.002, ns.; see Figure 5.8 for the coefficients of all 
paths).  These results provide no support for Hypothesis 9a.  Hypothesis 9b, on the other 
hand, was supported by the data.  The path from experiential reputation to negative affect 
was significant (β = -0.304, p < .01) as was the path from negative affect to trust (β  = -
0.083, p < .01), both in the expected direction.  Also as expected, the direct path from 
experiential reputation to trust was significant (β = -0.325, p < .001), confirming partial, 
rather than complete, mediation. 
 
Post-Hoc Analysis 
 Of special interest in this dissertation is the relationship between two kinds of 
reputation—hearsay reputation, or social information gleaned through social networks, 
and experiential reputation, social information gleaned through personal experience.  
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Hypothesis 7 pits these two constructs against each other, and I predicted that when 
decision-makers had both types of reputational information available, they would make 
decisions based on experiential reputation, or that experiential reputation would more 
strongly influence the decision to trust than would hearsay reputation.  While the 
previous analysis confirms this prediction, the significant effect of hearsay reputation in 
the complete model remains a point of interest.  This result suggests a more nuanced 
relationship between hearsay and experiential reputation than hypothesized. 
 Table 5.7, Model 2, reports the results of an ANCOVA, with the participants’ 
trusting behavior at T2 as dependent variable and participant gender, trustee hearsay 
reputation, contextual risk, and trustee experiential reputation as predictors.  The analysis 
reveals that, contrary to expectations, both experiential reputation (F = 58.750, p < .001) 
and hearsay reputations (F = 8.745, p < .01) have a significant influence on participant 
trust.  However, it must be acknowledged that experiential reputation has a much larger 
influence, by F statistic, an influence more than five times greater than hearsay 
reputation.  This observation prompted additional analysis. 
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Table 5.10.  Interaction Effects of Good Hearsay and Good Experiential Reputation on Participant Trusting Behavior at T2, 
Experiment 1 
 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                                                            Experiential  Experiential 
Model                                1             2        Reputation:   Reputation: 
                                                                Bad          Good 
                                -----------   -----------   -----------   ----------- 
F                                 16.590***     14.608***      4.89**        2.05 
df                               225           225           112           113 
adj. R^2                           0.22          0.23          0.10          0.03 
                                -----------   -----------   -----------   ----------- 
                                     F             F             F             F       
                                -----------   -----------   -----------   ----------- 
Constant                         112.953***    124.825***     35.310***    238.037*** 
Participant Gender                 1.069         1.092         3.375†        4.130* 
Good Hearsay Reputation            8.339**       8.745**       8.301**       0.291 
Contextual Risk                    5.293*        4.724*        2.750         1.381 
Good Experiential Reputation      52.474***     58.750*** 
Good Hearsay Reputation X 
   Good Experiential Reputation                  5.363* 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
*** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05; † < .1 
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Figure 5.9.  Interactive Effect of Hearsay Reputation and Experiential Reputation on the 
Estimated Marginal Means of Participant Trust at T2, Experiment 1 
  
 
Table 5.10 reports the results of four Analyses of Covariance.  The first repeats 
the analysis reported in Table 5.7, Model 2.  The second adds the interaction of hearsay 
and experiential reputation as a predictor.  The third examines those participants in the 
bad experiential reputation condition only and the fourth those participants in the good 
experiential reputation condition only.  Results indicate a significant interaction between 
hearsay and experiential reputation.  In the second model, the F statistics for both the 
model (F[225] = 124.83, p < .001; Adj. R2 = 0.23) and the interaction term (F = 5.363, p 
< .05) were significant.  A plot of the two reputation variables on the estimated marginal 
means of trust suggests that (1) hearsay reputation influences trust decision-making only 
when prior personal experience with the trustee has been negative, and that (2) when 
prior personal experience with the trustee has been positive, information regarding the 
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trustee’s behavior with others is not considered (see Figure 5.9).  The final two analyses 
support this conclusion.  Examining only those participants in the bad experiential 
reputation condition, an ANCOVA, with trusting behavior modeled as dependent variable 
and participant gender, hearsay reputation, and contextual risk included as predictors, 
revealed a significant coefficient for hearsay reputation (F = 8.301, p < .001), while a 
similar analysis using only data from those participants in the good experiential 
reputation condition revealed a non-significant result (F = 0.291, ns.; see Table 5.10).   
 
Discussion 
 Several important conclusions can be drawn from these results.  First, these 
results strongly support the idea that reputation matters.  Hearsay reputation alone had an 
impact on trust, confirming the results of Tinsley et al. (2002) and others.  Additionally, 
and independently, experiential reputation had a strong impact on trust.  Disentangling 
the effects of these two constructs, both theoretically and empirically, is a central purpose 
of this dissertation.  Results from this experiment support the theoretical argument, but 
these results are also important because previous empirical work has not made this 
distinction (i.e. Chen et al., 2004; Fehr & Gachter, 2000; Hill, 2002; Kaplin et al., 2000; 
Ostrom et al., 1992; Yamagishi, 1986), making the results of these studies sometimes 
ambiguous and difficult to interpret. 
 A second important conclusion relates to the type of information that reputation 
consumers perceive reputation to contain.  Others (e.g. Ostrom, 2002) have suggested 
that measures of reputation subsume all elements of transactional risk.  I have argued, 
however, that context matters—that reputation consumers weigh trustee reputation 
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relative to other risks, such as the quantity of resources they are willing to entrust.  
Results from this experiment support this conclusion.  Participants were more likely to 
trust when there was less at stake, when they stood to lose less if their trust were 
exploited.  However, an interaction effect provides additional insight.  Results suggest 
that when trustees have a good reputation, trustors are just as likely to risk a large amount 
as they are a small amount.  The same is not true, however, when the trustee has a bad 
reputation.  In this case it appears that trustor might be willing to take a bet with the 
trustee if stakes are low.  Care must be taken in interpreting this result, however.  The 
difference between a big versus a small risk in this experiment, while proportionally 
great, was probably insignificant relative to the practical economic realities of 
participants. 
 Third, the results of this experiment also help to articulate the cognitive processes 
involved in consuming reputational information.  Results suggest a strong causal 
relationship between both types of reputation and the experience of both positive and 
negative affect by the reputation consumer.  This is true when the trustor has had no 
previous experience with the trustee, but it is also true when the trustor has had personal 
experience with the trustee, and in this later case it is experiential reputation that triggers 
trustor emotional state and hearsay reputation has little if any effect.  Results also showed 
that the emotional state of trustors had a strong predictive effect on trustors’ propensity to 
engage in trusting behavior, a result which substantiates and clarifies the findings of 
Dunn and Schwitzer (2005), who also reported a predictive relationship between 
emotional state and trust.  However, the current study builds on their findings by 
manipulating emotional state in a context relevant to the trust decision, whereas the mood 
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manipulation Dunn and Schwitzer used was completely divorced from the trusting 
scenario later used to measure trust.  Thus, we see a causal pattern develop—good 
reputation, be it hearsay or experiential, leads to positive emotion which leads to trusting 
behavior; bad reputation leads to negative emotion which leads to punishing behavior. 
If we were to understand reputation consumption through a simple economic lens 
of individual self-interest, we would still predict that a trustee’s reputation would predict 
trustor trusting behavior, but we would reason that trustors are merely making a 
calculated decision as to the odds of their trust being reciprocated, and there would be no 
reason to suspect emotion had a role in trust decision-making.  Introducing emotion into 
the model, and verifying both that reputation induces an emotional reaction and that the 
emotional reaction predicts trusting behavior, lends credibility to the alternative 
hypothesis argued here, that the link between reputation and emotion is driven not by 
economic self-interest, but by actors’ perceptions of fairness—that bad reputations, 
signaling past non-cooperative behavior, induce feelings of anger, resentment, or some 
other constellation of negative feelings, feelings which lead to a desire to punish the non-
cooperative actor; and that good reputations, which signal past cooperative behavior, 
induce feelings of contentment, satisfaction, or other positive feelings which motivate a 
desire to reward the cooperative actor.   
The final conclusion is really a set of conclusions regarding the interplay between 
hearsay and experiential reputation in trust decision-making.  Results provided support 
for both Hypotheses 6 and 7, that is, experiential reputation had a strong influence on 
trust, and when trustors had access to both types of reputation, experiential reputation had 
a much more meaningful impact on trust than did hearsay reputation.  However, the 
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inclusion of experiential reputation did not entirely absorb the effects of hearsay 
reputation.  When trustors had a negative personal experience with the trustee they appear 
to rely on information from other sources, being much more likely to trust when others 
have had a positive experience than when they have not.  These results suggest a 
reworking of Granovetter’s (1985) hierarchy of social information.  While these results 
convincingly suggest that reputation consumers prefer, and rely upon, information from 
personal experience over that from others’ experiences, this effect appears to be more 
pronounced when personal experience has been positive.  When personal experience is 
negative it may be that trustors second-guess their prior experience, dismissing it as a 
fluke or an isolated experience when considered next to the several experiences of others.  
Trustors may also be expressing insecurity in their ability to accurately process 
reputational information.  Alternatively, it may be that the nature of the game modeled in 
this experiment lends itself to trustor risk-taking, that it is the inclination of participants 
to trust unless overpowering evidence to the contrary is available. 
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CHAPTER VI 
 
TRUST IN INTERNET TRANSACTIONS 
 
The slanderer and the assassin differ only in the weapon they use; with the one it is the 
dagger, with the other the tongue.  The former is worse than the latter, for the last only 
kills the body, while the other murders the reputation. 
--Tyron Edwards 
 
To strengthen my claim that reputational processing affects trust decision-making, 
I will further explore Hypotheses 1-9b in two experiments designed to simulate real 
world contexts where reputation matters—traditional online retailing and online 
auctioning.  However, these online contexts also afford the opportunity to pursue 
additional questions related to how reputational information is processed and used in 
making trust decisions.  In this chapter, I examine the unique role of reputation in 
inspiring consumer confidence and trust in the online retail marketplace.  Likening 
consumers in an online retail market to lenders who are unable to distinguish between 
safe and risky borrowers, I present three propositions and one testable hypothesis 
(Hypothesis 10) regarding how consumers make trust decisions in the absence of 
reputational cues as well as how reputational information is employed to make trust 
decisions when it is available.  Hypothesis 10 is tested in the experiments presented in 
Chapters 7 and 8. 
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The Role of Trust for Market-Newcomers 
Common wisdom in online shopping suggests that to minimize the risk of being 
defrauded consumers should only choose well-known retail or service outlets.  
Consumers wary of being cheated by unknown fraudsters are hesitant to reveal credit 
card information or to otherwise trust new and/or unknown internet businesses to fulfill 
their commitments.  Their caution, however, may be unfounded. 
In a paper on borrower reputation in debt markets, Diamond (1989) outlines three 
types of borrowers: (1) safe borrowers, who always choose safe projects, (2) risky 
borrowers, who always choose risky, but potentially high-returning projects, and (3) 
strategic borrowers who select a project based on its expected long-term payoff.  
However, lenders are unable to distinguish between borrowers with whom they have no 
experience (or what serves as a proxy for experience in lending markets—credit history 
with other lenders).  Therefore, lenders always lend to unknown borrowers at the same 
high rate, the rate they would lend to risky borrowers.  Strategic borrowers, recognizing 
that lenders cannot distinguish between borrower types, will only take on risky projects—
projects with a profit potential high enough to compensate for the high cost of borrowing.  
Either through luck or finesse, the strategic borrower may eventually choose a project 
which succeeds and will subsequently be successful in fulfilling his or her debt 
obligations with the lender.  In so doing, the borrower develops a “reputation” for being a 
safe borrower.  Having thus established this reputation, the strategic borrower nurtures it 
further by “masquerading” as a safe borrower, securing low interest rates because of her 
good reputation and choosing only safe projects. 
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Let us imagine the consumer in an online retail interaction as the lender in 
Diamond’s (1989) analysis.  The consumer is analogous to the lender in Diamond’s 
model because the consumer, like the lender, must interpret reputational cues in making 
trust decisions.  When a consumer purchases an item from a well-known, well-reputed 
retailer, she assumes a low risk of being defrauded and is therefore willing to pay a 
certain price, akin to the interest rate a lender assigns the safe borrower.  However, when 
a consumer transacts with a firm of marginal reputation, the consumer applies a risk 
discount to the price she is willing to pay, akin to the high interest rate a lender assigns 
the “risky” borrower.  In other words, the consumer is not willing to pay the low risk 
premium she would to the well-reputed retailer.  Instead, the consumer applies a bad 
reputation risk discount to the value she would otherwise be willing to pay for the 
product or service he or she is purchasing.  The discount is a hedge against the perceived 
increased probability of being defrauded by a retailer with a marginal reputation.  To the 
consumer, firms with no reputational history, like borrowers with no borrowing history, 
are indistinguishable from disreputable firms.  Thus, consumers apply the same risk 
discount to unknown firms or firms with minimal reputational markers as they do to firms 
with marginal reputations.  
The model can also be conceptualized in terms of market-clearing prices (see 
Figure 5.1).  In a market of well-known, well-reputed firms—where the quality of goods 
and services is assured, both by actual product quality and a reasonable return policy—
the market clears at a price P0.  However, consumer demand decreases in a market with 
firms of unknown reputation (because consumers cannot distinguish between unknown 
and disreputable firms), resulting in a market-clearing price of P1.  It is therefore expected 
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that consumers will pay less for advertised identical goods when contracted from an 
unknown firm versus a known, well-reputed firm.   
PROPOSITION 1:  Consumers are not willing pay as much for identical goods from 
unknown firms as they are from known, well-reputed firms. 
 
Furthermore, known firms that have established cooperative reputations with 
consumers may be less motivated to strictly maintain cooperative norms.  A single 
consumer’s sour experience will not likely taint the reputable image of a long-running 
interest.  However, from an unknown firm, worried about its developing reputation, we 
might expect to observe a sort of ubercooperative behavior.   
In Diamond’s (1989) model of lending behavior, it is clear that the unknown firm, 
in order to maximize its long-run payoff, will want to emulate or masquerade as a 
reputable firm.  In fact, there is reason to believe that the unknown firm has more 
incentive to behave cooperatively than the known, reputable firm.  In an analysis of new 
employee labor markets, Holmstrom (1999) argues that the behavior of new employees, 
who have little history in a firm, is weighed more heavily and judged more critically than 
employees with more history when mangers and co-workers evaluate ability or potential 
(what we might call a first-impression effect).  In a multi-round game situations (like the 
continuous interaction of employees with their superiors and peers) where uncertainty 
exists in the minds of players about a property or characteristic of another, players look to 
past behavior to predict future behavior (Wilson, 1985).  A new employee’s behavior will 
be judged more critically; thus, new employees have an interest in performing at their 
best during the first days, weeks, or months of their stint with an employer (Holmstrom, 
1999).  Likewise, it’s expected that what little reputational information is available to the 
consumer regarding an unknown internet retailer will have more salience and be judged 
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more critically than the reputational information of the well-known retailer.  New firms 
therefore may have a greater interest in delivering quality goods and services than even 
well-known, well-reputed firms. 
Dellarocas (2003) explains that sometimes players in long-term games lock 
themselves into a particular action.  For example, in a prisoner’s dilemma game, a player 
might signal their long-term cooperative intentions by removing their very ability to 
defect.  These kinds of actions are referred to generally as commitment types.  A subclass 
of the commitment type is called the Stackelberg type, after the nineteenth century 
German economist Heinrich von Stackelberg.  Stackelberg types are players in long-term 
games who would credibly commit to the most profitable long-term action if they could 
so commit.  For example, in an online auction context like eBay, where reputation is 
developed over time and available to potential future customers or sellers in the form of 
feedback scores, the Stakelberg action would be to cooperate (fulfill commitments), 
because cooperation maximizes the online auction user’s lifetime payoffs.  The longer the 
game, the greater the benefits of the Stakelberg action.  In the case of a firm (versus an 
individual), where its lifetime may long surpass the interests of a single person, the 
lifetime is potentially (or at least theoretically) infinite.   
Players utilize a variety of methods to demonstrate a commitment to a long-term 
cooperative strategy, including conspicuous advertising expense (Nelson, 1970).  The 
mechanism of interest here, of course, is the development of a cooperative reputation, 
which can only be achieved through repeated cooperative action, and actions toward the 
beginning of a firm’s life are the most salient.  Thus, I expect that new firms in an online 
marketplace, to the extent to which they have the capacity to fulfill commitments, will 
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fulfill them with at least the same regularity and standard of quality as, if not greater than 
will known, well-reputed firms. 
PROPOSITION 2:  New or unknown firms will cooperate in long-term games at 
least as frequently as known, well-reputed firms. 
 
Researchers studying human generosity have theorized that gift-giving and other 
generous behaviors, while having their obvious short-term costs, pay off in the long-run 
through direct (e.g. Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981; Axelrod, 1984; Trivers, 1971) and 
indirect (e.g. Alexander, 1987; Milinski, Semmann & Krambeck, 20002; Nowak & 
Sigmund, 1998a; Nowak & Sigmund, 1998b) reciprocal generosity.  Wedekind and 
Braithwaite (2002) found that among a group of participants randomly paired to play a 
series of single-shot (meaning they never played with the same partner twice) prisoner 
dilemma and reciprocity games, but where tallies of cooperative versus uncooperative 
behavior were kept and available to all, more generous, cooperative players fared better 
overall than less generous, competitive players.  In other words, players developed 
reputations characterizing their behavior.  Reputations formed in prior games resulted in 
increased cooperation from players in later games which resulted in higher overall 
payoffs. 
While these observations do not lead to direct propositions regarding whether 
firms in the online retail marketplace (or any other marketplace) will choose to behave 
more or less cooperatively, they do allow for predictions of outcomes contingent upon 
that choice.  Reputation is a dynamic property that travels through loosely-coupled 
networks.  Reputational information is not direct experience, but rather the perception of 
others’ experience.  Where a new or unknown firm fulfills its contracted commitments 
with consumers by delivering quality goods and services, it is expected that other 
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potential consumers will come to know this and, in a sense, reciprocate a firm’s good will 
with patronage.  Consumers do this not as indirect reciprocity of generosity, per se, but 
because it is in their financial best interest, assuming that the firm that has cooperated 
more in the past is more likely to cooperate in the future. 
PROPOSITION 3:  New or unknown firms that demonstrate cooperative behavior 
from the time of their entrance into the marketplace will generate more profits 
long-term than firms that do not.  
 
 
A Caveat 
The propositions stated here, taken together, suggest that conventional wisdom 
regarding the safety of purchasing products from unknown retailers may be ill-founded.  
New and unknown retailers must discount their products to the market-clearing price of 
the unknown firm, but also have an interest in delivering quality goods and services to at 
least the standard established by known, well-reputed firms in the same industry sector.  
Therefore, consumers may be better off, both in terms of price and risk, doing their online 
shopping with the unknown retailer.   
There is, however, one important caveat.  An important component to a firm’s 
“good” reputation is its ability to fulfill contracted commitments (Fombrun & Shanley, 
1990; Mayer et al., 1996).  A well-known firm has likely already demonstrated that it can 
deliver on its promises.  A new firm, despite its best intentions, is untested in its product 
delivery capabilities.  Thus, we must concede that despite my suggestion that consumers 
are better off purchasing from unknown retailers versus known, well-reputed firms, there 
remains risk associated with the new firm’s unproven mechanism for delivering goods 
and services.  
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A Testable Hypothesis 
 I argued at the beginning of this chapter that consumers are not willing to pay as 
much for identical products from firms with no reputations as they will from firms with 
good reputations.  Of course, to have a reputation at all, a firm must be known.  A firm 
new to the marketplace must, by the definition of reputation, be reputation-less, because 
the community which compiles reputational information has had no access to information 
about the firm.  A firm can only develop a reputation—that is, a hearsay reputation—after 
having interacted with a community, which compiles its information collectively to 
produce a reputational schema.   
The decision to place trust in, and how much to trust in, a given firm is equivalent 
to player one’s decision to invest in player two as modeled in Study 1’s trust game.  In a 
real-world application of the trust game, such as in an online retailing market, a trustor 
(consumer) who invests more money in a purchase is demonstrating more trust in the 
trustee (the firm).  Therefore, the amount of money the consumer is willing to put at risk 
with the firm is a measure of the consumer’s trust in the firm. 
HYPOTHESIS 10:  All else equal, participants will trust more in firms and sellers 
who are more experienced, and more established in the marketplace than those 
who are not. 
 
This hypothesis speaks to factors related but peripheral to reputation which have 
an impact on trusting behavior.  By virtue of the operationalization of reputation used 
throughout this dissertation, reputation is constrained to previous behavior of an identical 
nature to the behavior the trustor is contemplating.  For example, for a consumer 
considering a purchase with an online retailer, reputation is data concerning the retailer’s 
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prior reciprocation or exploitation of trust in previous, identical interactions either with 
others (in the case of hearsay reputation construction) or herself (in the case of 
experiential reputation construction).  But just as I previously hypothesized that the 
contextual risk of the transaction of interest would have an independent effect on trusting 
behavior, I contend that trustors take into account information from other sources as well 
when making trust decision; in this case, the relative marketplace tenure of the trustee. 
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CHAPTER VII 
 
THE VALUE OF REPTUATION IN ONLINE RETAILING 
 
The purpose of the experiment outlined in this chapter is to replicate the findings 
of Study 1, retesting Hypotheses 1-9b in an experiment modeling a real-world market 
context, internet retailing.  This experiment also tests Hypothesis 10, that, all else equal, 
consumers are willing to pay more for identical products from firms that have been in the 
marketplace longer. 
The internet retail market is still evolving, but has undeniably emerged as an 
important part of the world retail economy.  The internet allows consumers 
unprecedented global access to retailers who are, in essence, location-less; where 
physical location may be all important in traditional retailing, the physical location of an 
internet retailer is almost irrelevant.  The absence of physical location in internet retailing 
is important because as firms pursue legitimacy through reputation (Fombrun & Shanley, 
1990), firms cannot use their building’s physical characteristics to create a reputation, 
“burning money”, as it were, to signal cooperative intentions (Akerlof, 1970).  Shopping 
at a physical store can give consumers psychological comfort because they have face-to-
face interactions with representatives of the firm while shopping, providing the 
opportunity for positive personal relationships to form through self-disclosure and rapport 
building (Jourard, 1959; Moore, Kurtzberg, Thompson, & Morris, 1999).  A storefront 
retailer is also not likely to disappear overnight.  If a consumer experiences some 
difficulty or defect in quality with a good, he or she can return to the store and make 
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demands of retribution.  There are physical ways in which internet retailers can also buy 
legitimacy, such as in the presentation of a website or in costly advertising.  However, 
these strategies may not foster the same level of confidence or trust consumers exercise in 
traditional retailers.  Developing marketplace legitimacy through a cooperative, 
trustworthy reputation may be especially important, albeit uniquely challenging, to the 
internet retailer. 
Within the online retail environment, novel means for the development and 
management of reputational information have emerged.  One way in which this is 
accomplished is through third party “reputation clearinghouses.”  These often take the 
form of interactive websites that allow consumers to rate their experience with different 
online retailers.  For example, using a five point scale, Yahoo! Shopping invites 
consumers to evaluate retailers on five dimensions of quality: price, shipping options, 
delivery, ease of purchase, and customer service.  Consumers also rate retailers as to the 
overall quality of their shopping experience.  Overall ratings are averaged and presented 
in the aggregate to internet users who query on a particular firm.  In this way, quantifiable 
“reputations” evolve.  The reputation clearinghouse, while not providing the raw data 
from which the reputation is quantified, nonetheless are the caretakers of reputation as 
they collect, store, and distribute reputational the collective experience of communities of 
consumers.  I call these types of reputation systems quasi-objective.  They appear 
objective because they provide the user with a quantitative reputational score of each 
retailer.  However, the objectivity is qualified because these systems rely on consumers’ 
voluntary participation, which introduces a sample bias—consumers may be more likely 
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to leave feedback when their expectations are either not met (the disgruntled client) or are 
greatly exceeded.  
Generally speaking, the social information that is compiled into an individual 
reputational schema may be deeply nuanced and extremely complex.  However, in an 
online environment such as explained above, the social information that goes into 
forming a reputational schema has been vastly reduced—summarized, if you will, within 
a simple, single continuous scale.  To the individual evaluating a reputational rating of 
this sort, reputation appears on a continuum of good to bad; nice to mean; cooperative to 
uncooperative; ethical to unethical; reciprocity-oriented to defection-oriented. 
The experiment outlined in this chapter models an internet reputation system 
similar to existing internet reputation systems, such as is used by Yahoo! Shopping or 
Amazon.com.  Participants are presented with a scenario which describes a hypothetical 
online retailer and an internet reputation system.  Participants are told they want to 
purchase a product which they have the option of purchasing from two sources.  The first 
is an online retailer with whom they have interacted before and had positive results (the 
low risk condition).  The second is from an unknown internet retailer who is offering the 
same item at a discounted price (the high risk condition).  Given the information 
available from a third-party internet reputation system, participants are asked to choose to 
purchase the item from the known firm with which they have a relationship or at a 
significant discount with the unknown firm.  The time that the unknown internet retailer 
has been in business is also manipulated. 
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Method 
Research Design 
Study 2 consists of two experiments, Experiments 2 and 3 in this dissertation.  
Experiment 2 was designed with three manipulations, a 2 x 2 x 2 (Contextual Risk x 
Firm’s Hearsay Reputation x Firm Age) between-subjects design.  In Experiment 3, the 
same three manipulations were included, in exactly the same way, but an additional 
manipulation was added to examine the effect of the consumer’s prior experience with 
the discount internet retailer, or experiential reputation, on the dependent variable, thus 
Experiment 3 utilized a 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 (Contextual Risk x Firm’s Hearsay Reputation x 
Firm Age x Firm’s Experiential Reputation) between-subjects design.  Contextual risk 
was operationalized by the price of the good advertised by the discount internet retailer.  
This operationalization captures the risk inherent in a remote purchasing decision.  A 
consumer’s placement of an order constituted a trust move, and consumer trust was 
expected to vary as a function of the size of the trust move the retailer requested.  For 
example, in this experiment a good retailed at a known, trusted retailer for $450.  If the 
price advertised by an online discount retailer was $250 (low risk condition), the 
participant was given the potential opportunity to save $200 and need only risk $250; if 
the price advertised by a discount retailer was $400 (high risk condition), the consumer 
could potentially save $50, but only by risking $400.   
Hearsay reputation was operationalized through the introduction of a hypothetical 
internet reputation system similar to the internet reputation systems used by Yahoo! 
Shopping and Amazon.com.  Such internet reputation systems rely on the voluntary 
participation of internet shoppers whom, having purchased something from a particular 
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retailer, take the time to post feedback through the system on their shopping experience 
with the retailer.  Internet reputation systems like this allow, importantly, for both (1) the 
organic evolution of a retailer’s reputation and (2) the real time transmission of 
reputational information to potential consumers all over the world.  Voluntary user 
feedback systems have been used previously to operationalize reputation (Friedman et al., 
2004).  In this case, the feedback rating system was modeled on a “five star” system.  
This means that consumers rate their shopping experience on a five point scale, in effect 
evaluating their experience as 100 percent satisfactory (5 stars), 75 percent satisfactory (4 
stars), 50 percent satisfactory (3 stars), 25 percent satisfactory (2 stars), or not at all 
satisfactory (1 star).  The aggregate feedback left by all users is averaged such that the 
feedback score presented to potential consumers is on a five point (star) summary scale: 
retailers are assigned one, two, three, four, or five stars.  Retailer hearsay reputation was 
manipulated in the text of the scenario.  Participants were given reputational information 
from “a website…which allows buyers to rate the quality of their overall shopping 
experience with specific online retailers.”  The discount retailer in the experimental 
scenario was given an aggregate reputation score of either three stars (bad hearsay 
reputation condition) or five stars (good hearsay reputation condition). 
Firm age was operationalized by the quantity of feedback the retailer had 
received.  Where nothing else is known about the retailer, the number of instances of 
feedback it has received may be the only information a consumer has which indicates the 
relative time a retailer has been in business.   
The consumer’s prior experience with the retailing firm, or experiential 
reputation, was also manipulated, but only in the second variation of the experiment.   
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Participants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions: good experiential 
reputation or bad experiential reputation.  Participants in the good experiential reputation 
condition read the following text: 
You remember having previously ordered an item from [the discount retailer].  
On that occasion, you had a relatively good experience with the retailer—meaning 
that your expectations for security, quality, and promptness of delivery were 
satisfied.  Had you been asked, you would have rated your overall shopping 
experience as excellent. 
 
While participants in the bad experiential reputation condition read this: 
You remember having previously ordered an item from [the discount retailer].  
On that occasion, you had a relatively bad experience with the retailer—meaning 
that your expectations for security, quality, and/or promptness of delivery were 
NOT satisfied.  Had you been asked, you would have rated your overall shopping 
experience as poor. 
 
Procedure 
Participants were invited to participate in a study about “consumer behavior in 
online retailing.”  Those who chose to participate were directed to a website, randomly 
assigned an experimental cell, and presented with one of twenty-four versions (based on 
experimental cell) of the experimental scenario.  After reading through the scenario, 
participants were asked whether they would choose to order the item from the discount 
internet retailer, or the established, well-known, “safe-bet” retailer which sells the item at 
no discount.  All participants were then asked to complete a post-experimental 
questionnaire which included measures for trust, positive and negative affect, 
demographic information, and manipulation checks.  Participants who completed the 
exercise were entered into a lottery for a $100 prize which they have a 1 in 100 chance of 
winning.  
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Participants 
As with the first experiment, participants were drawn from the Vanderbilt 
University eLab research panel.  Potential participants were randomly selected from the 
eLab panel and emailed an invitation to participate in an experiment about “consumer 
behavior in online retailing.”  A total of 180 persons completed Experiment 2; 308 
completed Experiment 3. 
Measures 
 Trusting Behavior.  The dependent variable for Hypotheses 1-3, 5a-6, 8a-9 is the 
consumer’s trusting behavior.  As in the previous experiment, trusting behavior was 
operationalized by the buyer’s trust decision—in this case, the decision to buy from the 
discount internet retailer (operationalized as trusting behavior) or from the alternative, 
“safe-bet” retailer (operationalized as not trusting behavior).  However, trust was again 
also measured through a modified version of the Organizational Trust Inventory (OTI; 
Commins & Bromiley, 1996; Naquin & Paulson, 2003; Appendix C contains the items 
used for this application of the OTI).  As with Experiment 1, a strong, significant 
correlation between the participant’s purchase decision and the OTI would suggest that 
the purchase decision was indeed motivated by trust.  
 Positive and Negative Affect.  Hypothesis 4a and 4b predict that hearsay 
reputation will influence buyer emotional state such that a good hearsay reputation will 
lead to increased buyer positive affect (H4a) while a bad hearsay reputation will lead to 
increased buyer negative affect (H4b).  Hypotheses 5a and 5b in turn predict that the 
participant’s emotional state mediates the relationship between the retailer’s reputation 
and participant trusting behavior, such that hearsay reputation triggers an affective state 
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which then influences buyer trust.  Similarly, Hypotheses 8a and 8b predict that 
participants’ emotional state mediates the relationship between experiential reputation 
and buyer trusting behavior.  Because of the mediated relationships proposed, it was 
important that affect be assessed in such a way as to capture the affective state of the 
participant between the time the buyer is first exposed to the discount retailer’s feedback 
score and when the buyer is asked to make a decision whether or not to purchase from the 
discount retailer. To this end, participants were presented an instrument designed to 
measure affective state just prior to recording their decision whether or not to purchase.  
As in the previous experiment, the PANAS (Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988) was used 
to measure both positive and negative affect. 
 
Results 
Experiment 2  (H1 – H5b, H10) 
Preliminary Analysis.  The eight-item modified OTI used to measure trust 
returned a Cronbach’s α of 0.908.  The items were averaged into a scale and correlated 
with the participant’s purchase decision at 0.512 (p < .001).  This result suggests that the 
participant’s decision to purchase from the discount internet retailer in this experiment is 
motivated by trust, or that it is an action demonstrative of trust towards the retailer.  
Means for trusting behavior, as the participant’s decision to purchase from the discount 
retailer, are reported by conditional cell in Table 7.1. 
An exploratory factor analysis using maximum likelihood extraction (with 
Varimax rotation) revealed two distinct factors from the 20-item PANAS measure.  The 
items loaded as expected, with those items associated with positive feelings loading with 
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an Eigen value of 5.543 on the first factor, and those items associated with negative 
feelings loading with an Eigen value of 5.334 on the second factor.  Cronbach’s α for the 
positive and negative affect scales were 0.916 and 0.908 respectively, well above the 
acceptable cutoff point for scale validity. 
 
Table 7.1.  Means of Participants’ Trusting Behavior by Conditional Cell, Experiment 2 
 
 
 
 Means, standard deviations, and correlations between variables used in the first 
variation of this study are reported in Table 7.2. 
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Table 7.2.  Descriptive Statistics and Correlations between Variables Used in Experiment 2
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 Primary Analysis.  Hypotheses 1, 2, and 10 all posit the relationship of a single 
variable to the consumer’s trust decision.  Hypothesis 1 states that firm hearsay reputation 
will predict consumer trusting behavior.  The results of a t-test with a one-tailed test of 
significance comparing participants in the good versus bad firm hearsay reputation 
condition did not support this hypothesis (t = -0.958, ns).  Hypothesis 2 states that 
contextual risk will affect consumer trusting behavior.  In this case, the results of a t-test 
comparing participants in the low versus high contextual risk conditions did support the 
hypothesis (t = 3.346, p < .001).  Hypothesis 10, that relative firm age would predict 
consumer trust, was similarly examined by t-test, but was not supported (t = -0.958, ns).  
An additional test by ANCOVA confirmed these results.  All three experimental 
manipulations (hearsay reputation, contextual risk, and firm age) were included in the 
model, as well as participant gender as a control variable.  The model proved significant 
(F = 3.347, p < .05), as did the F statistic for contextual risk (F = 9.837, p < .01), however 
hearsay reputation (F = 1.180, ns) and firm age (F = 1.003, ns) did not vary significantly 
from the dependent variable (see Table 7.3, Model 1). 
Hypothesis 3 predicted an interaction effect between reputation and risk on 
trusting behavior.  This was tested by adding an interaction between hearsay reputation 
and contextual risk to the model reported above and again tested by ANCOVA.  The new 
model was significant (F = 2.878, p < .05), but the coefficient for the interaction term was 
not (F = 1.004, ns.), thus providing no evidence to support a rejection of the null 
hypothesis (see Table 7.3, Model 2).   
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Table 7.3.  Analysis of Variance of Contextual Risk and Firm Reputation, Controlling for
Participant Gender and Firm Age, on Participant Trusting Behavior, Experiment 2 
 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
Model                                1             2 
                                -----------   ----------- 
F                                  3.347*        2.878* 
df                                 184           184 
                                -----------   ----------- 
                                     F             F       
                                -----------   ----------- 
Intercept                        440.320***     -1.456* 
Participant Gender                 0.720         0.757 
Good Firm Hearsay Reputation       1.180         1.186 
Low Contextual Risk                9.837**       9.819** 
Older Firm                         1.003         1.004 
Good Firm Hearsay Reputation X 
   Low Contextual Risk                           1.004 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
*** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05 
 
 
 
Table 7.4.  Buyer Positive and Negative Affect Regressed on Firm Hearsay Reputation, 
with Controls, Experiment 2 
 
--------------------------------------------------------------- 
Model                                1                 2 
                                -----------       ----------- 
DV                            Positive Affect   Negative Affect     
                                -----------       ----------- 
F                                  4.369**           4.078** 
df                               183               183 
adj. R^2                           0.07               0.06 
                                -----------       ----------- 
                                     β                 β       
                                -----------       ----------- 
Participant Gender                -0.033            -0.182* 
Good Firm Hearsay Reputation       0.157*           -0.168* 
Low Contextual Risk               -0.224**           0.133† 
Older Firm                         0.111            -0.050 
--------------------------------------------------------------- 
** p < .01; * p < .05; † p < .1 
Note: Positive affect α = 0.916; negative affect α = 0.908  
 
Hypotheses 4a and 4b predicted that the seller’s hearsay reputation would 
influence the emotional state of the buyer, both the buyer’s positive affect (H4a) and the 
buyer’s negative affect (H4b).  OLS regression was used to test both hypotheses (results 
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are reported in Table 7.4).  With positive affect modeled as the dependent variable, and 
hearsay reputation, contextual risk, firm age, and buyer gender all included as regressors, 
the model was significant (F = 3.036, p < .05; Adj. R2 = 0.069) as was the coefficient for 
firm hearsay reputation (β = 0.157, p < .05).  Similarly, with negative affect modeled as 
the dependent variable the model was significant (F = 4.078, p < .01; Adj. R2 = 0.063) as 
was the coefficient for firm hearsay reputation (β = -0.168, p < .05).  These results 
provide strong support for both Hypothesis 4a and 4b. 
Hypotheses 5a and 5b predict that buyer positive affect and buyer negative affect, 
respectively, will mediate the relationship between firm hearsay reputation and trust.  As 
with Experiment 1, the recommendations of James and Brett (1984) and James, Mulaik 
and Brett (2006) were followed and the mediated relationships were tested by SEM.  
Experiment 2 was specifically designed as a causal model, fitting James and Brett’s 
criteria for the use of SEM in testing mediation models: participants are first presented 
with the discount retailer’s hearsay reputation and explained its significance, then asked 
to complete the PANAS measure, and finally they record their decision to purchase from 
the discount retailer.   
The mediation model tested is shown in Figure 7.1.  While only the mediating 
effects of positive and negative affect from hearsay reputation to trusting behavior are of 
interest here, additional paths are included as controls.   
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Figure 7.1.  A Path Model Representing the Mediation Model Described in Hypotheses 
5a and 5b, Experiment 2 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.2.  The Path Model Used to Test Hypotheses 5a and 5b, with Standardized 
Coefficients, Experiment 2  
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 The data fit the hypothesized model well (χ2[7, N = 180] = 7.145, ns.), and all 
goodness-of-fit statistics were within accepted standards (CFI = 0.998; NFI = 0.929; 
RMSEA = 0.011).  The data also supports the predicted mediation effects.  The path from 
hearsay reputation to buyer positive affect is significant (β = 0.158, p < .05) as is the path 
from buyer positive affect to buyer trusting behavior (β = 0.336, p < .001), providing 
support for Hypothesis 5a.  Similarly, the path from hearsay reputation to buyer negative 
affect is significant (β = -0.168, p < .05) as is the subsequent path from buyer negative 
affect to buyer trusting behavior (β = -0.293, p < .001), providing support for Hypothesis 
5b.  Standardized beta weights for all paths are reported in Figure 7.2. 
Experiment 3 (H6 – H10) 
The substantive difference between the analysis described in Experiment 2 and 
that described here is the addition of a manipulation for experiential reputation, or the 
consumer’s prior experience with the online internet retailer.  In Experiment 2, the 
consumer had no prior experience with the retailer, thus, in relation to the buyer, the 
retailer had no experiential reputation; in Experiment 3, the buyer was told that he or she 
had previously purchased something from the retailer and had had either a positive or 
negative experience.  This additional manipulation was necessary to test Hypotheses 6-
9b.   
Preliminary Analysis.  For those cases used in the Experiment 3, the eight-item 
modified OTI used to measure trust returned a Cronbach’s α of 0.928.  The scale derived 
from the OTI correlated with the consumer’s purchase decision, or trusting behavior, at 
0.597, p < .001.  This again confirms that the dependent variable, in this case, the 
participant’s decision to purchase from the discounted internet retailer, is informed by 
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trust, or that it is an action demonstrative of trust towards the retailer.  Means for trusting 
behavior are reported by conditional cell in Table 7.5. 
 
Table 7.5.  Means of Participants’ Trusting Behavior by Conditional Cell, Experiment 3
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Table 7.6.  Descriptive Statistics, and Correlations between Variables Used in Experiment 3 
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An exploratory factor analysis on the 20-item PANAS measure again revealed 
two distinct factors.  Except for the item associated with alert, which loaded on both 
factors equally, the items loaded as expected, with those items associated with positive 
feelings loading on the first factor with an Eigen value of 5.422, and those items 
associated with negative feelings loading on the second factor with an Eigen value of 
4.964.  The item associated with alert was not included in either scale.  Cronbach’s α for 
the scale created from the remaining positive items was 0.922, and for the negative affect 
scales was 0.897. 
 Means, standard deviations, and correlations between variables used in the first 
variation of this study are reported in Table 7.6. 
Primary Analysis.  Hypothesis 6 predicts a positive relationship between 
experiential reputation and buyer trusting behavior.  The results of a t-test with a one-
tailed test of significance comparing participants in the good versus bad firm experiential 
reputation condition supports this hypothesis (t = -9.402, p < .001).  Hypothesis 10 also 
predicts a simple positive relationship between a manipulated variable, firm age, and 
buyer trusting beavhior.  This hypothesis was tested in Experiment 2, but was not 
confirmed.  A t-test on the data in this  dataset provides support for Hypothesis 10 (-
1.799, p < .05).  An ANCOVA including all four manipulated variables (hearsay 
reputation, contextual risk, firm age, and experiential reputation) as well as consumer 
gender as a control confirms these results.  The model was significant (F = 21.807, p < 
.001) as were the coefficients for experiential reputation (F = 85.706, p < .001) and firm 
age (4.290, p < .05; see Table 7.7, Model 2). 
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Table 7.7.  Analysis of Variance of the Consumers’ (Participants’) Trusting Behavior on 
Firm Experiential Reputation with Controls, Experiment 3 
 
------------------------------------------------------------ 
Model                                   1             2  
                                   -----------   -----------    
 
 
F                                     4.558**      21.807***    
df                                  308           308        
adj. R^2                              0.04          0.25 
                                   -----------   ----------- 
                                        F             F    
                                   -----------   ----------- 
Intercept                           292.504***    352.572*** 
Participant Gender                    0.041         0.028 
Good Firm Hearsay Reputation          1.635         2.625   
Low Contextual Risk                  13.216***     15.911*** 
Firm Age                              3.370†        4.290 
Good Firm Experiential Reputation                  85.706***            
------------------------------------------------------------ 
*** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05; † < .1 
 
 
 
Table 7.8.  Good Hearsay and Good Experiential Reputation Regressed Logistically on 
Trusting Behavior, Participant Gender, Contextual Risk, and Firm Age Included as 
Controls, Experiment 3 
 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
Model                                1             2 
                                -----------   ----------- 
Chi-square                        17.861**      90.191*** 
df                                 4             5 
Nagelkerke R^2                     0.08          0.35 
                                -----------   ----------- 
                                   Exp(B)        Exp(B)       
                                -----------   ----------- 
Constant                           2.388         0.073** 
Participant Gender                 0.951         1.095 
Good Hearsay Reputation            1.377         0.095 
Low Contextual Risk                0.412***      0.327*** 
Firm Age                           1.574†        1.806* 
Good Experiential Reputation                    10.212*** 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
*** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05; † p < .1  
 
Hypothesis 7 states that when reputation consumers have access to both types of 
reputation, hearsay and experiential, that the effect of experiential reputation will 
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overshadow any effect of hearsay reputation on trusting behavior.  As in Experiment 1, 
this hypothesis is tested in two ways.  First, the two ANCOVAs reported in Table 7.7.  In 
the first, experiential reputation is left out of the model.  In the second, experiential 
reputation is included in the model.  Note that the variance explained by the predictors in 
Model 2 (F = 21.807, p < .001; R2 = 0.25) is substantially greater than Model 1 (F = 
4.558, p < .01; R2 = 0.04).  Furthermore, when the two models were again analyzed 
through logistic regression, with trusting behavior modeled as dependent variable (see 
Table 7.8), these results were substantiated.  Both the model excluding experiential 
reputation (χ2 = 17.861, p < .01; Nagelkerke R2 = 0.08) and the model including 
experiential reputation (χ2 = 90.191, p < .001; Nagelkerke R2 = 0.35) were significant; 
however, the second model again explained substantially more variance in participant 
trusting behavior.  Additionally, an examination of the odds ratio of hearsay reputation in 
the two models reveals a considerably lower coefficient in the model including 
experiential reputation.  Taken together, this evidence provides support for Hypothesis 7. 
Hypotheses 8a and 8b predict that the trustee’s experiential reputation influences 
the buyer’s expression of positive (H8a) and negative affect (H8b).  These hypotheses 
were tested with OLS regression.  A model with buyer gender, contextual risk, hearsay 
reputation, firm age, and experiential reputation regressed on buyer positive affect was 
significant (F(307) = 14.207, p < .001; Adj R2 = 0.18; see Table 7.9, Model 1), as was the 
coefficient for experiential reputation (β = 0.338, p < .001), providing support for 
Hypothesis 8a.  A model including the same regressors, but buyer negative affect 
modeled as dependent variable was also significant (F(307) = 9.965, p < .001; Adj R2 = 
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0.13; see Table 7.9, Model 2), as was the coefficient for experiential reputation (β = -
0.371, p < .001), providing support for Hypothesis 8b.   
 
Table 7.9.  Buyer Positive and Negative Affect Regressed on Firm Experiential 
Reputation, with Controls, Experiment 3 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Model                                   1                 2 
                                   -----------       ----------- 
DV                               Positive Affect   Negative Affect     
                                   -----------       ----------- 
F                                    14.207***          9.965 
df                                  307               307 
adj. R^2                              0.18              0.13 
                                   -----------       ----------- 
                                        β                 β       
                                   -----------       ----------- 
Participant Gender                   -0.119*           -0.016 
Good Firm Hearsay Reputation          0.168**          -0.043 
Low Contextual Risk                  -0.162**           0.041 
Firm Age                              0.016            -0.022 
Good Firm Experiential Reputation     0.338***         -0.371*** 
------------------------------------------------------------------ 
*** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05 
Note: Positive affect α = 0.922; negative affect α = 0.897  
 
To test the mediation effects predicted in Hypothesis 9a and 9b, that buyer 
positive and negative affect would mediate the relationship between experiential 
reputation and buyer trust, the same analytic technique used in Experiment 2 was 
employed.  Figure 7.3 shows the path model representing the structural equation model 
tested.  The data fit the hypothesized model well (χ2[11, N = 308] = 12.434, ns.), and all 
goodness-of-fit statistics were within accepted standards (CFI = 0.994; NFI = 0.953; 
RMSEA = 0.021).  Standardized beta weights for all paths are reported in Figure 7.4. 
 
  133
 
 
Figure 7.3.  A Path Model Representing the Mediation Model Described in Hypotheses 
9a and 9b, Experiment 3 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.4.  The Path Model Used to Test Hypotheses 9a and 9b, with Standardized 
Coefficients, Experiment 3  
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The SEM analysis shows the path from experiential reputation to buyer positive 
affect is significant (β = 0.339, p < .001) as is the path from buyer positive affect to buyer 
trusting behavior (β = 0.281, p < .001), providing strong support for Hypothesis 9a.  The 
path from experiential reputation to buyer negative affect was also significant (β = -.371, 
p < .001) as was the path from buyer negative affect to buyer trusting behavior (β = -
0.187, p < .001), which supports Hypothesis 9b.   
 
Post-Hoc Analysis 
The unhypothesized interaction effect between hearsay and experiential reputation 
that was demonstrated in Experiment 1 is again of interest here.  In Experiment 1 we 
concluded that when a trusting party is faced with trustee reputational information from 
both outside sources (hearsay reputation) and personal experience (experiential 
reputation), information from outside sources is only considered when personal 
experience has been negative.  Presumably trustors look to hearsay reputation as a check 
on the decisions they make based on personal experience, being willing to overlook a 
personal bad experience if all other evidence suggests the trustee is a cooperative, 
trustworthy party.   
The data from Experiment 3 did not, however, support this finding.  Modeling 
buyer trusting behavior as dependent variable and controlling for buyer gender, 
contextual risk, and firm age, an ANCOVA (F = 18.397, p < .001) returned an 
insignificant interaction coefficient, the interaction of interest being that between hearsay 
and experiential reputation (F = 1.257, ns.). 
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This is not the only result from Study 1 that was contradicted by the results of 
Study 2, the most obvious of which is Hypothesis 1, that trustors would be more likely to 
trust in trustees with good hearsay reputations (or reputations for reciprocity) than they 
would in trustees with bad hearsay reputations (or reputations for exploitation).  While it 
must be noted that the SEM analysis demonstrated this effect, albeit indirectly through 
positive and negative affect, the initial contradiction prompted consideration of the 
different operationalizations of reputation used in Study 1 versus Study 2.  In both, 
hearsay reputation was operationalized strictly as the trustee’s history of reciprocity in 
similar trust situations with unknown third parties.  The context of the later two 
experiments, however, may have prompted participants to consider other information that 
they might weigh when considering “reputation.”  For instance, it may be that when 
processing the hearsay reputation of trustees, trustors garner information from diverse 
and varied sources, including information that is at best peripheral to a trustee’s history of 
reciprocity, such as the length of time the trustee (retailer) has been in business or the 
total number of transactions the trustee has completed.  The buyer might reasonably 
rationalize that a retailer that does not meet at least a certain standard of cooperative 
behavior would not stay in business long, thus concluding that any retailer with a 
significant history of transactions, regardless their outcome, is more likely to reciprocate 
trust than a retailer with little transaction history. 
To explore this post-hoc hypothesis empirically, a new hearsay reputation 
variable was created by combining the old hearsay reputation and firm age variables.  
Participants in the established firm, good hearsay reputation cell were coded as being in 
the new good hearsay reputation condition.  Participants in the unestablished firm, bad 
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hearsay reputation cell were coded as being in the new bad hearsay reputation condition.  
Participants in the remaining two cells (unestablished firm, good hearsay reputation and 
established firm, bad hearsay reputation) were excluded from the analysis.  To first 
determine whether this new hearsay reputation variable would have an impact on buyer 
trust—or, in other words, to retest Hypothesis 1—an ANCOVA analysis was conducted 
with buyer trust modeled as dependent variable and buyer gender, contextual risk, and 
experiential reputation included as controls.  Even with greatly reduced power, the 
overall model was significant using the dataset from Experiment 3 (F = 15.705, p < .01), 
as was the coefficient for the new hearsay reputation variable (F = 7.243, p < .01).  The 
effect predicted in Hypothesis 2 (that buyers are more likely to trust in low risk contexts) 
was also confirmed (F = 5.408, p < .05).  Additionally, Hypothesis 7, which predicted 
that experiential reputation would overshadow hearsay reputation in its power to predict 
buyer trust, was also supported, as the F statistic for experiential reputation (F = 49.772, p 
< .001) was significant and exceeded the F statistic for the new hearsay reputation 
variable (F = 7.243, p < .01) by nearly seven times (see Table 7.10, Model 1). 
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Table 7.10.  Post Hoc Analysis of Variance of the Consumers’ (Participants’) Trusting 
Behavior on the New Hearsay Reputation Variable with Controls, Experiment 3 
 
------------------------------------------------------------ 
Model                                   1             2  
                                   -----------   -----------    
 
 
F                                    15.705***     14.892***    
df                                  154           154        
adj. R^2                              0.278         0.312 
                                   -----------   ----------- 
                                        F             F    
                                   -----------   ----------- 
Intercept                           240.770***    238.054*** 
Participant Gender                    0.138         0.004 
New Good Firm Hearsay Rep Variable    7.243**       8.536**   
Low Contextual Risk                   5.408*        5.893* 
Good Firm Experiential Reputation    49.772***     52.968***   
New Hearsay Rep Variable X 
   Experiential Reputation                          8.486**             
------------------------------------------------------------ 
*** p < .001; ** p< .01; * p < .05 
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Figure 7.5.  Interactive Effect of New Hearsay Reputation (Old Hearsay Reputation and 
Firm Age Combined) with Experiential Reputation on Trust, Experiment 3  
  138
Next, an interaction between the new firm hearsay reputation and experiential 
reputation was added to the model.  This model also proved significant (F = 14.892, p < 
.001; see Table 7.10, Model 2) as did the interaction term (F = 8.486, p < .001; see Figure 
7.5 for a graphical depiction of the result), indicating that when buyers have had a 
positive personal experience with a retailer, hearsay reputation is irrelevant.  In fact, in 
nearly all cases buyers who have had a prior positive experience with the discount retailer 
were willing to trust the retailer with a second order.  However, when the buyer’s prior 
experience was negative, hearsay reputation did matter; when the retailer enjoyed a good 
reputation, buyers were more likely to trust the retailer than when the retailer had a bad 
reputation. 
 
Discussion 
 The purpose of Study 2 was to reproduce the results of Study 1 in a more realistic 
retail environment and to extend the analysis to include the question of how a firm’s 
longevity in the marketplace impacts consumer trusting behavior.  The results from Study 
1 were mostly substantiated by this second study.  However, it is in the exceptions where 
our interest lies. 
Experiment 2 did not at first appear to support the fundamental, primary 
hypothesis that trusting behavior is influenced by hearsay reputation.  However, 
subsequent structural analyses demonstrated that hearsay reputation does indeed have an 
impact on trusting behavior, but through affect.  Of course, this was expected, but 
Hypotheses 4a and 4b specifically predicted that buyer positive and negative affect would 
partially mediate the relationship between hearsay reputation and buyer trusting 
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behavior.  The data from Experiment 2 indicate that this relationship is fully mediated.  
While I had argued that the reputation consumer processes reputational information both 
cognitively and emotionally—and the results of Study 1 supported this argument—the 
present data suggest that my expectation of cognitive processing may have been 
overestimated.  The data instead suggest stronger support for the functional hypothesis of 
emotion; that emotion motivates actors to reward the cooperative and punish the 
uncooperative, the social forces which encourage societal cooperation. 
Experiment 2 also did not initially provide support for the hypothesis that a firm’s 
tenure (firm age) in the marketplace matters to trustors.  However, as the post hoc 
analysis suggests, it may be that as reputation consumers conflate information from a 
variety of sources as they process “reputation.”  While I have argued that hearsay 
reputation is the cumulative past experience of various third parties with a particular 
person or firm, a definition consistent with the contention of others that a component of a 
firm’s reputation is its track record for fulfilling commitments (Fombrun & Shanley, 
1990; Mayer et al., 1996), the reputation consumer may take other factors into account.  
In other words, my operationalization of reputation is driven by a theoretical 
understanding of what reputation is.  However, the actual cognitive mapping of 
reputational schema may be more complex in that individuals, for all practical purposes, 
consider much more than just information about a firm’s past cooperative or non-
cooperative acts when constructing reputation.  For instance, reasoning that a firm would 
not be able to stay in the marketplace long without fulfilling commitments, the reputation 
consumer may conclude that a more established firm is more likely to fulfill future 
commitments merely by the fact that it is still in existence.  Thus, a firm’s long tenure 
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might be interpreted as a signal of future cooperative intentions, a signal which multiplies 
what I have operationalized as reputation—recorded incidences of cooperative or non-
cooperative behavior.  (It should be mentioned that in Experiment 3 the relationship 
between firm age and trusting behavior was significant, as was the relationship between 
experiential reputation and trusting behavior, perhaps because the salience of personal 
experience is strong enough to be processed differently, and therefore separately, from 
information derived from the tenure of the firm.)  Results from the post hoc analysis 
support this view, but also suggest a potentially problematic disconnect between formal 
definitions of reputation and the actual social phenomena that researchers intend to 
describe when talking of reputation. 
While the post hoc analysis may lead to a reconsideration of reputation which 
includes the impact of other signals (firm age) on perceptions of past performance, the 
results from both the primary analysis of Study 2 and the post hoc analysis—that trusting 
behavior is influenced by contextual risk—support my prediction that reputation 
consumers separate a firm’s past behavior from the risk in a transaction relative to how 
much the trustor has to lose should the transaction go sour. 
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CHAPTER VIII 
 
THE VALUE OF REPTUATION IN ONLINE AUCTIONS 
 
A good reputation is more valuable than money. 
--Publius Syrus 
 
 A second, relevant real-world context for the modeling of reputation’s effect on 
trusting behavior is online auctioning.  Unlike the retail environment modeled in Study 2, 
auctions allow for dynamic pricing of a good.  Given a particular kind of auction 
environment, an individual’s maximum bid can be understood as the maximum value that 
individual places on the item for sale.  In an auction involving risk, the risk of the seller 
dishonestly representing material facts about the item up for bid or of the seller not 
fulfilling his or her obligation to deliver the item, the value of that risk should be 
represented in the buyer’s bidding price.  For example, imagine a specific commodity-
like product is up for auction that can otherwise be easily and without risk purchased for 
$100.  If the buyer could be assured that there was no risk of the seller not fulfilling his or 
her obligation to deliver the item or the item being misrepresented, the rational buyer 
would be willing to pay anything equal to or less than $100 for the item up for auction.  
However, introduce the risk that the seller may somehow cheat the auction winner and 
the potential buyer will likely be willing to pay a maximum of something far less than 
$100 for the item up for auction.   
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The Mayer et al. (1995, p. 712) definition of trust discussed earlier, “the 
willingness of a party to be vulnerable to the actions of another party based on the 
expectation that the other will perform a particular action important to the trustor, 
irrespective of the ability to monitor or control that other party,” implies that there must 
be risk if there is to be trust.  In a commodity auction, the difference between the no-risk 
alternative and an individual’s maximum bid I refer to as a risk discount.  The risk 
discount reflects the degree to which the buyer trusts the seller.   
Many online auction sites, like eBay, allow for buyers and sellers to post 
“feedback” after each transaction.  This feedback is in reality a satisfaction rating of the 
transaction experience.  eBay provides only three options for a feedback rating: positive, 
negative, or neutral.  The number of instances of feedback of each type become available 
to all eBay users, and become in essence a material characteristic of the user to which 
they are assigned.  Reputation, in this context, is quantitatively real, and as visible and 
accessible to others as one’s hair color, or gender, might be in face-to-face conversation. 
 These feedback ratings serve an important social function in online auction 
communities because they contain the collective experience of the community with a 
particular user and transmit this information to novice users or others who may have had 
no experience with another of the community.  Feedback ratings, or reputation scores, 
may be the only indicator as to how much a particular user can be trusted.  Therefore, 
online auctions provide a useful context for evaluating the central question of this 
dissertation, how reputation informs trust decision-making. 
The social dynamic through which reputations develop in auction environments 
differs qualitatively from how reputations develop in online commercial markets that 
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mirror a traditional retail shopping experience, such as that modeled in Experiments Two 
and Three.  This difference merits some discussion.  In the marketplace reputation system 
modeled in the prior study, buyers post feedback on sellers in anonymity, with no fear of 
exploitation and no expectation for reciprocity.  The motivation to leave feedback lies 
either in the buyer’s good will to the community of buyers or in a desire to punish 
retailers for not meeting buyer expectations.  In online auction environments, such as the 
one modeled in this study, reputations develop as buyers and sellers post feedback on one 
another after completing a transaction.  Because the reputational information of all 
members of the community is available, and both buyers and sellers can discriminate 
based on reputation, buyers and sellers may not wish to leave negative feedback for fear 
of reprisal.  Likewise, users may be motivated to leave positive feedback (even after less 
positive transactions) to prompt a reciprocal posting of positive feedback.  Past 
experience studying eBay feedback suggests that users leave feedback honestly 
(Friedman et al., 2004), meaning that when they feel they have been wronged they leave 
negative feedback.  However, it is important to note that in this study only users who had 
already entered into a dispute with their transaction partner were sampled.   
  Experiments Four and Five were designed to explore the effect of reputation on 
trusting behavior in an online auction setting.  Prior research (Resnick & Zeckhauser, 
2001) has shown that while sellers with good reputations could more easily sell the items 
they listed on eBay, they were unable to garner any price premium.  The present study 
challenges this conclusion, albeit peripherally.  The hypothesis here is that a seller’s 
reputation is related to buyer trust, and the experiment is designed specifically to capture 
trusting behavior.  This is done by asking participants for a single, maximum bid, a value 
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indicative of trusting behavior.  This procedure differs substantially from how bidders 
actually behave in an auction.  Nonetheless, I expect seller reputation to be significantly 
correlated to bid values, a prediction which, if substantiated, would contradict Resnick 
and Zeckhauser’s finding. 
An important difference between this study and the prior studies reported in this 
dissertation is the absence of the contextual risk experimental condition.  In the previous 
three experiments,, risk was conceptualized as the amount the trustor stood to lose should 
the trustee exploit the situation and chose not to reciprocate.  Risk was therefore 
described as either “high” or “low,” given the specific conditions of the experiment.  In 
an auction situation, however, it does not make sense to conceptualize risk in this way.  
Bidders are presumably factoring their assessment of risk into their bid price—bidding 
higher (putting more at risk) in situations they judge as relatively safe; lower (putting less 
at risk) in situations they judge as relatively risky.  In an auction situation, a bid therefore 
reflects the buyer’s assessment of risk.  However, a bid also reflects the buyer’s trust of 
the seller.  Thus, in an auction, a buyer’s evaluation of contextual risk and trust in the 
seller are behaviorally indistinguishable. 
 
Method 
Research Design 
 Like Study 2, Study 3 was composed of two distinct experiments.  The first, 
Experiment 4, contained two manipulations, a 2 x 2 (Seller’s Hearsay Reputation x 
Seller’s Auction Tenure/Experience) between-subjects design.  The second, Experiment 
5, included the same two manipulations, but a third, experiential reputation (the buyer’s 
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prior experience with the seller), was also included.  Thus, variation two used a 2 x 2 x 2 
(Seller’s Social Reputation x Seller’s Auction Tenure/Experience x Seller’s Experiential 
Reputation) between-subjects design. 
 Hearsay reputation was operationalized by the percentage of positive feedback to 
all feedback the seller had received for prior transactions.  Participants, all of which were 
assigned the role of buyer, read the following when assigned to the “good” hearsay 
reputation condition: 
[The seller] has a positive feedback percentage of 100 percent, which is very 
good when compared to the average.  In fact, [the seller] has a positive feedback 
percentage 2.5 points higher than the average user on this site.   
 
Participants in the “bad” hearsay reputation condition read: 
[The seller] has a positive feedback percentage of 95 percent, which is not very 
good when compared to the average.  In fact, [the seller] has a positive feedback 
percentage 2.5 points lower than the average user on this site.  
  
 Seller experience was manipulated in a manner similar to how firm age was 
manipulated in Experiments Two and Three, by the total instances of feedback a seller 
has received.  Risk was not manipulated in this experiment.  
 A seller’s auction experience, or tenure, was operationalized by the total feedback 
the seller has received from prior transactions.  In the eBay auction system, posting 
feedback after a transaction is optional, thus the total sum of user feedback may not equal 
the total number of transactions an eBay user has performed.  However, assuming users 
post feedback after transactions at the same rate across the community, it is an 
appropriate proxy for user tenure.  In this experiment, participants assigned to the 
condition of high seller auction experience, or long seller tenure read: 
…more than 300 people have left feedback in all, indicating that [the seller] is a 
relatively experienced user on this auction site. 
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Participants assigned to the low seller auction experience, or short seller tenure condition 
read: 
…only 19 people have left feedback, indicating that [the seller] is a relatively 
inexperienced user on this auction site. 
 
 Finally, in Experiment 5, participants were assigned to one of two experimental 
conditions relating to experiential reputation, or the buyer’s prior experience with the 
seller.  Participants in the “good” experiential reputation condition read: 
…you have previously ordered an item from this same seller….  On that occasion 
you had a relatively good experience with the seller—meaning that your 
expectations for security, quality, and promptness of delivery were satisfied.  You 
didn’t leave feedback, but had you done so you would have rated your overall 
experience as POSITIVE. 
 
Participants in the “bad” experiential reputation condition read: 
…you remember having previously ordered an item from this same seller….  On 
that occasion you had a relatively bad experience with the seller—meaning that 
your expectations for security, quality, and/or promptness of delivery were NOT 
satisfied.  You didn’t leave feedback, but had you done so you would have rated 
your overall experience as NEGATIVE. 
 
Procedure 
Participants were invited to participate in a study about “consumer behavior in 
online retailing.”  Those who chose to participate were directed to a website, randomly 
assigned to an experimental condition, and presented with one of four versions of the 
following scenario, corresponding to experimental condition.  First, all participants read 
the following. 
To complete this experiment some familiarity with the eBay auction system is 
necessary.  A brief explanation of what eBay is and how eBay works follows.  
Afterwards, you will be asked to read a hypothetical scenario in which you should 
imagine yourself being the person described. 
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How eBay Works 
 
eBay is an online auction house where anyone can attempt to auction nearly 
anything.  Users (potential buyers) bid for the items for sale and, after a seller 
designated period of time, the auction is over and a winner is declared.  Buyers 
and sellers work out terms for shipment and payment. 
 
One feature of the eBay system is that, for buyers, bidding is automated up to a 
buyer specified maximum bid.  Say, for example, that a radio is being auctioned 
on eBay.  The opening bid is set at $6.  If you are willing to pay a maximum of 
$20 for the radio, you enter $20 as your maximum bid, but eBay shows the seller 
that you have only raised the bid from $6 up one increment to $6.50.  However, if 
someone else outbids $6.50, eBay will automatically outbid the other bidder on 
your behalf, up to the maximum amount you indicated, which in this case is $20. 
 
Another feature of the eBay auction system is that buyers and sellers, after each 
transaction, leave feedback for their trading partner.  Users may leave either 
positive, negative, or neutral feedback.  Feedback scores are totaled and displayed 
for all eBay users to see.  In this way, when you bid on an item up for auction, 
you have some idea regarding others’ experience buying from and selling to the 
person with whom you will be trading. 
 
An Item for Sale 
 
Imagine an item that you have been planning to purchase for some time.  Retail, 
this item costs $450.  The nature of this item is such that it can rarely be found on 
sale, so if you buy it, you would more or less expect to pay around $450.   
 
However, you are always on the look out for a bargain.  Recently, you have been 
searching eBay in hopes of finding it up for auction.  Today you found it.  
 
You are comfortable buying things on eBay, but realize there is always a chance 
of being defrauded by sellers who may misrepresent the quality of their goods.  
So the reputation of eBay sellers is an important factor in your decision. 
 
Only participants in the bad hearsay reputation, low seller auction experience 
condition read this: 
You note that the seller of the item you want has a feedback score of only seven, 
with 88 percent positive feedback, meaning that a total of eight users left 
feedback, of which one left negative feedback.  The user who left negative 
feedback felt that the seller dishonestly represented the item for auction, and was 
doubly upset because they were not allowed to return the item for a refund. 
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Only participants in the bad hearsay reputation, high seller auction experience 
condition read this: 
You note that the seller of the item you want has a feedback score of 1082 with 88 
percent positive feedback, meaning that a total of 1237 users left feedback, of 
which 157 left negative feedback.  Many of the users who left negative feedback 
felt that the seller dishonestly represented the item for auction, and were doubly 
upset because they were not allowed to return the item for a refund. 
 
Only participants in the good hearsay reputation, low seller auction experience 
condition read this: 
You note that the seller of the item you want has a feedback score of only nine, 
but with 100 percent positive feedback, meaning that all users who have 
transacted with this one left positive feedback. 
 
Only participants in the good hearsay reputation, high seller auction experience 
condition read this: 
You note that the seller of the item you want has a feedback score of 1213 with 98 
percent positive feedback, meaning that a total of 1237 users left feedback, of 
which 24 left negative feedback.   
 
There are two days left in the auction, you know you won’t have time to monitor 
the auction until its close, so you’ll have to decide now whether you will bid on 
the item and the maximum price you are willing to pay.  Currently the high bid is 
at $50.   
 
What is your maximum bid?  (Enter zero if you would not bid on this item.) 
 
Because online auction environments, like that of eBay, may not be familiar to 
some participants, the scenario is prefaced with a brief explanation of how online 
auctioning works.  While I believe this explanation is enough to give participants a 
sufficient operating understanding of auction sites like eBay, I also ask participants how 
familiar they are with online auction houses, and if they have ever bought or sold 
something through a company like eBay.  When asked, 5.8 percent of participants in 
Experiment 4 and 4.7 percent of participants in Experiment 5 reported being not at all 
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familiar with online auction sites such as eBay.  Eight-one percent of participants in 
Experiment 4 reported having bought at least one item on an online auction site like 
eBay; 83.3 percent in Experiment 5.  These data suggest that the participants in these 
studies generally have an adequate understanding of the mechanics of online auctioning, 
and no cases were removed from the analysis in light of this finding. 
After participants reported their maximum bid, they were asked to complete a 
post-experimental questionnaire which included measures for trust, positive and negative 
affect, demographic information, and manipulation checks.  Participants were then 
entered into a lottery for a $100 price which they had a 1 in 100 chance of winning. 
 In this experiment, participants were asked to bid on a hypothetical item: 
“Imagine an item that you have been planning to purchase…”  This approach deserves 
some discussion.  On the one hand, asking participants to bid on a hypothetical item, 
rather than a real, concrete item, may present a problem: how can someone name a price 
for a hypothetical good?  On the other hand, if a specific good were specified, such as a 
TV or a digital camera, a quite different problem arises.  If a specific item is named, let’s 
imagine a digital camera, the bids on that item will be influenced by the natural variance 
within the sample population of desire for that item.  Someone who is not interested in a 
camera may grossly underbid, the camera only becoming “worth it” at a significant 
discount.  Whereas to someone very interested in a camera, perhaps in reality on the 
verge of buying one themselves, any discount at all over the price they expect to pay 
would be welcome.  A second, potentially more serious problem is that there will also be 
a good deal of variance in how much information participants have relative to the market 
in which cameras are bought and sold.  A camera connoisseur and eBay aficionado may 
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have a remarkably accurate sense of the eBay market value of the camera describing in 
the scenario and therefore offer a more informed bid than a novice.  By writing the 
scenario in such a way as to force the participant to imagine a product of their own 
invention, something which to them a $450 retail price tag seems realistic, I have 
sidestepped these difficulties and am better able to capture the relationships between 
variables of interest in this study.  Participants were asked to report the item they had in 
mind while completing the exercise.  A little over half reported some kind of electronic 
item, such as a TV, digital camera, personal computer, or stereo.  Other responses 
included a bed, handbag, widget, jewelry, quality tools, and designer shoes.  About 25 
percent reported that they had nothing in particular in mind. 
Participants 
Participants were again drawn from the Vanderbilt University eLab research 
panel.  Invitees were randomly selected from the eLab panel and emailed an invitation to 
participate in an experiment about “consumer behavior in online retailing.”  Experiment 4 
was completed by 139 persons; 277 completed Experiment 5. 
Measures 
 Trusting Behavior.  As with the previous two studies, the dependent variable for 
Hypotheses 1 and Hypotheses 4a-5b is the buyer’s trusting behavior.  In this experiment, 
trusting behavior is operationalized by the buyer’s bid.  If a participant bids zero, she is 
clearly signaling her lack of trust in the seller.  However, a low bid can also signal low 
trust.  Consider the case of two individuals in negotiation over the price of an apple.  The 
seller wants one dollar for the apple.  The buyer agrees that the apple is worth one dollar, 
but doubts the seller’s intentions to deliver the apple after payment.  In fact, the buyer 
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estimates the odds of the seller fulfilling his bargain at one in ten.  Though a delivered 
apple is worth a dollar to the buyer, given her risk calculation of the seller not surrender 
the apple, the seller is only willing to pay ten cents for the apple, or one tenth the real 
value.  The value of seller’s bid, therefore, signals the level of trust the buyer has in the 
seller, where no bid is the equivalent of no trust, and a bid equal to the alternative retail 
price of the item for auction indicates a level of trust equivalent to what the buyer has in 
the alternative retailer. 
To confirm the construct validity of this operationalization of trust, I also 
measured trust through a survey instrument—a modified version of the OTI (Cummings 
& Bromiley, 2003; Naquin & Paulson, 2003; see Appendix B) as described in 
Experiment 1.  A correlation between bid price and the OTI would indicate convergent 
validity toward the desired construct, and in fact the scale created from the OTI and the 
buyer’s bid were significantly correlated in both Experiment 4 (r = 0.335, p < .001) and 5 
(r = 0.600, p < .001). 
 Positive and Negative Affect.  Hypothesis 4a predicts that a buyer’s positive 
affective state increases the likelihood of buyer trusting behavior whereas Hypothesis 4b 
predicts that a buyer’s negative affective state decreases the likelihood of buyer trusting 
behavior.  Hypothesis 5 goes on to predicts that a buyer’s affective state mediates the 
relationship between a seller’s reputation and a buyer’s trust, such that reputation triggers 
an affective state which then affects trusting behavior.  Because of the mediated 
relationships proposed, it was important that emotion be assessed in such a way as to 
capture the affective state of the participant after the participant is first exposed to the 
feedback score of the seller, yet before recording his or her bid.  Participants were 
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therefore asked to complete a survey measuring positive and negative affect just prior to 
recording their bids.  As with the prior four experiments, the PANAS (Watson, Clark, & 
Tellegen, 1988), was used to measure participants’ emotional state.  The PANAS is a 
measure of both positive and negative affect. 
 
Results 
Experiment 4 (H1, H4a – H5b, H9) 
 Preliminary Analysis.  The eight-item survey instrument used to measure trust, 
the OTI, returned a Cronbach’s α of 0.907.  The scale created from the OTI and the 
buyer’s bid were highly correlated (r = 0.335, p < .001), indicating that bid price in an 
auction setting is indicative of buyer trust.  Means of trusting behavior, measured by the 
buyer’s maximum bid, are reported by cell in Table 8.1. 
 
Table 8.1.  Means of Participants’ Trusting Behavior by Conditional Cell, Experiment 4
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Table 8.2.  Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations Between Variables Used in Experiment 4 
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 The 20-item PANAS was subjected to factor analysis, using maximum likelihood 
extraction and Varimax rotation.  The items loaded predictably, and quite elegantly, on 
two distinct factors; the factor labeled positive affect returned an Eigen value of 6.452, 
whereas the factor labeled negative affect returned an Eigen value of 5.2387.  The scales 
produced from the ten items loading on each factor proved reliable, both for positive 
affect (Cronbach’s α = 0.914) and negative affect (Cronbach’s α = 0.913). 
 Descriptive statistics as well as correlations between variables used in Experiment 
4 are reported in Table 8.2. 
 Primary Analysis.  Hypothesis 1, that seller hearsay reputation will predict buyer 
trusting behavior, was tested by t-test and then by ANCOVA, in a model including 
controls.  The t-test compared participants in the good versus bad seller hearsay 
reputation conditions.  Results did not support the hypothesis (t = 0.155, ns).  Hypothesis 
10, that the relative experience of the seller will positively impact buyer trusting 
behavior, was also tested by t-test and ANCOVA.  The results of the t-test supported the 
hypothesis (t = -2.468, p < .01).  An ANCOVA modeling buyer trusting behavior as 
dependent variable and hearsay reputation, seller experience, and buyer gender as 
independent variables supported these results.  The model proved significant (F(138) = 
2.173, p < 0.1; adj. R2 = 0.03), as did the coefficient for seller’s auction experience (β = 
0.198, p < .05), while the coefficient for hearsay reputation was not significant (β = -
0.008, ns; see Table 8.3). 
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Table 8.3.  Analysis of Variance of Seller Hearsay Reputation, Controlling for 
Participant Gender and Seller Experience, on Participant Trusting Behavior,  
Experiment 4 
 
------------------------------------------------ 
F                                       2.173†     
df                                    138      
adj. R^2                                0.03 
                                     -----------  
                                          F        
                                     ----------- 
Buyer Gender                           -0.059       
Good Seller Hearsay Reputation         -0.008       
Experienced Seller                      0.198*     
------------------------------------------------ 
* p < .05; † < .1 
 
 
 
Table 8.4.  Buyer Positive and Negative Affect Regressed on Firm Hearsay Reputation, 
with Controls, Experiment 4 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Model                                   1                 2 
                                   -----------       ----------- 
DV                               Positive Affect   Negative Affect     
                                   -----------       ----------- 
F                                     2.309†            4.078 
df                                  138               138 
adj. R^2                              0.03              0.06 
                                   -----------       ----------- 
                                        β                 β       
                                   -----------       ----------- 
Buyer Gender                          0.037            -0.182 
Good Seller Hearsay Reputation        0.146*           -0.168*** 
Seller Auction Experience             0.146*           -0.050 
------------------------------------------------------------------ 
*** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05; † p < .1; asterisks indicate one-
tailed significance 
Note: Positive affect α = 0.914; negative affect α = 0.913  
 
 Hypotheses 4a and 4b stated that the seller’s hearsay reputation would influence 
both the positive and negative affect of the buyer, good reputations having positive effect 
on the buyer’s experience of positive affect and a negative effect on the buyer’s 
experience of negative affect and bad reputations having the opposite effect.  These 
hypotheses were tested by OLS regression.  Seller’s hearsay reputation, seller’s auction 
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experience, and buyer gender were included in the model as predictors.  With positive 
affect modeled as dependent variable, the model proved significant (F(138) = 2.309, p < 
.1) as did the coefficient for seller hearsay reputation, in the hypothesized direction (β = 
0.146, p < .05, see Table 8.4, Model 1).  Likewise, with negative affect modeled as 
dependent variable, the model again proved significant (F(138) = 4.078, p < .01) as did 
the coefficient for seller hearsay reputation, in the hypothesized direction (β = -0.168, p < 
.001, see Table 8.4, Model 2).  These results support both Hypotheses 4a and 4b. 
 Hypotheses 5a and 5b predict that buyer positive and negative affect will mediate 
the relationship between seller hearsay reputation and buyer trusting behavior.  As with 
the prior two experiments, the mediation analysis was conducted through structural 
equation modeling (SEM) as recommended by James, Mulaik, and Brett (2006).  The 
complete model, with labels indicating the paths included in the mediation analysis, is 
represented as a path model in Figure 8.1.   
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Figure 8.1.  A Path Model Representing the Mediation Model Described in Hypotheses 
5a and 5b, Experiment 4 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8.2.  The Path Model Used to Test Hypotheses 5a and 5b, with Standardized 
Coefficients, Experiment 4  
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The same statistics used in Experiments 1-3 to assure data-model fit were used 
again here, and as was the case previously, these data fit the hypothesized model well 
(χ2[4, N = 139] = 3.477, ns) and all goodness-of-fit statistics were well within accepted 
standards (CFI = 1.000; NFI = 0.911; RMSEA = 0.000).  The data also supports both 
partial mediation hypotheses.  The coefficient for path from seller hearsay reputation to 
buyer positive affect was marginally significant (β = 0.146, p < .1) and the coefficient for 
the path from buyer positive affect to buyer trusting behavior (β = 0.227, p < .001) was 
significant, providing moderate support for Hypothesis 5a.  The coefficient for the path 
from seller hearsay reputation to buyer negative affect was also significant (β = -0.275, p 
< .001) as was the coefficient for the path from buyer negative affect to buyer trust (β = -
0.559, p < .001), results that support Hypothesis 5b.  Standardized beta weights for all 
paths are reported in Figure 8.2. 
Experiment 5 (H6 – H9) 
 Preliminary Analysis.  The OTI proved highly reliable in this experiment 
(Cronbach’s α = 0.957), and highly correlated with buyer trusting behavior, the buyer’s 
bid (r = 0.600, p < .001).  A correlation this high leaves little doubt that a buyer’s bid is 
representative of his or her relative trust in the seller.  Means of buyer trusting beheavior, 
measured by the buyer’s maximum bid, are reported by cell in Table 8.5. 
 An exploratory factor analysis of the 20-item PANAS instrument revealed two 
distinct factors, loading as expected, with one exception, on items associated with either 
positive or negative affect.  The item asking participants about the degree to which they 
felt alert loaded inconclusively on neither factor, and was thus removed from the 
analysis.  With the item removed, a second exploratory analysis loaded elegantly on two 
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factors.  The first, labeled negative affect, returned an Eigen value of 5.547, while the 
second, labeled positive affect, returned an Eigen value of 5.300.  The items which 
loaded on the factor labeled positive affect proved reliable as a scale (Cronbach’s α = 
0.922) as did those labeled negative affect (Cronbach’s α = 0.918).   
 Descriptives and correlations are summarized in Table 8.5. 
 Primary Analysis.  In this experiment the analysis is focused around the addition 
of buyer’s prior experience with the seller as a manipulated experimental condition, or 
seller experiential reputation.  Hypothesis 6 states that seller experiential reputation is 
positively related to buyer trusting behavior (operationalized in this and Experiment 4 by 
buyer high bid) and Hypothesis 7 states that the effect of experiential reputation will 
diminish the effect of seller hearsay reputation on buyer trust to a level of 
inconsequentiality.  It’s important to note here, however, that the hypothesis that hearsay 
reputation is positively related to buyer trust was not supported in Experiment 4.   
 
Table 8.5.  Means of Participants’ Trusting Behavior by Conditional Cell, Experiment 5
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Table 8.6.  Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations Between Variables Used in Experiment 5 
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 A t-test with a one-tailed test of significance comparing participants in the good 
experiential reputation condition with those in the bad experiential reputation condition 
provided support for Hypothesis 6 (t = -6.513, p < .001).  These data also confirmed 
Hypothesis 10; a t-test comparing participants in the experienced versus inexperienced 
seller condition was significant (t = -2.583, p < .01).  And while the data from 
Experiment 4 did not support Hypothesis 1, these data did (t = -2.264, p < .05).  An 
ANCOVA including all three conditional variables as well as controlling for buyer 
gender confirms these results (see Table 8.7).  The model was significant (F(276) = 
14.523, p < .001; adj R2 = 0.16), as were the coefficients for seller hearsay reputation (F 
= 5.922, p < .05), seller auction experience (F = 7.652, p < .01), and experiential 
reputation (F = 44.040, p < .001).   
The hypothesized relationship between experiential reputation and buyer trust is 
supported by these results.  The inclusion of experiential reputation into the model did 
not eliminate the impact of hearsay reputation on trusting behavior, but the effect of 
experiential reputation on trusting behavior is meaningfully greater than the effect of 
hearsay reputation on trusting behavior.  By regressing buyer high bid (trusting behavior) 
on seller hearsay reputation, seller auction experience, and seller experiential reputation 
while controlling for buyer gender, and by comparing the standardized beta weights of 
the coefficients of hearsay reputation and experiential reputation, we are able to quantify 
the difference in the effect size of the two variables on buyer trusting behavior.  An OLS 
regression returned standardized beta weights of 0.135 and 0.365 for hearsay and 
experiential reputation respectively (see Table 8.8).  Notice that the effect size of 
experiential reputation on buyer trust is more than 2.7 times the effect size of hearsay 
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reputation on buyer trusting behavior.  Therefore, while the effect of hearsay reputation 
on buyer trusting behavior remains significant, the differential of effect size noted here 
still provides support for Hypothesis 7. 
 
Table 8.7.  Analysis of Variance of Seller Experiential Reputation, Controlling for Seller 
Hearsay Reputation, Buyer Gender and Seller Experience, on Participant Trusting 
Behavior, Experiment 5 
 
------------------------------------------------ 
F                                      14.523***     
df                                    276      
adj. R^2                                0.16 
                                     -----------  
                                          F        
                                     ----------- 
Buyer Gender                           -0.102       
Good Seller Hearsay Reputation          5.922*      
Experienced Seller                      7.652** 
Good Seller Experiential Reputation    44.040*** 
------------------------------------------------ 
*** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05 
 
 
 
Table 8.8.  Buyer Trusting Behavior Regressed on Seller Hearsay Reputation and Seller 
Experiential Reputation, Controlling for Buyer Gender and Seller Experience, 
Experiment 5 
 
------------------------------------------------ 
F                                      14.523***     
df                                    276      
adj. R^2                                0.16 
                                     -----------  
                                          F        
                                     ----------- 
Buyer Gender                           -0.018       
Good Seller Hearsay Reputation          0.135*      
Experienced Seller                      0.152** 
Good Seller Experiential Reputation     0.365*** 
------------------------------------------------ 
*** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05  
 
  163
Table 8.9.  Buyer Positive and Negative Affect Regressed on Firm Hearsay Reputation, 
with Controls, Experiment 5 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Model                                   1                 2 
                                   -----------       ----------- 
DV                               Positive Affect   Negative Affect     
                                   -----------       ----------- 
F                                    22.994            25.338 
df                                  276               276 
adj. R^2                              0.24              0.26 
                                   -----------       ----------- 
                                        β                 β       
                                   -----------       ----------- 
Buyer Gender                          0.034            -0.028 
Good Seller Hearsay Reputation        0.208***         -0.074 
Seller Auction Experience             0.125*           -0.103* 
Good Seller Experiential Reputation   0.442***         -0.504*** 
------------------------------------------------------------------ 
*** p < .001; * p < .05 
Note: Positive affect α = 0.922; negative affect α = 0.918  
 
 Hypotheses 8a and 8b concern the predictive relationship of experiential 
reputation on positive and negative affect.  These hypotheses were tested, as before, with 
OLS regression.  Regressing buyer positive affect on seller hearsay reputation, auction 
experience, and experiential reputation, the model proved significant (F(276) = 22.994, p 
< .001; adj. R2 = 0.24) as did the coefficient for experiential reputation (β = 0.442, p < 
.001; see Table 8.9, Model 1).  A second model regressing buyer negative affect on the 
same set of four variables likewise proved significant (F(276) = 25.338, p < .001; adj. R2 
= 0.26) as did the coefficient for experiential reputation within that model (β = -0.504, p 
< .001; see Table 8.9, Model 2).  Experiment 4 confirmed that seller hearsay reputation 
had a predictable impact on buyer positive and negative affect.  I have argued in this 
dissertation that trustors give trustee experiential reputation, when available, cognitive 
priority over trustee hearsay reputation in trust decision-making.  If this prediction is 
correct, we would expect that the effect of experiential reputation on positive and 
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negative affect would be noticeably greater than any effect of hearsay reputation when 
both are included in the model.  Results from this analysis support that hypothesis.  With 
positive affect modeled as the dependent variable, the effect of hearsay reputation was 
significant (β = 0.208, p < .001), however the effect of experiential reputation was more 
than double the size (β = 0.442, p < .001).  More profound is the contrast between the two 
effects when negative affect was modeled as dependent variable.  Hearsay reputation did 
not have a significant effect on negative affect (β = -0.074, ns), while the effect of 
experiential reputation accounted for more 50 percent of the variance in participant 
negative affect (β = -0.504, p < .001).   
SEM was again used to test the predicted mediation effects predicted in 
Hypothesis 9a and 9b.  The path model tested is graphically represented in Figure 7.3.  
The data fit the hypothesized model well (χ2[7], N = 276] = 6.040, ns.), and all goodness-
of-fit statistics were within accepted standards (CFI = 1.000; NFI = 0.979; RMSEA = 
0.000).  Standardized beta weights for all paths are reported in Figure 7.4. 
The SEM analysis indicates that the paths from experiential reputation to buyer 
positive affect (β = 0.442, p < .001) and from buyer positive affect to buyer trusting 
behavior (β = 0.313, p < .001) are both significant, which supports Hypothesis 9a.  The 
analysis also indicates that the paths from experiential reputation to buyer negative affect 
(β = -0.504, p < .001) and from buyer negative affect to buyer trusting behavior (β = -
0.394, p < .001) are significant, which supports Hypothesis 9b.   
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Figure 8.3.  A Path Model Representing the Mediation Model Described in Hypotheses 
9a and 9b, Experiment 5 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8.4.  The Path Model Used to Test Hypotheses 9a and 9b, with Standardized 
Coefficients, Experiment 5  
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Post-Hoc Analysis 
 Again, the unhypothesized interaction effect between hearsay and experiential 
reputation is of interest.  The data from Study 1 suggested that trusting parties only 
consider hearsay reputation when experiential reputation is negative.  The data from 
Study 2 did not initially appear to support this finding, however when the hearsay and 
firm age variables were combined into a new hearsay reputation variable, the finding was 
supported.   
 
Table 8.10.  Buyer Trusting Behavior Regressed on Seller Hearsay Reputation, Seller 
Experience, and Buyer Gender by Experiential Reputation Conditional Cell,  
Experiment 5 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Data                               Experiential      Experiential 
                                   Reputation =      Reputation =  
                                      Good               Bad 
                                   -----------       ----------- 
F                                     2.758*            6.961*** 
df                                  138               137 
adj. R^2                              0.04              0.12 
                                   -----------       ----------- 
                                        β                 β       
                                   -----------       ----------- 
Buyer Gender                          0.186*           -0.222** 
Good Seller Hearsay Reputation        0.148†            0.144† 
Seller Auction Experience             0.086             0.218**  
------------------------------------------------------------------ 
*** p < .001; * p < .05  
 
The data from Study 3 did not support this finding.  In an ANCOVA with buyer 
trusting behavior modeled as dependent variable and controlling for buyer gender and the 
seller’s auction experience, the model proved significant (F = 11.606, p < .001), but the 
interaction effect did not (F = 0.123, ns).  Similarly, separating the data by participants 
assigned to the good experiential reputation condition versus participants in the bad 
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experiential reputation condition revealed no meaningful difference in the effect size of 
hearsay reputation across conditions (see Table 8.10).  A plot of the proposed interaction 
effect indicates the two variables had an additive effect on buyer trust (see Figure 8.5), a 
conclusion corroborated by the analysis used above to test Hypotheses 6 and 7. 
 
 
 
Figure 8.5.  Additive effect of Hearsay Reputation and Experiential Reputation on Trust, 
Experiment 5  
 
As in Study 2, I also explored the possibility that reputation consumers consider 
two sources of information when constructing schemas of reputation, both reputation as 
operationalized in this study and the relative experience of the seller.  As in the post-hoc 
analysis of the Study 2, I combined the hearsay reputation variable and auction 
experience variables such those in the good hearsay reputation and high auction 
experience conditions were assigned the new good hearsay reputation condition.  
Similarly, those originally in the bad hearsay reputation and low auction experience 
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conditions were assigned to the new bad reputation condition.  An ANCOVA predicting 
trusting behavior with the new hearsay reputation, experiential reputation, and buyer 
gender included as a control, revealed (F = 13.995, p < .001; adj. R2 = 0.22) that both the 
new reputation variable (β = 0.275, p < .001) and experiential reputation (β = 0.393, p < 
.001) had a significant impact on trusting behavior (see Table 8.11, Model 1).  However, 
a second model testing the interaction effect between the new hearsay reputation variable 
and experiential reputation, while significant (F = 10.821, p < .001; adj. R2 = 0.22), did 
not return a significant interaction effect (β = -0.365, ns). 
 
Table 8.11.  Post Hoc Analysis of Variance of the Buyers’ (Participants’) Trusting 
Behavior on the New Hearsay Reputation Variable with Controls, Experiment 5 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Model                                      1                 2 
                                      -----------       ----------- 
F                                       13.995***         10.821*** 
df                                     137               137 
adj. R^2                                 0.22              0.22 
                                      -----------       ----------- 
                                           β                 β       
                                      -----------       ----------- 
Buyer Gender                             0.064            -0.059 
New Good Seller Hearsay Rep Variable     0.275***         -0.527* 
Good Seller Experiential Reputation      0.393***         -0.645** 
New Hearsay Rep Variable X 
   Experiential Reputation                                -0.365 
------------------------------------------------------------------ 
*** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05  
 
Discussion  
 Study 3 was designed to test the same hypotheses tested in the prior studies 
(except Hypotheses 2 and 3), but in a simulated online auction environment, with 
characteristics unique from other online marketplaces.  In a traditional retail relationship, 
the buyer demonstrates his or her trust in the retailer by purchasing the good for sale at a 
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price the seller sets.  In an auction, however, pricing is dynamic, and as I have designed 
this experiment (which is a variation on how we normally think of auctioning), buyers 
signal their trust in the seller with their high bid.  In this experiment, the buyer’s high bid 
relative to his or her “safe” alternative represents the degree to which the buyer trusts the 
seller.  Furthermore, trust has been described in this dissertation as a characteristic of the 
relationship (Mayer, Davis, Schoorman, 1995) between buyer and seller rather than a 
dispositional characteristic of either party, thus it is worth discussing the difference in the 
relationship between buyer and seller in a fixed-price marketplace versus an auction 
marketplace.  When interacting with a retail firm, a buyer does not usually consider that 
he or she is interacting with a specific individual or group of individuals, but an 
institution.  Online auctions, however, are generally much more personal.  A bidder has 
the sense he is interacting with a person who is a principal unto him or herself, not a firm 
or its agent.  While the psychology of constructing a reputational schema for an 
institution versus an individual is not dissimilar, attributions of competence and intent 
directed towards institutions likely concern systemic functions of the institution whereas 
the same attributions towards individuals would tend toward the personal.  For example, 
after a negative experience trying to resolve a dispute with a retail firm, one might 
comment, “The customer service at that company is a disgrace.”  However, after a 
similarly negative experience with an individual principal, one might hear, “So and so is 
a cheat and a scoundrel.”  The first comment suggests a systemic problem with a 
management solution, the second a personal characteristic, or personality trait, of an 
individual. 
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 As with Study 2, the hypothesis that hearsay reputation influences trust was not 
here immediately supported.  Also as with Study 2, subsequent structural analysis 
revealed that trust is influenced by hearsay reputation, both directly and, as later 
hypothesized, indirectly through the reputation consumer’s positive and negative affect, 
the emotional state of the buyer being influenced by hearsay reputation.  These results 
again underscore the importance of emotional state in the relationship between reputation 
and trust.  Reputation consumers evaluate reputational information emotionally, and that 
their subsequent emotional state influences how much they are willing to risk, or how 
vulnerable they are willing to make themselves in a trusting situation.  Buyer affect was 
also confirmed to mediate the relationship between experiential reputation and trusting 
behavior. 
 Results from this study also show that not all reputational information is of equal 
value to reputational consumers.  As with prior studies, results show that buyers put more 
weight on information from personal experience than with hearsay. 
 A departure from the results of the prior two studies comes when examining the 
post hoc analysis.  Notably, the interaction effect observed between hearsay and 
experiential reputation on trusting behavior in the prior two studies could not be 
reproduced in Study 3 despite the fact that both hearsay and experiential reputation had 
significant, independent effects on the dependent variable.  As the results from the prior 
two studies suggested a more nuanced relationship between hearsay and experiential 
reputation in predicting trust than was hypothesized, results from Study 3 suggest that 
there may be some additional theoretical element missing, and suggest an avenue for 
future investigation. 
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CHAPTER IX 
 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
 It is the intention of this dissertation to explore the relationships between 
reputation, emotion, and trust.  I began by making the argument that reputations are 
cognitively organized as representational schemata.  As such, characteristics common to 
schemata can be associated with reputation.  Similar to Platonic ideal types or Kantian 
classes (Kant, 1781, 1998), which describe how characteristics of physical objects and 
beings are organized in memory, reputational schema are simplifications of complex 
social information relevant to the relationship between the reputation consumer and the 
reputation target, such as events and behavior which indicate future cooperative or 
uncooperative intentions.  Reputational schemas are used to inform future decision-
making in social relationships under conditions of uncertainty and vulnerability. 
 Reputation consumers use information from past interactions, either personal or 
that of others’, to create simple reputations.  As the focus of this dissertation is on trusting 
behavior in one dimensional trust situations (i.e. to invest or not invest, how much to 
risk), reputational schemata can be understood simply as describing an individual or 
entity as trustworthy or not, or as having a good or bad reputation.  Thus, I predicted that 
reputation consumers would exercise more trusting behavior toward reputation targets 
with good reputation than with bad (see Tables 9.1 & 9.2 for a summary of tested effects 
and their outcomes). 
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Table 9.1.  Summary of Results from Tests of Hypothesized Effects 
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Table 9.2.  Summary of Results from Tests of Unhypothesized Effects and Other Post-Hoc Analyses 
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 However, data by which reputational schemas are constructed comes from varied 
sources, and may thus be of variable value to the reputation consumer in predicting future 
target behavior.  In Chapter 2, I highlighted an ambiguity in prior investigations into the 
relationship between reputation and trust and theorized that information regarding an 
individual or entity from third-party sources is qualitatively different from information 
obtained firsthand, therefore used differently by reputation consumers.  I described 
reputation developed from these two sources of information as either hearsay 
reputation—a reputational schema constructed from hearsay, or information from third-
party sources—and experiential reputation—a reputational schemata constructed from 
the reputation consumer’s personal experience with the reputation target.  Based on 
Granovetter’s (1985) hierarchy of information value, I rejected Lind et al’s (1998) 
prediction that information obtained through social networks is a more powerful 
representation of reality to reputation consumers, who privilege information obtained 
through their own experience to that of others.  Prior researchers focused on the 
behavioral effects of reputation have failed to make this distinction (i.e. Chen, Hogg, & 
Wozny, 2004; Fehr & Gachter, 2000; Hill, 2002; Kaplin, Hill, Lancaster & Hurtado, 
2000; Ostrom, Walker & Gardner, 1992; Yamagishi, 1986), making the interpretation 
and comparison of their experimental results sometimes difficult. 
 Studies 1, 2, and 3 were all explicitly designed to test the hypotheses that hearsay 
reputation influences trusting behavior (Hypothesis 1), experiential reputation influences 
trusting behavior (Hypothesis 6), and the effect of experiential reputation on trusting 
behavior is stronger than the effect of hearsay reputation (Hypothesis 7).  The data used 
in all three studies provided strong support for these hypotheses (Hypothesis 1 was not 
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initially supported in Studies 2 and 3, but the structural analysis later showed that hearsay 
reputation did impact trusting behavior through the trustor’s affective state).  The 
contribution to the social psychological literature here is not so much that trust is 
impacted by reputation, but that reputation consumers differentiate reputational 
information by type (hearsay or experiential), and furthermore that they rely more on 
experiential reputation to guide trusting behavior.  The distinction between hearsay and 
experiential reputation is theoretically critical, but also has implications for management 
which I will discuss later on. 
 This dissertation also proffers an explanation as to the cognitive process by which 
reputation leads to trusting behavior.  Reputation-trust relationships have traditionally 
been explained through evolutionary theories of human cooperation which conceptualize 
the human decision-maker as a rational being making rational decisions (Alexander, 
1987; Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981; Axelrod, 1984; Leimar & Hammerstein, 2001; Lotem, 
Fishman, & Stone, 1999; Nowak & Sigmund, 1998a, 1998b).  Evolutionary theories of 
cooperation generally require that cooperative agents, or altruists, within a system punish 
non-cooperators and/or reward cooperators in ways that are not directly self-interested.  
Fehr and Gachter (2000, 2002) argue that altruism is an insufficient explanation for this 
seemingly non-rational behavior, and that rather than being motivated by altruism, per se, 
the rewarding and punishing behavior that keeps cooperative systems sustainable is 
motivated by the agent’s emotional response to others’ cooperative or non-cooperative 
behavior.   
 Studies 1, 2, and 3 were also designed to test predictions based on this theory.  
Specifically, I have argued that the motivation to engage in trusting behavior—or not 
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to—is motivated by the trustor’s emotional state, and that emotional state is impacted the 
reputation, be it hearsay or experiential, or the trustee.  Two avenues for this path were 
hypothesized, the first through trustor positive affect and the second through trustor 
negative affect.  In the first case, the positive feelings—and lack of negative feelings—
result from interacting with a cooperative agent, whereas in the second case the negative 
feelings—and lack of positive feelings—are a consequence of interacting with a non-
cooperative agent.  In both instances, the emotional response is an innate, evolutionary 
derived response which motivates either rewarding (trusting) or punishing (not trusting) 
behavior.  These hypotheses were tested in each study both as a function of hearsay 
reputation and experiential reputation and in each study the data fit the hypothesized 
model well.  That is, altogether six separate tests of the hypothesis that reputation effects 
emotion which effects trusting behavior were conducted, and each test supported the 
prediction.   
 These results are important because they support the proposition that emotions are 
evolutionarily functional in maintaining cooperation in economic communities.  Models 
of the reputation-trust relationship, where reputation’s social function is hypothesized to 
be only an indicator of the odds of trustee exploitive intentions inadequately explain the 
psychological and physiological component of the decision to engage in trusting 
behavior.  Furthermore, these tests of the emotion-trust link go beyond earlier evidence 
presented by Dunn and Schweitzer (2005) that trustor mood effects trust because in this 
dissertation emotion was modeled as a consequence of reputational information 
processing.  Dunn and Schweitzer found that a trusting parties ambient mood—emotional 
state unrelated to the context of the trusting situation—impacted trust.  I have shown, 
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however, that mere exposure to a good or bad reputation is enough to impact emotional 
state.  It is reasonable to conclude, therefore, that emotion influences trusting behavior 
regardless the antecedent of the emotional state.  However, the finding that reputation 
itself influences trustor emotional state has implications for practice worthy of discussion. 
 The post-hoc analyses from the three studies also merit attention.  Data from 
Study 1 provided evidence of an interaction effect between hearsay and experiential 
reputations.  Figure 5.9 shows that trusting behavior is always more likely when the 
trustor has had a positive experience with the trustee (good experiential reputation), 
hearsay reputation only has an impact on trusting behavior when the trustor has had a 
negative personal experience with the trustee (bad experiential reputation).  This finding 
was also supported by data from Study 2 when modeled with the new hearsay reputation 
variable (see Figure 7.5).  Even though this finding was not supported by Study 3, the 
observation may have important implications for practice because it suggests that broken 
trust, as evidenced by a bad experiential reputation, can be healed through hearsay 
reputation.  That is, a retailer’s good hearsay reputation may go a long way in convincing 
customers who have at one time had a negative experience to come back and try the 
retailer again. 
The introduction of the firm age manipulation in Studies 2 and 3 prompted a post-
hoc revaluation of the operationalization of reputation used in this dissertation.  
Theorizing that individuals may combine information and signals from a variety of 
sources in constructing their personal reputational schema, and that the tenure of a firm’s 
marketplace presence might be one signal informing the complex cognitive structure that 
is a reputational schema, I created a new hearsay reputation variable combining the 
  178
original hearsay reputation variable with firm age.  Even though doing so reduced the 
statistical power of the analysis, the data from Studies 2 and 3 directly supported 
Hypothesis 1—that hearsay reputation predicts trusting behavior—whereas the data from 
the original operationalization of hearsay reputation did not.   
 
LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
This finding illustrates a practical constraint of all research investigating 
reputational effects in particular, and to some extent work in the social sciences 
generally.  The operationalization of reputation in this dissertation is informed by the 
work of others, but is undeniably unique.  This observation may at first call into question 
the generalizablity of any conclusions, but when considered as one point of light in a 
larger constellation of related research, a general picture of the phenomena, at first fuzzy, 
comes into focus.  An advantage of an experimental design such as those used here is that 
the researcher can hope to disentangle the effect of what he or she is declaring reputation 
from other informational noise.  The intention is to simplify the texture of the complex 
cognitive structures that are reputational schemas.  The counterpoint is that real world 
reputations are not created in vacuums, but are inevitably and invariably constructed 
within an ear-shattering chaos of social noise.   
One reason that hearsay reputation was not as strong a predictor of trusting 
behavior as was experiential reputation in all three studies could be that the participants 
were unable to evaluate the quality of information provided in hearsay reputation. It is 
possible that hearsay information provided by individuals close (not anonymous) to the 
participants would have been more influential in determining a participant’s trusting 
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behavior.  In fact, Granovetter (1985, p. 490) states, “better than a statement that 
someone is known to be reliable is information from a trusted informant that he has dealt 
with that individual and found him so.”  As the experiments were designed, the 
participant is asked to make a trust decision based on information from an informant that 
he does not know can be trusted. There may be other factors related to the source of 
hearsay reputation important in considering the strength of the predictive impact of 
hearsay reputation on trusting behavior such as whether that source is intuitional (eBay’s 
reputation system) or personal (the experience of a friend). 
The larger point is that this dissertation did not attempt to address the question of 
the quality, strength, or intensity of reputational signals, and how the quality of a hearsay 
reputational signal may in some cases be better than the quality of experiential 
information.  For instance, it’s not difficult to imagine situations in which the opinion of 
an expert third party would be of more value than one’s own naive opinion, even if 
derived from personal experience.  Varying levels of reputational quality, strength, or 
intensity might not only lead to differences in the direct effects of hearsay and 
experiential reputations on trusting behavior, but interesting interaction effects as well. 
Furthermore, future consideration should be given to the sequence of information 
exposure.  In the first of the three studies reported here, participants were first exposed to 
hearsay reputation, and then later had personal experience to draw on.  In the other two 
experiments where hearsay and experiential reputations were pitted against each other, 
constraints of the experimental protocol left participants to process both types of 
reputational information simultaneously.  The question of how might the relationship 
between hearsay and experiential reputation on trusting behavior be affected by a person 
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first having had a personal experience with the trustee, then being exposed to hearsay 
reputation is one that will need to be addressed by some future investigation.  Future 
research might also consider that it may take more than one interaction to construct an 
experiential reputation of another person or firm.  Thus, the effect on trusting behavior of 
an experiential reputation based on a single interaction may be theoretically distinct from 
an experiential reputation based reoccurring interactions (though reoccurring interactions 
are likely to occur only if the trustee has proven reliable in reciprocating trust).  
Another limitation relates to both the small rewards at stake for participants and 
the possibility of a trusting bias.  It should be noted that many researchers that make use 
of similar experimental designs—trust games (c.f. Berg et al., 1995), public goods games 
(c.f. King-Casas et al., 2005), modified dictator games (c.f. Kahneman, Knetsch, Thaler, 
1986b) reward participation with monetary sums as much as 100 times greater than those 
offered here.  While my approach to participant compensation is not without precedent 
(Barclay, 2004), the limitation of this method to motivate the type of activity I expected 
must be acknowledged.  It may be that the type of people willing to participate in an 
online research experiment for very little compensation—who are willing to provide 
personal information over the internet and, in the case of the lottery winners, share their 
social security number with the researchers in order to be compensated—are simply, on 
average, more trusting than the average person from the population that this sample is 
meant to represent.  To some extent, this limitation could be addressed by including in 
the experimental design a measure for dispositional trust and controlling for it in each 
analysis. 
  181
An additional idiosyncrasy of the experimental design is that participants are only 
given the option of trust versus no trust, where in reality individuals faced with trust 
decisions often have alternative individuals or firms in which to engage in trusting 
behavior.  In Studies 2 and 3 in particular, the observation of trusting behavior may be 
artificially inflated in the bad reputation conditions.  Some participants that engaged in 
trusting behavior may have otherwise sought alternative exchange partners had they that 
opportunity. 
In this dissertation I modeled positive and negative affect mediating the 
relationship between reputation and trusting behavior.  While I believe this approach was 
appropriate (and certainly defensible given the statistical methodologies I applied), it 
should be noted that the range of emotion contained within the constructs positive affect 
and negative affect is quite large.  Consider, for example, the various components of the 
PANAS used to measure negative affect: afraid, guilty, hostile, irritable, ashamed, 
nervous, distressed, upset, scared, and jittery.  In short, the general construct negative 
affect covers a lot of emotional terrain.  Researchers studying the role of affect in a 
variety of behavioral contexts have begun focus more on the differentiation of discrete 
emotions, such as differentiating between anger and sadness (DeSterno, Petty, Rucker, 
Wegener & Braverman, 2004; DeSterno, Petty, Wegener & Rucker, 2000) or anger and 
disgust (Lerner, Small & Loewenstein, 2004).  To better understand the cognitive-
emotional process by which reputations are processed, future work might follow in this 
vein with the intention of investigating precisely what emotions reputations invoke as 
well as their varying effects on trusting behavior. 
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In the present work reputation was operationalized as the behavior of the trustee 
in past equivalent transactions, such as how many times Player Two, in prior rounds of a 
trust game, reciprocated or exploited trust.  However, by defining reputation as a schema 
the realm of information that a trustor might use to develop a reputation is more 
expansive.  As was previously discussed, a schema is a model for understanding how 
concepts (like a reputational type) are stored in memory (Fiske & Taylor, 1991) and are 
used to make reliable assumptions about unknown characteristics or behavioral 
tendencies of the schema target (Bruder, 1973).  This conceptualization of reputation 
allows for information other than trustee behavior in past equivalent transactions to be 
considered—and experimentally operationalized—reputational information.  The present 
investigation hinted at one other source of reputational information, a firm’s marketplace 
tenure.  In a way similar to that discussed by Akerlof (1970), firms (even online retailers 
and auctioneers) “burn money” by developing websites with sophisticated technological 
capability and pleasing aesthetics to woo and reassure potential clientele.  And a third 
factor which may influence the quality and type of reputational schema trustors construct 
relates to how firms borrow reputation from other firms, professional associations, and 
regulatory agencies.  For example, banks prominently display logos of the FDIC, 
indicating that deposits are insured by the federal government.  Internet retailers draw on 
the reputation of secure sockets layer (SSL) Certificate Authority enablers, such as 
VeriSign, by not only using their service, but by conspicuously displaying their logo at 
checkout.  These observations provide fertile ground for theory development and 
subsequent empirical investigation.  How are different sources of reputational 
information theoretically distinct?  How do they differentially impact trustor affect and 
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trustor behavior?  Do these sources of reputational information interact in significant 
ways? 
A final direction for future research concerns the trustee side, or target side, or 
reputation.  In other words, how do concerns about reputation management affect the 
behavior of the reputation owner?  In a study of conflict resolution between two parties to 
an eBay transaction gone sour, Friedman et al. (2004) found that expressions of anger 
hindered settlement, except in those cases where the respondent of the complaint had a 
bad reputation, and resolution of the conflict promised the removal of negative feedback.  
This finding points to how at least one contingency—the quality of one’s reputation—
effects a person’s behavior in regard to managing their reputation.  More research is 
needed in this area.  Not only do we know little regarding what the antecedents of 
reputation management behavior are, we also don’t know what kind of behavior 
individuals perceive as having an effect on their reputation.   
 
IMPLICATIONS FOR PRACTICE 
 The results of these studies have implications for three parties: trustors, trustees, 
and those who design markets where trusting behaviors are observed.  For trustors, the 
implications are relatively simple.  Trustors should be aware that their behavior is 
influenced by reputation, and that personal experience weighs more heavily than hearsay 
reputation in that calculus.  Trustors should also acknowledge that these tendencies are 
heavily influenced by their emotional reaction to good and bad reputations.  Reflection on 
this reality may lead trustors to consider other factors which the present studies have not 
addressed, such as the quality and source of the information used in developing 
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reputational schema as well as the particular experiences by which reputations were 
constructed.  In other words, exactly how was trusting behavior either reciprocated or 
exploited may be relevant.   For instance, a customer may give an online retailer a poor 
evaluation because the retailer failed to accept the return of an item.  If a return guarantee 
is of no importance to the present trustor, the fact that the retailer offers none is of no 
relevance. 
 To trustees the implications of the present work are more profound.  For firms 
that rely on repeat business, managers should know that the quality of customers’ 
personal experience looms large in their decision to interact with the firm in the future, 
regardless of the firm’s overall reputation.  However, a firm’s overall reputation may go a 
long way in repairing strained trust relationships.  Results from the first two studies 
suggest that even when trustors have had a negative personal experience with a trustee 
that they are much more willing to engage in trusting behavior with the trustee again if 
the trustee has a good hearsay reputation.  This suggests that it may be in the best interest 
of the firm to make customers with past negative experiences aware of the positive 
experience of others, an effort that might be pursued through the firm’s marketing and 
public relations arms.    
 Another implication for business regards standards for quality control and other 
procedures designed to affirm customer satisfaction.  Because experiential reputation has 
such a strong impact on trusting behavior, a firm might safely upset a significant portion 
of its customers and still retain enough business to be able to sustain the livelihood of the 
firm.  For instance, if a firm relies entirely on new business for its customer base, and can 
sufficiently control reputational information such that the firm itself is the only source of 
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customer information about it (through its public relations and marketing functions), it 
may not be necessary to invest any resources in quality control and customer service 
beyond a legal standard.  Or in another instance, if a firm knows that nearly one hundred 
percent of customers that have had a positive experience will return, but that five percent 
of its customers are always new customers, it could safely afford to upset up to five 
percent of its returning customers and still maintain its current level of business.  These 
realizations have rather unfortunate implications, from the consumer’s perspective, for a 
firm’s strategic standard of quality control. 
 Finally, the work reported here has implications for those who design markets.  
My findings support the view (for an example, see Bohnet and Huck, 2004) that when 
reputational information is made available trust is facilitated.  Trustees, understanding 
that past behavior will influence the likelihood of others to trust have an interest in 
building and maintaining reputations of trust and reciprocity.  Those who design markets, 
who have an interest in eliminating consumer trust barriers, should be encouraged by 
these findings to integrate into their markets systems which facilitate the recording and 
dissemination of transactional information relevant to the construction of reputations.   
However, my findings also suggest that records of past behavior alone is not all that is of 
interest to trustors.  The post-hoc analyses of Studies 2 and 3 suggest that at least a firm’s 
marketplace tenure is also relevant to the trustor’s decision to engage in trusting behavior.  
Designers who tap into all the sources of reputational information that consumers use in 
making trust decision would create the best systems—which is to say the systems that 
would most facilitate the trust required to enable economic exchange. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
EXPERIMENTAL PROTOCOL FOR EXPERIMENT 1 
 
The following is the text used in Experiment 1 (Chapter 4) to explain the experimental 
procedure to participants.  Text in brackets [] indicates page ordering and the 
experimental condition shown the text that follows. 
 
 
[PAGE 2 – instructions – all conditions] 
 
In this exercise there are two players, you and another eLab participant with whom you will be 
connected.  (If no other participants are available, we’ll ask that you login again later.)  You will be 
randomly assigned to the role of either Player One or Player Two. 
 
*** Right now, there are 3 others eLab participants logged on. *** 
 
At the beginning of the exercise (or game) Player One is given a sum of “lab dollars.”  Player One 
can choose to keep this money to him or her self, in which case Player Two receives nothing, or 
give the entire sum to Player Two.  If Player One gives the money to Player Two, the total sum of 
money will be multiplied by a factor such that Player Two receives considerably more than Player 
One gave.  Player Two then has two options for dividing the now larger sum of money between 
both players: (1) Player Two can divide the money in his or her own favor or (2) Player Two can 
divide the money in Player One’s favor. 
 
Each lab dollar in this exercise represents a 1 in 1000 chance at winning a $100 prize.  The more 
lab dollars you collect, the better chance you have at winning.  For example, if you ended the 
game with 15 lab dollars, you would have better than a 1 in 70 chance at winning $100. 
 
Some pairs, after completing the first game, will be asked to play again.  The more you play the 
more you may increase your odds of winning. 
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[PAGE 2.5 – instructions (cont)] 
 
You have been randomly assigned as Player One.   
 
The game from your perspective is depicted in the following figure: 
 
[high risk condition] 
 
 
 
You will be given 14 lab dollars which you may either keep (depicted by the “DO NOT INVEST” 
branch of the decision tree above) or invest in Player Two (depicted by the “INVEST” branch of 
the decision tree).   
 
If you choose not to invest in Player Two, you walk away with 14 lab dollars and Player Two 
receives nothing. 
 
If you choose to invest in Player Two, you will be giving your 14 lab dollars to Player Two and the 
14 lab dollars will become 30 lab dollars. 
 
Player Two then has two options, as depicted in the following figure: 
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(1) Player Two may split the money in his or her favor, keeping 24 lab dollars and returning 
only 6 lab dollars to you.  Or,  
 
(2) Player Two may split the money in your favor, keeping 13 lab dollars and returning 17. 
 
In other words, by making the decision to invest in Player Two you stand to gain something (3 lab 
dollars), but could also lose something (8 lab dollars). 
 
All the information contained in the above figures has also been given to Player Two. 
 
 
 
Take a moment to make sure you understand the flow of the game.  When you click on the 
“Proceed” button below, you will be connected with another eLab participant who will play the role 
of Player Two.  Please be patient…depending on user availability, the process of connecting may 
take a few minutes. 
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[low risk condition] 
 
 
 
You will be given 7 lab dollars which you may either keep (depicted by the “DO NOT INVEST” 
branch of the decision tree above) or invest in Player Two (depicted by the “INVEST” branch of 
the decision tree).   
 
If you choose not to invest in Player Two, you walk away with 7 lab dollars and Player Two 
receives nothing. 
 
If you choose to invest in Player Two, you will be giving your 7 lab dollars to Player Two and the 7 
lab dollars will become 30 lab dollars. 
 
At this point, Player Two has two options, as depicted in the following figure: 
 
  190
 
 
(1) Player Two may split the money in his or her favor, keeping 24 lab dollars and returning 
only 6 lab dollars to you.  Or, 
 
(2) Player Two may split the money in your favor, keeping 13 lab dollars and returning 17. 
 
In other words, by making the decision to invest in Player Two you stand to gain something (10 
lab dollars), but could also lose something (1 lab dollars). 
 
All the information contained in the above figures has also been given to Player Two. 
 
 
 
Take a moment to make sure you understand the flow of the game.  When you click on the 
“Proceed” button below, you will be connected with another eLab participant who will play the role 
of Player Two.  Please be patient…depending on user availability, the process of connecting may 
take a few minutes. 
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[Page 3 – wait screen] 
 
 
 
Please wait while we search for an available participant. 
Estimated wait time from 0 to 4 minutes. 
 
… 
 
You are being connected with User #487G1.   
 
[high risk condition] 
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[low risk condition] 
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[Page 4 – P1 to trust decision, all conditions] 
 
You have been connected with User #487G1.  User #487G1 has completed this exercise 6 times 
before (each time as Player Two). 
 
 
You now have 14 [7] lab dollars.   
 
You must choose to invest this sum in Player Two or to keep it to yourself.  Remember, if you 
give the money to Player Two, your 14 [7] lab dollars will become 30.  Player Two then has two 
options for dividing it:  
 
Gives $17 to you and keeps $13 
 
OR  
 
Gives $6 to you and keeps $24. 
 
 
As was mentioned before, User #487G1 has already completed this exercise several times.  
Here are User #487G1’s statistics: 
 
 [good reputation condition] 
Number of times User #487G1 divided $30 investment in favor of Player One: 6 
Number of times User #487G1 divided $30 investment in favor of Player Two: 0 
 
 [bad reputation condition] 
Number of times User #487G1 divided $30 investment in favor of Player One: 0 
Number of times User #487G1 divided $30 investment in favor of Player Two: 6 
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APPENDIX B 
 
 
 
TRUST INSTRUMENT USED IN STUDY 1 
 
 
 
Please mark the number below each statement that most clearly describes your opinion of 
the other party right now. 
 
1.  I think that the other party meets its obligations. 
 
1..7, where 1 = strongly disagree 
  4 = neither agree nor disagree 
  7 = strongly agree 
 
2.  In my opinion, the other party is reliable. 
3.  I think that the other party succeeds by stepping on other people. 
4.  I feel that the other party tries to get the upper hand. 
5.  I think that the other party took advantage of me. 
6.  I feel that the other party represented itself honestly. 
7.  I think the other party has not misled me. 
8.  I think the other party tires to get out of its commitments. 
9.  I feel that the other party takes advantage of people who are vulnerable. 
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APPENDIX C 
 
TRUST INSTRUMENT USED IN STUDY 2 
   
 
Please mark the number below each statement that most clearly describes your opinion of 
www.whatyouwant4less.com right now. 
 
1.  I think that www.whatyouwant4less.com meets its obligations. 
 
1..7, where 1 = strongly disagree 
  4 = neither agree nor disagree 
  7 = strongly agree 
 
2.  In my opinion, www.whatyouwant4less.com is reliable. 
3.  I think that www.whatyouwant4less.com succeeds by stepping on its customers. 
4.  I feel that www.whatyouwant4less.com tries to take advantage of people. 
5.  I feel that www.whatyouwant4less.com represents itself honestly. 
6.  I think www.whatyouwant4less.com has not misled me. 
7.  I think www.whatyouwant4less.com tires to get out of its commitments. 
8.  I feel that www.whatyouwant4less.com takes advantage of people who are vulnerable. 
 
 
 
 
  197
REFERENCES 
 
Akerlof, G. (1970).  The market for ‘lemons’: Qualitative uncertainty and the market 
mechanism.  Quarterly Journal of Economics, 84, 488-500. 
 
Alexander, R. D. (1987).  The biology of moral system.  New York: Aldine de Gruyter. 
 
Alvarez, S. A., Barney, J. B., & Bosse, D. A. (2004).  Trust and its alternatives.  Human 
Resource Management, 42, 393-404. 
  
Axelrod, R. (1984).  The Evolution of Cooperation.  New York: Basic Books. 
 
Axelrod R., & Hamilton W. D. (1981).  The evolution of cooperation.  Science, 211, 
1390-1396. 
 
Barclay, P. (2004).  Trustworthiness and competitive altruism can also solve the “tragedy 
of the commons.”  Evolution and Human Behavior, 25, 209-220. 
 
Baron, R. M., & Kenny, D. A. (1986).  The moderator-mediator variable distinction in 
social psychological research:  Conceptual, strategic, and statistical 
considerations.  Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 51, 1173-1182. 
 
Bartlett, F. C. (1932).  Remembering.  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Bazerman, M. H., Curhan, J., & Moore, D. (2000a).  Negotiation.  Annual Review of 
Psychology, 51, 279-314. 
 
Bazerman, M. H., Curhan, J., & Moore, D. (2000b).  The death and rebirth of the social 
psychology of negotiation.  In M. Clark & G. Fletcher (Eds.), Blackwell handbook 
of social psychology.  Cambridge, MA: Blackwell. 
 
Berg, J., Dickhaut, J., & McCabe, K. (1995).  Trust, reciprocity, and social history.  
Games and Economic Behavior, 10, 122-142. 
 
Bohnet, I., & Huck, S. (2004).  Repetition and reputation: Implications for trust and 
trustworthiness when institutions change.  The American Economic Review, 94, 
362-366. 
 
Bruder, J. S. (1973).  Going beyond the information given.  In J. M. Anglin (Ed.), Beyond 
the information given (pp. 218-243).  New York: Norton. 
 
Camerer, C. (2003).  Behavioral Game Theory: Experiments in Strategic Interaction.  
Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press. 
 
  198
Camerer, C. F., & Fehr, E. (2006).  When does “Economic Man” dominate social 
behavior?  Science, 311, 47-52. 
 
Carter, B. (1993, February 11).  G.M. suspends ads on NBC News despite apology for 
truck report.  The New York Times, pp A1, A21. 
 
Chen, K.-Y., Hogg, T., & Wozny, N. (2004).  Experimental study of market reputation 
mechanisms.  Proceedings of the 5th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 
234-235. 
 
Cialdini, R. B. (2001).  Influence: Science and Practice, (4rd Edition).  Boston: Allyn and 
Bacon. 
 
Clark, J. (2002).  Recognizing large donations to public goods: An experimental test.  
Managerial and Decision Economics, 23, 33-44. 
 
Cook, J., & Wall, T. (1980).  New work attitude measures of trust, organizational 
commitment, and personal need nonfulfillment.  Journal of Occupational 
Psychology, 53, 39-52. 
 
Coleman, J. (1990).  Foundations of Social Choice Theory.  Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press. 
 
Cummings, L. L., & Bromiley, P. (1996).  The organizational trust inventory (OTI): 
Development and validation.  In R. M. Kramer & T. R. Tyler (Eds.), Trust in 
organizations: Frontiers of theory and research (pp. 302–330).  Thousand Oaks, 
CA: Sage. 
 
D’Andrade, R. G.  (1995).  The Development of Cognitive Anthropology.  New York: 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
Dasgupta, P. (2000).  Trust as a commodity.  In D. G. Gambetta (Ed.), Trust: Making and 
breaking cooperative relations (pp. 49-72).  New York: Blackwell. 
 
Davis, D. D., & Holt, C. A. (1993).  Experimental economics.  Princeton, NJ:  Princeton 
University Press. 
 
Dawes, R. M., McTavish, J., & Shaklee, H. (1977).  Behavior, communication, and 
assumptions about other people’s behavior in a commons dilemma situation.  
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 21, 281-295. 
 
Desteno, D., Petty, R. E., Rucker, D. D., Wegener, D. T., & Braverman, J. (2004). 
Discrete emotions and persuasion: The role of emotion-induced expectancies. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 86, 43-56. 
 
  199
Desteno, D., Petty, R. E., Wegener, D. T., & Rucker, D. D. (2000). Beyond valence in the 
perception of likelihood: The role of emotion specificity. Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology, 78, 397–416. 
 
 
de Quervain, D. J.-F., Fischbacher, U., Treyer, V., Schellhammer, M., Schnyder, U., 
Buck, A., & Fehr, E. (2004).  The neural basis of altruistic punishment.  Science, 
305, 1254-1258. 
 
DeGoey, P. (2000).  Contagious justice: Exploring the social construction of justice in 
organizations.  Research in Organizational Behavior, 22, 51-102.  Greenwhich, 
CT: JAI Press. 
 
Dellarocas, C. (2003).  The digitization of word of mouth: Promise and challenges of 
online feedback mechanisms.  Management Science, 49, 1407-1424. 
 
Deutsch, M. (1960).  The effect of motivational orientation upon trust and suspicion.  
Human Relations, 13, 123-140. 
 
Diamond, D. (1989).  Reputation acquisition in debt markets.  Journal of Political 
Economy, 97, 828-862. 
 
Diekmann, K. A., Tenbrunsel, A. E., & Galinsky, A. D. (2003).  From self-prediction to 
self-defeat:  Behavioral forecasting, self-fulfilling prophecies, and the effect of 
competitive expectations.  Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 85, 672-
683. 
 
Dunn, J. R., & Schweitzer, M. E. (2005).  Feeling and believing: The influence of 
emotion on trust.  Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 88, 736-748. 
 
Dutton, J. E., & Jackson, S. E. (1987).  Categorizing strategic issues:  Links to 
organizational action.  Academy of Management Review, 12, 76-90. 
 
Erikson, E. G. (1963).  Childhood and society.  New York: W. W. Norton. 
 
Erikson, E. G. (1980 [1959]).  Identity and the life cycle.  New York: Norton. 
 
Fehr, E., Fischbacher, U., & Gachter, S. (2002).  Strong reciprocity, human cooperation, 
and the enforcement of social norms.  Human Nature, 13, 1-25. 
 
Fehr, E., & Gachter, S. (2000).  Cooperation and punishment in public goods 
experiments.  American Economic Review, 90, 980-994. 
 
Fehr, E., & Gachter, S. (2002).  Altruistic punishment in humans.  Nature, 415, 137-140. 
 
  200
Fiske, S. T., & Neuberg, S. L. (1990).  A continuum model of impression formation, from 
category-based to individuating processes: Influence of information and 
motivation on attention and interpretation.  In M. P. Zanna (Ed.), Advances in 
experimental social psychology (Vol. 23, pp. 1-74).  San Diego, CA: Academic 
Press. 
 
Fiske, S. T., & Taylor, S. E. (1991).  Social cognition.  New York: McGraw-Hill.   
 
Fombrun, C. J. (1996).  Reputation: Realizing Value from the Corporate Image.  Boston: 
Harvard Business School Press. 
 
Fombrun, C. J., & Shanley, M. (1990).  What’s in a name?  Reputation building and 
corporate strategy.  Academy of Management Journal, 33, 233-258. 
 
Fombrun, C. J., & Zajac, E. J. (1987).  Structural and perceptual influences on 
intraindustry stratification.  Academy of Management Journal, 30, 33-50. 
 
Forgas, J. P. (1992).  Affect in social judgments and decisions: A multi-process model.  
In M. Zanna (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 25, pp. 227-
275).  San Diego, CA: Academic Press. 
 
Forgas, J. P. (1995).  Mood and judgment: The affect infusion model (AIM).  
Psychological Bulletin, 117, 39-66. 
 
Forgas, J. P., & George, J. M. (2001).  Affective influences on judgments and behavior in 
organizations: An information processing perspective.  Organizational Behavior 
and Human Decision Processes, 86, 3-34. 
 
Friedman, R. A., Anderson, C., Brett, J., Olekalns, M., Goates, N., & Lisco, C.  (2004).  
The positive and negative effects of anger on dispute resolution: Evidence from 
electronically-mediated disputes.  Journal of Applied Psychology, 89: 369-376. 
  
Gambetta, D. (1988).  Can we trust trust?  In D. G. Gambetta (Ed.), Trust: Making and 
breaking cooperative relations (pp. 49-72).  New York: Blackwell. 
 
Geertz, C. (1979).  Suq: The bazaar economy in Sefrou.  In C. Geertz, H. Geertz, & L. 
Rosen (Eds.), Meaning and order in Moroccan society.  New York: Cambridge 
University Press. 
 
Gintis, H. (2000).  Strong reciprocity and human sociality.  Journal of Theoretical 
Biology, 206, 169-179. 
  
Goates, N. & Friedman, R. A. (2006).  Under representation: Concession-making in 
negotiation when not negotiating for oneself.  Paper presented at the 2006 Annual 
Meeting of the Academy of Management, Atlanta, Georgia. 
 
  201
Gouldner, A. W. (1960).  The norm of reciprocity: A preliminary statement.  American 
Sociological Review, 25, 161-178. 
 
Granovetter, M. (1985).  Economic action and social structure: The problem of 
embeddedness.  American Journal of Sociology, 91, 481-510. 
 
Gurerk, O., Irlenbusch, B., & Rockenbach, B. (2006).  The competitive advantage of 
sanctioning institutions.  Science, 312, 108-111. 
 
Hamilton, D. L., & Sherman, J. W. (1994).  Stereotypes.  In R. S. Wyer, Jr. & T. K. Srull 
(Eds.), Handbook of social cognition (Vol. 2, 2nd ed., pp. 1-68).  Hillsdale, NJ: 
Erlbaum. 
 
Hardin, G. (1968).  The tragedy of the commons.  Science, 162, 1243-1248. 
 
Hardin, R. (1993).  The street-level epistemology of trust.  Politics and Society, 21, 505-
29. 
 
Hardin, R. (2001).  Conceptions and explanations of trust.  In K. S. Cook (Ed.), Trust in 
society.  New York: Sage. 
 
Harrison, B. (1989).  Assessing the damage: Practitioner perspectives on Valdez.  Public 
Relations Journal, 45, 40-45. 
 
Hastie, R. (1981).  Schematic principles in human memory.  In E. T. Higgins, C. P. 
Herman, & M. P. Zanna (Eds.), Social cognition: The Ontario symposium (Vol. 1, 
pp. 39-88).  Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. 
 
Hill, K. (2002).  Altruistic cooperation during foraging by the Ache, and the evolved 
human predisposition to cooperate.  Human Nature, 13, 105−128. 
 
Holmstrom, B. (1999).  Managerial incentive problems: A dynamic perspective.  Review 
of Economic Studies, 66, 169-182. 
 
Hutton, C. (1986).  America’s most admired corporations.  Fortune, January 6, 16-22. 
 
Issac, R. M., McCue, K., & Plott, C. R. (1985).  Public goods provision in an 
experimental environment.  Journal of Public Economics, 26, 51-74. 
 
James, L. & Brett, J. (1984).  Mediators, moderators, and test for mediation.  Journal of 
Applied Psychology, 69, 307-321. 
 
James, L. Mulaik, S., & Brett, J. (2006). A tale of two methods. Organizational Research 
Methods, 9, 233-244.   
 
  202
Johnson-George, C., & Swap, W. (1982).  Measurement of specific interpersonal trust: 
Construction and validation of a scale to assess trust in a specific other.  Journal 
of Personality and Social Psychology, 43, 1306-1317. 
 
Jones (1995).  Instrumental stakeholder theory: A synthesis of ethics and economics.  
Academy of Management Review, 20, 404-437. 
 
Jones, D. A., & Skarlicki, D. P. (2005).  The effects of overhearing peers discuss an 
authority’s fairness reputation on reactions to subsequent treatment.  Journal of 
Applied Psychology, 90, 363-372. 
 
Jones, N. A., & George, J. M. (1998).  The experience and evolution of trust: 
Implications for cooperation and teamwork.  Academy of Management Review, 
23, 531-546. 
 
Kahneman, D., Knetsch, J. L., & Thaler, R. H. (1986a).  Fairness and the assumptions of 
Economics.  Journal of Business, 59, S285-S300. 
 
Kahneman, D., Knetsch, J. L., & Thaler, R. H. (1986b).  Fairness as a constraint on profit 
seeking: Entitlements in the market.  American Economic Review, 76(4), 728-741. 
 
Kant, I. (1781, 1998).  Critique of Pure Reason.  New York: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Kaplin, H., Hill, J., Lancaster, J., & Hurtado, A. M. (2000).  A theory of human life 
history evolution: Diet, intelligence, and longevity.  Evolutionary Anthropology, 
9, 156-185. 
 
Kelly, H. H., & Stahelski, A. J. (1970).  The inference of intentions from moves in the 
prisoner’s dilemma game.  Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 6, 401-
419. 
 
Kelly, H. K., & Michela, J. L. (1980).  Attribution theory and research.  Annual Review of 
Psychology, 31, 457-501. 
 
King-Casas, B., Tomlin, D., Anen, C., Camerer, C. F., Quartz, S. R., & Montague, P. R. 
(2005).  Getting to know you: Reputation and trust in a two-person economic 
exchange.  Science, 308, 78-83. 
 
Kleine, R. E., III, Kleine, S. S., & Kernan, J. B. (1993).  Mundane consumption and the 
self: A social-identity perspective.  Journal of Consumer Psychology, 2, 209-235. 
 
Kramer, R. M. (1999).  Trust and distrust in organizations: Emerging perspectives, 
enduring questions.  Annual Review of Psychology, 50, 569-598. 
 
  203
Kramer, R. M., & Brewer, M. B. (1984).  Effects of group identity on resource use in a 
simulated commons dilemma.  Journal of Personality and Social psychology, 46, 
1044-1057. 
 
Kreps, D. M. (1990).  Corporate culture and economic theory.  In J. Alt & K. Shepsle 
(Eds.), Perspectives on positive political economy.  Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
 
Leary, M. R. (1995).  Self-presentation: Impression management and interpersonal 
behavior.  Boulder, CO: Westview Press. 
 
Leimar, O., & Hammerstein, P. (2001).  Evolution of cooperation through indirect 
reciprocity.  Proceedings of the Royal Society: Biological Sciences, 268, 745-753. 
 
Lerner, J. S., Small, D. A., & Loewenstein, G. (2004). Heart strings and purse strings: 
Carry-over effects of emotions on economic decisions. Psychological Science, 15, 
337–341. 
 
Levine, D. K. (1998).  Modeling altruism and spitefulness in experiments.  Review of 
Economic Dynamics, 1, 593-622. 
 
Lewicki, R. J., & Buncker, B. B. (1995).  Trust in relationships:  A model of trust 
development and decline.  In B. B. Bunker & J. Z. Rubin (Eds.), Conflict, 
cooperation, and justice (pp. 133-173).  San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. 
 
Lewis, J. D., & Weigert, A. (1985).  Trust as a social reality.  Social Forces, 63, 967-985. 
 
Lieberman, J. K. (1981).  The Litigious Society.  New York: Basic Books. 
 
Lind, E. A., Kray, L., & Thompson, L. (1998).  The social construction of injustice: 
Fairness judgements in response to own and others’ unfair treatment by 
authorities.  Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 75, 1-22. 
  
Lotem, A., Fishman, M. A., & Stone, L. (1999).  Evolution of cooperation between 
individuals.  Nature, 400, 226-227. 
 
Luhmann, N. (1988).  Familiarity, confidence, trust:  Problems and alternatives.  In D. G. 
Gambetta (Ed.), Trust:  Making and breaking cooperative relations (pp. 94-107).  
New York: Basil Blackwell. 
 
Maggi, G. (1999).  The role of multilateral institutions in international trade cooperation.  
The American Economic Review, 89, 190-214. 
 
Malhotra, D. (2004).  Trust and reciprocity decisions:  The differing perspectives of 
trustors and trusted parties.  Organizational Behavior and Human Decision 
Processes, 94, 61-73. 
  204
 
Malhotra, D. & Murnigham, J. K. (2002).  The effects of contracts on interpersonal trust.  
Administrative Science Quarterly, 47, 534-559. 
 
Markus, H. (1977).  Self-schemata and processing information about the self.  Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 35, 63-78. 
 
Markus, H., & Zajonc, R. B. (1985).  The cognitive perspective in social psychology.  In 
G. Lindzey & E. Aronson (Eds.), Handbook of social psychology (Vol. 1, pp. 137-
230).  New York: Random House. 
  
Mayer, R. C., Davis, J. H., & Schoorman, F. D. (1995).  An integrative model of 
organizational trust.  Academy of Management Review, 20, 709-734. 
 
McCabe, K. A., Rigdon, M. L., & Smith, V. L. (2003).  Positive reciprocity and 
intentions in trust games.  Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 52, 
267-275. 
 
McGuire, J. B., Schneeweis, T., & Branch, B. (1990).  Perceptions of firm quality: A 
cause or result of firm performance.  Journal of Management, 16, 167-180. 
 
Meyer, J. W. & Rowan, B. (1977).  Institutionalized organizations: Formal structure as 
myth and ceremony.  American Journal of Sociology, 83, 340-363. 
 
Milinski, M., Semmann, D., & Krambeck, H. J.  (2002).  Reputation helps solve the 
‘tragedy of the commons’.  Nature, 415, 424-426. 
 
Miller, A. & Glick, D. (1993, June 28).  The great Pepsi panic.  Newsweek, p. 32. 
 
Monroe, K. R., Hankin, J., & Van Vechten, R. B. (2000).  The psychological foundations 
of identity politics.  Annual Review of Political Science, 3, 419-447. 
 
Naquin, C.E., & Paulson, G.D. (2003).  Online bargaining and interpersonal trust.  
Journal of Applied Psychology, 88, 113-120. 
 
Neale, M. A., & Bazerman, M. H. (1991).  Cognition and Rationality in Negotiation.  
New York: Free Press. 
 
Nelson, P. (1970).  Information and consumer behavior.  Journal of Political Economy, 
78, 311-329. 
 
Neu, D. (1991).  Trust, contracting, and the prospectus process.  Accounting, 
Organization and Society, 16, 243-256. 
 
Nowak, M. A. & Sigmund, K. (1998a).  The evolution of indirect reciprocity by image 
scoring.  Nature, 393, 573-577. 
  205
 
Nowak, M. A. & Sigmund, K.  (1998b).  The dynamics of indirect reciprocity.  Journal 
of Theoretical Biology, 194, 561-574. 
  
O’Connor, K. M., & Arnold, J. A. (2001).  Distributive spirals: Negotiation impasses and 
the moderating effects of disputant self-efficacy.  Organizational Behavior and 
Human Decision Processes, 84, 148-176. 
 
O’Connor, K. M., Arnold, J. A., & Burris, E. R. (2005).  Negotiators’ bargaining histories 
and their effects on future negotiation performance.  Journal of Applied 
Psychology, 90, 350-362. 
 
Orbell, J. M., & Dawes, R. M. (1991).  A ‘cognitive miser’ theory of cooperators’ 
advantage.  American Political Science Review, 85, 515-528. 
 
Orbell, J. M. & Dawes, R. M. (1993).  Social welfare, cooperators’ advantage, and the 
option of not playing the game.  American Sociological Review, 58, 787-800. 
 
Orlitzky, M., Schmidt, F. L., & Rynes, S. L. (2003).  Corporate social and financial 
performance: A meta-analysis.  Organization Studies, 24, 403-441. 
 
Ostrom, E. (2002).  Toward a behavioral theory linking trust, reciprocity, and reputation.  
In E. Ostrom & J. Walker (Eds.), Trust and reciprocity: Interdisciplinary lessons 
from experimental research.  New York: Sage. 
 
Ostrom, E., Walker, J., & Gardner, R. (1992).  Covenants with and without a sword:  
Self-governance is possible.  American Political Science Review, 86, 404-417. 
 
Perry, J. (1975).  The problem of personal identity.  In J. Perry (Ed.), Personal identity, 
pp. 3-32.  Berkeley: University of California Press. 
 
Pillutla, M. M., Malhotra, D., & Murnighan, J. K. (2003).  Attributions of trust and the 
calculus of reciprocity.  Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 39, 448-455. 
 
Pruitt, D. G., & Carnevale, P. J. (1993).  Negotiation in social conflict.  Pacific Grove, 
CA: Brooks/Cole. 
 
Radaev, V. (2004).  Coping with distrust in emerging Russian markets. In R. Hardin 
(Ed.), Distrust.  New York: Sage. 
 
Resnick, P. & Zeckhauser, R. (2001).  Trust among strangers in internet transactions: 
Empirical analysis of eBay’s reputation system.  Unpublished manuscript 
presented for review by NBER workshop participants, University of Michigan. 
 
Resnick, P., Zeckhauser, R., Friedman, E., & Kuwabara, K. (2000).  Reputation systems.  
Communications of the ACM, 12, 45-48. 
  206
 
Ring, S. M., & Van de Ven, A. (1992).  Structuring cooperative relationships between 
organizations.  Strategic Management Journal, 13, 483-498. 
 
Ross, L., & Nisbett, R. (1991).  The person and the situation.  New York: McGraw-Hill. 
 
Rousseau, D., Sitkin, S., Burt, R., & Camerer, C. (1998).  Not so different after all: A 
cross-discipline view of trust.  Academy of Management Review, 23, 393-404. 
 
Schank, R. C. & Abelson, R. P. (1977).  Scripts, Plans, Goals and Understanding:  An 
Inquiry into Human Knowledge Structures.  Hillsdale, New Jersey: Erlbaum. 
 
Schwarz, N. (1990).  Feelings as information: Informational and motivational functions 
of affective states.  In E. Higgins & R. Sorrentino (Eds.), Handbook of motivation 
and cognition: Foundations of social behavior (Vol. 2, pp. 527-561).  New York: 
Guilford Press. 
 
Schwarz, N., & Clore, G. L. (1988).  How do I feel about it? Informative functions of 
affective states.  In K. Fiedler & J. Forgas (Eds.), Affect, cognition, and social 
behavior (pp. 44-62).  Toronto: Hogrefe International. 
 
Shapiro, D., Sheppard, B. H., & Cheraskin, L. (1992).  Business on a handshake.  
Negotiation Journal, 8, 623-658. 
 
Smith, C. A., & Ellsworth, P. C. (1985).  Patterns of cognitive appraisal in emotion.  
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 48, 813-838. 
 
Snijders, C., & Keren, G. (1999).  Determinats of trust.  In D. V. Budescu & I. Erev 
(Eds.), Games and human behavior:  Essays in honor of Amnon Rapoport (pp. 
355-385).  Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc. 
 
Staw, B. M. & Epstein, L. D. (2000).  What bandwagons bring:  Effects of popular 
management techniques on corporate performance, reputation, and CEO pay.  
Administrative Science Quarterly, 45, 523-556. 
 
Tinsley, C. H., O’Connor, K. M., & Sullivan, B. A. (2002).  Tough guys finish last: The 
perils of a distributive reputation.  Organizational Behavior and Human Decision 
Processes, 88, 621-645. 
 
Trivers, R. L. (1971).  The evolution of reciprocal altruism.  Quarterly Review of biology, 
46, 35-57. 
 
Vallacher, R. R., & Wegner, D. M. (1989).  Levels of personal agency: Individual 
variation in action identification.  Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 
57, 660-671. 
 
  207
Van Kleef, G. A., De Dreu, C. W. & Manstead, A. S. R. (2004). The interpersonal effects 
of emotions in negotiations: A motivated information processing approach. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 87, 510-528. 
 
Watson, D., Clark, L. A., & Tellegen, A. (1988).  Development and validation of brief 
measures of positive and negative affect: The PANAS scales.  Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 54, 1063-1070. 
 
Wedekind, C. & Braithwaite, V. A. (2002).  The long-term benefits of human generosity 
in indirect reciprocity.  Current Biology, 12, 1012-1015. 
 
Williamson, O. E. (1993).  Calculativeness, trust and economic organization.  Journal of 
Law and Economics, 30, 131-145. 
 
Wilson, R. (1985).  Reputations in games and markets.  In A. Roth (Ed.), Game-
Theoretic Models of Bargaining (pp. 27-62).  Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge 
University Press. 
 
Worchel, P. (1979).  Trust and distrust.  In W. G. Austin & S. Worchel (Eds.), The social 
psychology of intergroup relations (pp. 174-187).  Belmont, CA: Wadsworth. 
 
Yamagishi, T. (1986).  The provision of a sanctioning system as a public good.  Journal 
of Personality and Social Psychology, 51, 110-116. 
 
Yamagishi, T. & Yamagishi, M. (1994).  Trust and commitment in the United States and 
Japan.  Motivation and Emotion, 18, 129-166. 
 
